

THE
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

MARCH, 1858.

ART. I. — UNUSED POWERS.

The Dietetics of the Soul. By ERNEST VON FEUCHTERSLEBEN,
M. D. New York : C. S. Francis & Co. Boston : Crosby, Nich-
ols, & Co.

THIS little book is the most suggestive instance of what may be called "practical metaphysics" that has recently appeared. It treats of the laws of health, with especial reference to mental phenomena. The effect of the passions on the organization; the influence of imagination on the nervous fluid; how temperaments modify character, and the nature and treatment of hypochondriasis, — are among the subjects discussed, with a sympathy that renders them attractive, and a mingled knowledge of facts and love of philosophy which give the essay a singular value. As a manual for the irresolute victims of *ennui* and the *hypo*, it is excellent; as an exposition of many neglected laws of life and sanity, it is somewhat too fragmentary, and takes for granted a degree of scientific information and a power of reflection hardly to be looked for in the average and undisciplined reader. Yet, with these defects, it is, for a work of the kind, remarkably pleasing in style and useful in its appeals to consciousness. We have known physicians commend it to their more intelligent nervous patients with good results.

The subject embraced in "The Dietetics of the Soul" is too extensive for analysis in a brief review; but there is one idea constantly prominent in this work, in which consists the practical value of the whole, and on this we shall venture to enlarge: the power of self-control and guidance resident in the will, as regards individual development. Our author sets out with the proposition, that "the happiness or misery of the individual depends on the deeply-marked impressions or conceptions of his own mind"; he then defines the functions of imagination and the will. "By no act of consciousness," he says, "can we escape consciousness itself, but we can excite or yield to certain dispositions within ourselves"; and by a series of arguments he indicates how, through wise self-culture, a man becomes "wrapped in gentle thoughts, advances with steady purpose, his eye is fixed with clearness on the world around him, and his forces, actions, and enjoyments are harmoniously fused." In comparing the philosophy of this charming little essay with actual life around us, we are struck with the incomplete mental activity, the small amount of moral experience, realized among us, and are prompted to say a word on the subject of *unused powers* as the American defect in the prevalent "Dietetics of the Soul."

Positive calamity is the exception, not the rule, of human life. In the retrospect of threescore years, men of average experience designate the misfortunes of their career as special events, occurring generally at long intervals. An illness, a bereavement, or a bankruptcy throws here and there a deep shadow over a picture otherwise serene if not cheerful. Doubtless the amount and degree of actual enjoyment is graduated by individual temperament. The anxious and the buoyant take life in quite a diverse mood, and sensitiveness and hardihood equalize the apparent caprice of fortune; still, with these and other allowances, it may safely be declared of modern civilization, that the mere outward condition and vicissitudes of life do not explain the prevalent unhappiness. Within the large, and, in this country at least, prosperous sphere of the middle class,—of those whose pecuniary means are adequate to all the essential comforts and many of the luxuries of life, whose intelligence is cultivated, and whose social posi-

tion is honorable, — there is found a remarkable discontent, restlessness, and absence of that repose of manner, mind, and feeling which should result from circumstances on the whole favorable to enjoyment. Various names are given to this dissatisfaction; it is called nervousness in one, *ennui* in another; this young man, we are told, is *blasé*, that matron delicate; to-day the evil is called “the blues,” to-morrow, neuralgia; at one time it is attributed to the climate, and at another to a peculiar organization; change of scene is recommended by the physician, change of heart by the clergyman; recourse is had to public amusements, to charitable enterprise, to hydropathy, homœopathy, novel-reading, a voyage, the marvellous, the laborious, the diverting, the speculative, and such social excitements as are available to the patients. It is on this vague and ill-defined, but real, want of humanity, this intangible self-dissatisfaction, this chronic unrest and weariness of mind, that quackery, superstition, and fashionable absurdity banquet, at the expense of what is most genuine and capable in human nature. After exhausting the absolute causes of the phenomena thus indicated, — those which may be detected in the constitutional peculiarities, the vocations, and the circumstances of individuals, — after accepting the explanation which infringement of physical laws affords, there remains, in the last analysis, a balance not accounted for. And it is this residuum of causeless unhappiness which is peculiar to our times. The men and women of an earlier day were too busy or too much in earnest, too unconscious or too insensible, to experience it, at least to the same extent. Was it that life was so full of actual good and evil to them, the heart so absorbed in its own passions, time so fleet to their consciousness? Has the multiplicity of means rendered us too susceptible to the ends of life, so that contemplation breeds evils once absorbed by action, and instead of Othellos and Macbeths, with loves and ambitions developed by intense and incessant realities, we are Hamlets, — for ever turning the soul’s eye inward, and watching the very heart-throbs which, in a healthy life, should be lost to consciousness? The problem is too wide to be briefly solved; but there is one explanation of the evil in question which deserves more attention

than it has received from either divine, metaphysician, or philanthropist. A vast amount of the unhappiness so obvious among the educated and prosperous of our day is to be directly ascribed to Unused Powers.

It is a remarkable coincidence, and one which signally illustrates the great law of compensation, that, while the discoveries of modern science have abridged physical toil, and thereby essentially ameliorated the outward condition of humanity, the leisure thus secured, the immunity from muscular effort, the superior domestic arrangements, have, at the same time, given occasion to morbid consciousness and nervous susceptibility,—in other words, to an overplus of unused powers. Steam, as a motive power, has in a great measure done away with the equestrian and pedestrian habits which invigorated a less favored generation; and, by bringing distant communities near and making people gregarious, has diminished both the occasion and the motive to individuality of purpose and feeling. The necessity of labor is vastly lessened by mechanism, and that of observation by journalism; but in the same ratio mental and moral idiosyncrasies have been developed. Material civilization is incredibly advanced; healthful enjoyment and rational activity almost in equal proportion diminished. The manly and the womanly elements of character are dwarfed by the luxury and utilitarian instinct of the age. As life becomes more complex, it is less earnest; sympathy, once concentrated, is now diffused; to know a little of everything, and profoundly nothing, to feel casually and not intensely, is the average standard; and it results, from all this, that special gifts and sentiments are turned aside or overlaid, and the individual fails to exercise the powers wherein his or her best good consists, and is often drawn into a current of life uncongenial and inadequate. The strong bias of a dominant instinct is, therefore, a blessing; artists, in the most genuine sense of the term, are proverbially harmonious, because they are suffered to live in the vocation for which nature endowed them. Nature, society, books,—these are the great resources to keep in due proportion the powers taxed so partially by the division of labor and the exigencies of life; no one who loves nature finds a country life irksome; no one

who loves intelligent companionship and honest sympathy of heart, need grow arid and selfish unless cut off from society. No one with a catholic taste for reading is justified in complaining of the barrenness of experience. Books, wisely used, atone for the deficiencies of the actual; to such readers as Lamb, Hazlitt, and Montaigne they were, as the latter calls them, "the best viaticum": "*L'habitude de vivre dans un monde imaginaire leur inspire des preventions contre tout ce qui se passe dans le monde réel; les événements de la vie ne leur semblent jamais dignes d'occuper leur ame, ce n'est jamais cela qu'elles attendent pour éclater.*" Yet exclusive retiracy and absorption in this direction again bring up the protest of unused powers. Elia well says we may lose ourselves in another man's mind as well as in his grounds; and unless recourse is had to nature, either through sentiment in Wordsworth's spirit, or through science with the delectable relish of White of Selborne, the wisest page is insalubrious; and more imperative often than either the consolation of books or nature is the social need. The experiments in solitary confinement, as a punishment, have fully shown how vital to man is contact with his kind; and there are organizations among the richest and noblest that seem actually inspired by and dependent on the right kind of society. You will see a fair and gifted woman, pale, indifferent, aimless, — too intellectual to find content in housekeeping, shopping, dress, and gossip, — too refined for coarse, too sincere for artificial pleasures, — surrounded perhaps by only material people, and allied to the conventional and unaspiring. Let a kindred mind, a soul attuned to the same lofty key, draw near, and what a change in this passive, dormant being! Color steals to lip and cheek, mobility relaxes elongated muscles, the beaming light of intelligent recognition kindles the eye, and the smile of conscious affinity plays round the mouth; her nature expands, radiates, and is vivified, because her unused powers, that hung as a doom or craved like moral hunger, now quicken into genial activity both soul and body. "*Le genres bien organisés,*" writes Madame Girardin, "*savent réunir la profondeur dans le sentiment et la légèreté dans l'esprit.*" But this ideal is only to be realized through social privileges; and the want of

them is one of the greatest hindrances to the legitimate development of superior women, who, from their limited range and false education, are the peculiar victims of unused powers.

The process of reading itself illustrates the want to which it so conveniently ministers. Few relish fiction more than those accustomed to severe professional labor or devoted to affairs; and when desultory reading is applied to as a resource by those in the prime of their mental energies, it soon grows wearisome, unless associated with a specific inquiry or pursued with an object beyond that of casual entertainment. The charm of society becomes irksome, if it does not alternate with seclusion; those talk with the greatest zest whose minds are familiar with the recuperative influence of meditation. The same instinct is apparent when a peculiar style of life or occupation is earnestly adopted. Recent examination has shown that, when the Emperor Charles sought the austerities of monastic retirement, he varied its religious offices with gastronomic and other diversions; Michel Angelo laid aside his chisel, so intent upon sublime conceptions, to observe "the harmless comedy of life"; from the refinements of ideal maternity Raphael fled to the embrace of human affection; Sir Isaac Newton blended the abstraction of a philosopher with the vigilance of a domestic economist; and Alfieri rose from his severe dramatic toil to indulge in feats of horsemanship.

One of the most striking truths, indeed, revealed in biography, is the absolute need of entire activity in the functions of the mind,—the action and reaction of every sentiment and gift of our nature; each, when over-exerted, produces a morbid state of feeling, and when totally neglected asserts itself with a vehement or incongruous force. Nature instinctively and continuously aims at completeness; life and its economies work in the contrary direction; hence the vacuums in the moral atmosphere, the inward struggles for an equilibrium of the faculties,—the melancholy and hushed cry of unsatisfied desire. Let loose the votary of a limited pursuit, and to what an opposite sphere his mind instantly reverts! The favorite topic of seamen on the ocean is rural life; we have never known a shipmaster, however fond of his profession, whose dream of the future was not a place in the country and the

oversight of acres and herds. Statesmen, too, from the not less agitated sea of politics, look forward to and rejoice in the same ideal. An overplus of ratiocination drove Dr. Johnson to his cat and conviviality; a reaction from the intensity of reflective emotion inspired Byron to fight in Greece. There are no hills to satisfy the instinct for the picturesque in the Low Countries, and therefore the Dutch sought in color what nature denied them in form, and made up by the variegated splendor of their tulips for the absence of scenic diversity; London authors and artists create the most vivid interiors and pay the most subtle homage to nature under a cloudy sky and in a humid air, while the tropical genius, bathed in the luxuries of climate, expends its energy in superstition and vague fantasies; Paul Jones, the hero of desperate maritime battles, loved Thomson's Seasons; Bonaparte, whose greatest skill lay in material success, found his literary recreations in the wild rhapsodies of Ossian. It has become a proverb in France, that the women most successful in the *salon* end their career by the most rigorous devotion. Metaphysical Kant cheered himself with birds, and our most laborious and venerable jurist used to steal away to the barn, and, recumbent on a haymow, watch the swallows in the eaves. Washington's first letters, after he had sheathed his sword and retired to Mount Vernon, allude to the strange feeling with which he awoke in the morning and realized that he had no march to plan, forage to supply, and military or civil duties to methodize; and he soon began a systematic agricultural life as a substitute for national duties. Sydney Smith talked nonsense after writing a chapter of moral philosophy; and Edmund Kean used to turn somersets after performing Lear, while Matthews, having kept the Park Theatre in a roar all the evening, would cross the river and take a lonely midnight walk, absorbed in melancholy reverie, along its banks. Thus instinctively do select intelligences and strong characters seek the relief of contrast, and so preserve the wholesome balance of the mind and escape the consequences of unused powers, such as drive weaker temperaments to despair or absurdity. Had Cowper travelled, married, or been to a water-cure, instead of merging his exquisite sensibility in the theological

mazes of Newton's creed; had Kirke White developed his muscles as well as his sentiment, and trenched his tenderness within the bulwarks of severe dialectic; had Haydon forgotten himself in admiration of others, bowed meekly to Nature and Providence, instead of clinging to the pivot of egotism, had he diffused by sympathy instead of concentrating on selfhood the passion for art, — who doubts that, in each instance, the tone of mental health, the integrity of life and thought, might have been prolonged, if not kept intact? The favorable influence of travel upon health is owing to the variety it insures, the immunity from stagnation of any prominent human faculty. It was through sentiment that Rousseau, and through will that Alfieri, achieved their triumphs of genius; and the excess of each element in them caused all the practical errors and moral conflict under which they suffered. Coleridge dreamed too much, Southey was too devoted to his library, Wordsworth was too unsympathetic and insulated in his life and taste, for completeness of development; and to these causes may be ascribed their imperfections. Unused powers vindicate their natural rights sooner or later in the highly gifted as well as in the average of mankind. One of our fellow-passengers on a sea-voyage lost his spirits a week after embarking, and excited our sympathy by an indescribable discomfort of mood that began to undermine health and equanimity. The surgeon was puzzled to account for his condition on physical grounds, and declared the case unique. At last we missed him for hours from the deck, and when he reappeared it was with his old vivacity and genial content. He informed us with glee that he had discovered his ailment: he had been suffering for a problem to solve, and had foregone his usual mathematical exercise unconsciously. Euclid and La Place kept him well for the rest of the voyage; in other words, his unused powers were brought into play. It is an anomalous condition for an ardent sense of the beautiful to exist without faith. Such was the state of an artist who could find no satisfaction in the ministrations of religion, and endeavored while cultivating ideal perfection in form and color to forget his disbelief in immortality. The want of harmony thus induced acted on his sensitive organization, and made

his enjoyment of life spasmodic instead of normal. Entering his studio after a long interval, we found him seated with a book in his hand, and an expression of lofty serenity; one could see, at a glance, that the disturbance within was adjusted, that the elements were no longer in conflict; his cherished visions had now an illimitable perspective, his beautiful and evanescent fancies an eternal background; he could dwell upon both with hopeful complacency. Swedenborg had given impulse and scope to secret cravings and religious sentiments long set aside and ignored. What a picture of unused powers has Balzac wrought from provincial life in France, and what a diagnosis of the effect upon human nature in the virgin isolation of Eugenie Grandet and the too exclusively parental devotion of Père Goriot! They are psychological studies in this regard. This analytic delineator hints at a large class of men who are philosophers enough to avoid the neglect or over-exercise of special faculties, without even the motive of ambition or self-confidence; he speaks of "*l'homme découragé mais sans dégoût et qui persiste plus pour employer ses facultés, que dans l'espoir d'un douteux triomphe.*"

But there is a striking provision in nature against a perverse self-monopoly. Where there is concentrated thought or emotion, as in the philosophic and poetic character, we almost invariably find a gift or love of humor; the play of the mind which is thus insured saves it from morbid excess in a serious direction. Nearly all great writers who appeal strongly to reflection and sentiment have combined humor and pathos. Shakespeare, the best English bards and novelists, the most delicate and intense artists, — Burns, Cowper, Hood, and Lamb, — the most complete and genial men, — Sir Thomas More, Jeremy Taylor, Sydney Smith, — are familiar examples. The grim truth of Hogarth, the trenchant satire of Swift, and the classic precision of Addison, are each modified in the same way. These opposite and alternate elements co-operate to prevent the mischief of unused powers in genius; and where this is not the case, the popular impression is narrowed. Dante, Molière, and Tasso claim less universality; the first from an exclusive and solemn intensity, the second because of the entire absence of the tragic, and the third from the un-

varied chivalry of his strain. Humor is the natural accompaniment of intellectual force, to which it serves as contrast and refreshment. So also when volition is suspended by sleep, or the imagination allowed to act, unused powers assert their neglected claims, and find in dreams and what is called castle-building — *chateaux d'Espagne* — compensation for the denial imposed by routine, voluntary abnegation, or unfavorable circumstances.

Statistics prove that insanity, and especially monomania, has increased in this country in the ratio of its prosperity. The love of gain, political ambition, and religious fanaticism are the predominant moral causes of this melancholy result; and to the over-exercise of the acquisitive propensities and gross neglect of the higher sentiments we can, in the majority of instances, directly trace mental disease. But an illustration of the effect of unused powers is equally manifest in the hypochondriac state of our men of business when they venture upon the hazardous experiment of retiring to enjoy their fortunes. What restless wanderers they become abroad! Unable to fix attention on the resources which European travel opens to cultivated taste and scientific inquiry, they seek excitement in the affectation of the connoisseur, in incessant locomotion or gross material pleasure, all the time pining for the routine of the warehouse or the speculations of the Exchange. The sentiments of reverence and love of beauty, the noble passion for abstract truth, the charms which beguile the naturalist, have been too long repudiated; only the bustle of affairs and the chances of the stock-market represent life to their consciousness; the unused powers of their souls, with the amplest opportunity for exercise, lack the freshness and adaptation which comes only from habit. After all the expedients of the materia medica and available hygiene had been exhausted in behalf of an American millionaire, who, at the age of sixty, had safely invested his property, built himself a palatial dwelling, and ensconced himself in a splendid library, to be serene and happy, — and found in his luxurious arrangement, only the leisure which made him aware for the first time that his digestion was not perfect and his nerves unstrung, — the family physician, one morning, told him of an enterprise just

broached whereby a tract of waste land on the outskirts of the city was to be transformed into eligible streets. The languid muscles about the invalid's mouth all at once grew firm, the eye brightened, and the weary brain, so long deprived of its wonted stimulus, was roused to calculations, estimates, speculation. The doctor advised his patient to engage in the new project; and, in a month, he was as cheerful and vigorous as ever.

Society is full of unconscious victims to self-love and want of sympathy. The man who, by study and reflection, makes his mind a kingdom, vainly flatters himself with the idea of his own independence; sooner or later comes from within "the cry of the human"; and scholars crowned with fame, like Madame de Staël, in the desolation of ungratified affections, confess their lives have been a long sigh. Childless women, not obliged to busy themselves with a *menage*, and without strong intellectual proclivities, form a corps of nervous patients, who make fortunes for agreeable physicians and idols of their clergymen. What Byron called "entusymusy" is the safety-valve of their unused powers. How Boone shrunk from the advancing tide of emigration which levelled the forest where his nature found so genial a home; how Audubon, in his last days, pined for the woodland and seashore which his feathered idols haunted; how pathetic the image of Scott, the tear on his manly cheek, because enfeebled nature warned him that his occupation was gone; how sadly Gibbon paced the acacia walk of his garden at Lausanne, when the last line of his long historic labor was written; and how Napoleon, dying in his island prison, raved of the bivouac and the charge! These familiar instances prove how intimately happiness depends on legitimate activity.

"Le bonheur était là," says La Touch, "sur ce même rocher d'où nous sommes tous deux partis pour le chercher." Thus romance brings us back to the starting-point of reality. The greatest of domestic torments is the man with nothing to do. His unused powers revenge themselves by an *ennui* that disheartens, or a microscopic tyranny that aggravates, his family. We sometimes find taste, method, wisdom, and benevolence in a dwelling, and yet the atmosphere lacks a vital element. Pres-

ently a child appears there, and then those gentler sympathies and tender ministries which its advent calls forth reveal the before unused powers of humanity which caused the shadow and the need. Two friends may abide together in manly confidence, reciprocally stimulate each other's intellects, and cheer the hours of leisure with mutual amity; yet a certain ungracious spirit will generally indicate the want of a womanly presence, whereby harsh attributes are refined, selfishness exorcised, and the noble heart touched to finer issues. The limited and artificial forms of character we encounter are so many fossil results of unused powers. Women become enamelled through the exercise of vanity at the expense of tenderness. Bigots, coquettes, pedants, egotists, demagogues, what are they but confirmed instances of the perverse indulgence of certain natural qualities and the practical repudiation of others? The one-sided and the incomplete abound. The liberal in opinion, which is but another way of describing those who reach a wide circle of truth by the free and varied use of their minds,—the enjoyable in temper, which means those who have broad and active sympathies,—the benign in spirit, which is equivalent to "loving much,"—are what they are by virtue of habitually using all their moral powers. Strong natures invariably seek compensation when external relations forbid this universality of emotion. Witness the memoirs of a girl lately published, whose masculine grasp of life in fiction—of its passions, sins, energy, and triumph—was attained by reaction on an isolated, joyless, and baffled existence. "*Depuis de siècles,*" writes Madame Girardin, "*on se figure que le bonheur est une grosse pierre qu'il est impossible de trouver, que l'on cherche mais sans esperance. Point du tout; le bonheur c'est une mosaïque composée de mille petites pieces qui, séparément et par elles mêmes ont peu de valeur, mais qui réunies avec art forment un dessin gracieux.*" And the material of this mosaic is as varied as the phases of thought and sentiment, all of which must be contributed towards the perfect result. Unused powers leave blank and cold spaces in the picture.

Even national defects originate chiefly in unused powers. The long civic inertness to which the Italians have been consigned by despotic rule, habitually restraining executive tal-

ents and fostering evasive instincts, has kept in abeyance those faculties which find scope in public duty, and brought into sad relief minute, superficial, and limited views, making intrigue take the place of comprehensive and frank development. The inordinate self-dependence and material activity of our young Western communities, on the other hand, deaden reverence and ideality. We once asked a prosperous emigrant from the East, who in college had given promise of a high and refined intellectuality, what was the result to his nature of ten years' residence in one of those new and flourishing towns of the West. "As regards what is called success," he replied, "my wildest dreams have been more than realized; but when I think what I am now and was when I left New England, I shudder at the eclipse of those mental aspirations which invested consciousness with a kind of prophetic glory." Luxury in France has bred an invincible trust in money, to acquire which the old chivalric tone of the Gallic mind has been subdued to a material level that thrives on *finesse*. What Emerson calls the "pluck" of the English character, by overlaying the sympathetic, has made ungraciously prominent the self-preserving and self-asserting qualities. Give play to manly energy in the Italian, to taste and veneration in the American, to magnanimity and truth in the French, and to humane refinement in the British character,—in a word, call into action their unused powers as a national impulse, and the same complete and grateful charm which we sometimes celebrate in individuals would redeem and glorify a people. Wherever a memorable perfection lingers around a class or nation, an era or a man, we can easily trace it to a generous and harmonious exercise of the soul. Longevity, imperishable trophies, felicitous habitudes, mark the artists of the fifteenth century, because their high calling was no isolated aim, but linked with and inspired by the interests and the sentiment of nationality and religion. Absolute endowments, local beauty, and public sympathy,—all that is loved and honored among men, all that is auspicious to life, both of body and mind,—the sanction of faith, the love of work, the amenities of clime and society,—all conspired to evoke and to celebrate the triumphs and the toils of Art. Grecian civ-

ilization is in this respect an immortal precedent. There muscle and mind, the form and the intuitions of man, the athlete, the statue, the language, seminal principles of government, philosophy, art, discipline, simultaneously exemplified the wisdom, the health, and the beauty of exercising all the powers; and had the Beatitudes raised the moral and religious to the plane attained by the intellectual and physical, this highest of ancient civilizations would not have collapsed through unused powers, — those holiest of all powers which are fostered and conserved by Christianity. How many grand interests — maritime discovery kindling the imagination, national growth awakening patriotism, dawning science quickening intellect, prowess and passion incited by free and earnest social conditions — united to awaken the genius and enrich the manhood of England in Elizabeth's age! There was a call upon all the powers, and large natures could scarcely avoid their use. Bacon was not only a chancellor, but a philosopher and an essayist; Raleigh was not only an admiral, but a statesman and an annalist; Sidney not only wielded a sword, but struck a lyre; and, as if to mirror in one broad and eternal picture the wide activity and universal humanity then projected into coming time, Shakespeare unfolded in the drama all the experience that life includes, and all the powers it enlists and illustrates.

The degrees of civilization may, indeed, be fairly tested by the residuum of unused powers; the inactivity of the provident instincts sealed the fate of the aborigines of this continent when their vast hunting-grounds were invaded by the Anglo-Saxons. Art and domestic economy have been stationary for ages in China, because imitation supersedes invention, and the sense of beauty is so utterly unused that discordant sounds and grotesque forms and costumes are national. The neglect of forethought makes whole classes of people vagabonds in the midst of highly civilized lands: witness the Irish, the Italian lazzaroni, and the Gypsies, once so common in England. Isolation and antagonism, by destroying confidence, have identified the very name of Jew with self-interest and extortion; and the proverbial spirit of intrigue in the old Venetian character sprang from the repudiation of

all candor in their political system. It is proverbial in Palermo that the most copious gossip is dispensed at the convents, a natural reaction from a life of seclusion from the world to minute and incessant curiosity about its most frivolous doings. The rise of Methodism in England was nothing more than the spontaneous outbreak of natural religious feeling long unused, by reason of the conventional pressure of an established ceremonial; and the astonishing spread of what is called "Spiritualism" in this country is one of those inevitable protests consequent upon the neglected powers of human nature, — a protest against that life-long bondage to material interests which keeps unused, in so many hearts, the conscious, earnest, and personal instinct of spiritual affinities. Christianity itself is the divine appeal to what is highest and most sacred in man; and it is because self-denial, benevolence, love, and faith are powers unused in comparison with the selfish and the lower instincts, that there exists a moral necessity for the unremitted invocation of these uncherished endowments through nature and art, the discipline of life, and the hope of immortality. The venerable in architecture, the beautiful in painting, the impressive in music, the convincing in books, and the eloquent in speech, — the English cathedral, the Italian Holy Family, the German oratorio, the Tyrolese hospice, the Alpine cross, — Savonarola, St. Augustine, Fénelon, Luther, Jeremy Taylor, Chalmers, and Channing, — all religious art, charities, and oratory, for ever appeal to powers whose use is liable to be forestalled and overshadowed by material and worldly encroachment.

Kings are proverbially unobservant, from the lives of etiquette and conventionalism which they lead; and from this one unused power have resulted the most bloody revolutions. Louis the Sixteenth and James of England were thus unacquainted with the exigencies of their times and the spirit of the age and people against which they fatally contended; while the Czar Peter almost created a nation by virtue of the intrepid and patient exercise of perception and will. "Each individual," we are told by a German writer, "bears with him in his bodily form and mental capacity that symmetry which he is ultimately to attain through self-development."

"Habit," says the author of the work named at the head of this article, "is the vital force which enables life to maintain itself and slowly assimilate foreign elements." These two cardinal truths involve an invincible argument against unused powers. To exercise all our faculties, and thus attain a symmetrical habitude of soul, is the philosophy of life. Art and nature, society and truth, love and beauty, are set before us; but the assimilation of these is a process more or less dependent on the will. Unfortunately, systems of education are not based upon the individuality of the soul, and its special powers often remain unused during that arbitrary ordeal, to break forth into jubilant and effective action when the privilege of self-control is obtained. Probably there are few persons of sensibility and intelligence who, in the early period of their lives, have not heartily responded to the enthusiasm of the favorite English poets who have sung the pleasures of Hope, Imagination, and Memory; and yet to how many of them are the qualities thus happily celebrated, in a greater or less degree, unused powers! The ambitious man, like Cassius, "hears no music"; the avaricious, like Shylock, loves his ducats more than his daughter; the contemplative, with Hamlet, loses in thought "the name of action"; the practical scorns fanciful delights; and the misanthropic has no hope. The "mental serenity which forms the protection and safety of our being" is the result of an equilibrium of forces, a harmonized activity; it is, in the last analysis, the "peace which the world can neither give nor take away,"—impossible to those who perversely cling to one idea, obey a singular order of instincts, confine sympathy and effort to a narrow aim, disobey the great edict of God, of nature, and humanity, and rob life of its fruit and its consecration, by unused powers.

ART. II. — THE HINDOOS.

1. *Institutes of Menu*. Translated by SIR WILLIAM JONES. Jones's Works, Vols. VII. and VIII. London. 1807. — *Hitopadesa*. Ibid., Vol. XIII. — *Extracts from Vedas*. Ibid., Vol. XIII. 367.
2. *Asiatic Researches* Vols. I. — VIII. Colebrooke's Essays.
3. *History of India*. By the HON. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE. Second Edition. London. 1843. 2 vols.
4. *Central India*. By SIR JOHN MALCOLM. Third Edition. London. 1832. 2 vols.

FOR the present, the Hindoos have lost their good name. Bitter maledictions from the English they have earned, and are receiving, and will continue to receive for some time to come. Americans, more distant and less interested, though startled at first by their atrocious audacity, are sooner ready to put on the philosopher and inquire what manner of men these are who have acted so. Our estimate of the "gentle Hindoos," having received a shock, calls for re-adjustment. We used to hear that they were gentle even to effeminacy, submissive even to servility, cowardly save when marshalled on by European discipline and bravery; that their feeling of nationality was lost, their religion dying out; that they were good for little but to nurse children, and pull punkas, and pay taxes. To govern them was growing into holiday work; to live among them, and be waited on by them so assiduously and politely, was coming, more and more, to be paradise. The swift events of a few months have taught the world how superficial were these judgments.

In our last number we have shown that in sympathy and admiration for their English rulers we are not wanting. We shall try now to show that we have sympathy and admiration left for the Hindoos themselves. God forbid that we should excuse their barbarous cruelties. God forbid, too, that we should give way to that thirst for vengeance, "that actual longing for slaughter," which is now said — with great exaggeration, we hope — to fill the heart of every Englishman in India.* No doubt it is maddening to think of "delicate,

* Blackwood's Magazine, November, p. 607.

refined women, women they had known, had laughed with, danced with, perhaps wept with, dying such deaths by such hands." But it was maddening too to the Hindoos to think of the wrongs and insults of ages; their religion threatened, their race despised, their caste outraged. The hour had struck. It was time at last to lift up the terrible sword of Hinduism, — time to make thorough work. A century of insolence was enough. Now for the dire reckoning. Never more let red-coated Englishmen presume to lead the Rajpoots to battle. Let Feringee women and children look never again upon the Ganges. Terrified and dishonored, let the whole hated race for ever depart! Root and branch, exterminate all! And if in this outburst of fury and frenzy deeds were done which humanity will strive in vain to forget, let it be considered that all the mutineers were not thus devilish, — probably not one in ten, perhaps not one in a hundred. The many were patriots and heroes; only the few were scoundrels. Let it be remembered that all our reports of the massacres come through an interested medium, which, however high-minded, is not above mistake and prejudice. The Hindoo side we have not heard, and may never hear. Already even the English reports are assuming a more moderate tone. "The first accounts reported all killed, but many were saved by the faithfulness of their servants and syces." It is a relief to hear the reporter pause in his detail of suffering and crime to add, "Yet, often, what consideration and what kindness!" and again, "Hundreds of natives, Brahmins, fakeers, rajahs, zemindars, high and low, took pity on the outcasts, gave them food and clothing, hid them in their houses, and guided them on their way, when the detection of such care for the lives of the hated foreigners would have cost them their own." Still, after full allowance is made for mistake and exaggeration, for passion and prejudice, on the one side and on the other, the cruelties of these mutineers will leave upon Mohammedan and Hindoo character an ineffaceable stain. But where, since the world began, has there been nation or people whose history is not occasionally darkened by ineffaceable stains? Not above all others are these men sinners. Even for their sake, as well as for the sake of England and the general good, we rejoice

in the fall of Delhi and their ruined hopes. Our Hindoo sympathy goes out in quite other directions than against the best government they have ever had.

Having looked upon the dark side of Hindoo character, it is but just that we inquire after their virtues also. We shall find our account in it. They are no commonplace people. Whatever we may have supposed, tameness and mediocrity are not their characteristics. Much that has been said of their lying, their treachery, their monstrous superstition, their bondage to the past, their cheating, their flattery so exquisitely refined, their childish timidity at times, is true, but only a small part of the truth, and therefore error when taken alone. It is a poor way to judge of men, to fix upon two or three of our favorite virtues, and then admit into our synagogue only those who are strong in these few points; it misleads us as much to adopt from some coterie, or community, or sect, a set of rules concerning this or that fault or vice which we are free from, or think ourselves to be, and then make sweeping inferences against all nonconformity to this contracted standard. This narrowness is always leading us astray. It makes the Frenchman underrate the Englishman, and the Englishman underrate the Frenchman, and both undervalue the American, and all three misunderstand the German, the Italian, the Hindoo. It is difficult to judge of individuals, much more of nations, however great our opportunities of knowing them. We shall not presume, then, to decide upon the character of Hinduism from our personal impressions, nor from the isolated authority of this and that competent observer and thinker, but from as wide a circle of evidence of all sorts as we can collect. Even in India, "Englishmen," says Elphinstone, "have less opportunity than might be expected of forming opinions of the native character. In England few know much of the people beyond their own class, and what they do know they learn from newspapers and other publications, which do not exist in India. We know nothing of the interior of families but by report. Missionaries of a different religion, judges, police magistrates, officers of revenue or customs, and even diplomatists, do not see the most virtuous portions of a nation, nor any portion

unless when influenced by passion or occupied by some personal interest. What we do see, we judge by our own standard. Those who have known the Indians longest, have always the best opinion of them." We sing, and forget, that man is a "harp of thousand strings," on all of which the Hindoos may have learned to play, in their four or five thousand years of civilization, none surpassing them in drawing out music from these manifold and mysterious strings, to charm both devils and angels. We call the Hindoos effeminate, and some of them are;* their scale of human nature extending from the weakness of the weakest woman to the strength of the manliest man. This breadth and fineness of organization has its advantages. If in one direction it leads to littleness and vice, in another it makes them the best of all nurses, tender, patient, watchful, self-denying, unsurpassed save by Florence Nightingale; while in another direction, where a sublime combination is called for, of religiousness, patriotism, and military heroism, it makes them rivals of Joan of Arc and the Chevalier Bayard. Nowhere, indeed, so well as in studying the Rajpoots, men and women, can we learn to understand and appreciate that wonder and glory of France, the Maid of Orleans. An age which at times has gone mad after Napoleon, notwithstanding his prodigious faults, ought not to withhold its admiration from the Hindoos. For a regiment of Rajpoots is a regiment of Napoleons; and, with a scientific Napoleon to lead them, could march through the world. Of all soldiers they are the most rapid on the march, especially when marching to battle. The Mahrattas seemed to fly on the wings of the wind from one side of the peninsula to the

* "I had heard all my life of the gentle and timid Hindoos, patient under injuries, servile to their superiors. Now this is doubtless to a certain extent true of the Bengalees, and there are a great many people in Calcutta who maintain that all the nations of India are alike; but on entering Hindustan, properly so called, I was struck and surprised to find a people equal in stature and strength to the average of European nations, despising rice and rice-eaters, feeding on wheat and barley bread, exhibiting in their appearance, conversation, and habits of life, a grave, proud, and decidedly a martial character, accustomed universally to the use of arms and athletic exercises from their cradles, and preferring very greatly military service to any other means of livelihood. . . . So idle is it to ascribe uniformity of character to the inhabitants of a country so extensive, and subdivided by so many almost impassable tracts of mountain and jungle." — Heber's *Travels in India*, Vol. II. p. 288.

other. Hyder Ali and his men came down upon the Carnatic with such desolating swiftness as only the language of Burke could describe. Clive and Hastings learned of the Hindoos their despatch and versatility and persistence, as well as their craftiness. Those who have been borne onward hour after hour in palanquins, on Hindoo shoulders, with the same unfaltering half-trot, at the rate of four or five miles an hour, have seen something of their speed and endurance. They can work and hold out, when they have a motive, with the least possible food. They know them not who think them indolent and imbecile. Some Englishman has said: "The French are excellent soldiers, but they found their match in the Rajpoots." Bonaparte used depreciatingly to call Wellington the "Sepoy general," because he had learned the art of war in India. The Sepoy general showed he had been to a good school. Perhaps the English slowness and insularity of Wellington were quickened by Hindoo insight and versatility to enable him on one side to face Napoleon, and on another O'Connell and the Pope. Macaulay did not fully magnetize *all* readers of the English language till he had lived in India and baptized himself in Hindoo poetry and enthusiasm. His papers on Clive and Hastings, written on the Ganges, are Anglo-Indian poems. It is a peculiarity of the Hindoos, that they readily take on all the efficiency imparted by the military discipline of Europe, without being turned into machines. They retain their individuality, which, on occasion, is a tower of strength. Clive was the first Englishman to perceive the soldierly qualities of the Hindoos, though he took the hint from the French. It was to him an inspiration, and grandly he turned it to account. He appreciated and loved his incomparable Hindoos; they understood and worshipped their immortal leader. Hence the wonders they wrought. On one occasion, when besieged, and when provisions fell short, the Sepoys brought to Clive all their rice, saying that the English required good food, but they could live on the water poured from the rice, on anything or nothing. Before the revolt, Englishmen were pleased and proud to repeat this anecdote. Their indignation over, their manliness and justice will return; and they will repeat it again, gratefully and

proudly as ever. History must not immortalize Clive and forget his Hindoos.

We count it in Christendom a great thing to die well. Hence our stanchest theologians have been inclined to claim Socrates as almost a Christian. But in the virtue of dying none have ever surpassed the Hindoos. To see the calmness and dignity and beauty with which these Hindoos die, men and women, on the funeral pile, or bound to the cannon's mouth, one would think the spirit of saints and heroes were a common endowment in Hindustan. These very mutineers, when condemned to be blown away from the mouths of cannon, — to the Hindoos the most dreadful of deaths, as it makes it impossible for friends, after the commingling of so many fragments of Hindoos and Mohammedans, heads, legs, and arms all mixed together, to identify the body for the last sacred rites, — have so met their fate as to call forth the admiration of their inexorable enemies. "They certainly," says a stern eyewitness, "died like men." After the first ten had been thus blown into fragments, "the next batch, who had been looking on all the time, walked up to the guns calmly, without moving a muscle or showing the least signs of fear. Whence had these men this strength? Their religion, bad as it is, befriends them well in the hour of death; it teaches them the great lesson how to die." As a companion to this picture, but still more instructive, and very touching, we give from Elphinstone the following:—

"The sight of a widow burning is a most painful one; but it is hard to say whether the spectator is most affected by pity or admiration. The more than human serenity of the victim, and the respect she receives from those around her, are heightened by her gentle demeanor, and her care to omit nothing in distributing her last presents and paying the usual marks of courtesy to the by-standers. The reflections which succeed are of a different character, and one is humiliated to think that so feeble a being can be elevated by superstition to a self-devotion not surpassed by the noblest examples of patriots and martyrs." — Vol. I. p. 367.

Not on great and rare occasions only are the Hindoos estimable. In Calcutta, Bombay, and other large towns, where Europeans commonly see them, their good qualities are sel-

dom brought out, their bad ones often. Towards foreigners, whom they look upon as hostile to their race and their religion, as Modern Greeks look upon the Turks, and as Irish Catholics regard Englishmen and Americans, they think it rather a virtue to be deceitful; but towards each other, and especially in the interior, among the cultivators of the soil, they are represented by those who know them best as a simple, honest, truth-telling people. Colonel Sleeman, than whom no one has had better opportunities or superior qualifications for understanding them, says, "I believe that as little falsehood is spoken by the people of India in their village communities, as in any other part of the world." His chapter on veracity, with nothing of the form, but everything of the reality, of profound philosophy, is worthy of careful study. We commend to the thoughtful this extract:—

"In India we find strict veracity most prevalent among the wildest and half-savage tribes, and among the same men we find cattle-stealing most common. I asked a native gentleman of the plains, what made the people of the woods more disposed to speak the truth than those more civilized. 'They have not yet learned the value of a lie,' said he, with the greatest simplicity and sincerity, for he was a very honest and plain-spoken man." — *Rambles of an Indian Official*, Vol. II. p. 109.

The impartial observer will find everywhere both more deception and more truthfulness than common opinion recognizes. Strict veracity is rare. One man is truthful in one direction, another in another. Whatever the Americans and English may think, there is among the French as much veracity as among themselves. The French deceive about different things,—that is the difference. Speaking in more general terms of the character and condition of the ryots of India, Colonel Sleeman bears this testimony:—

"I am much attached to the agricultural classes of India generally, and I have found among them some of the best men I have ever known. The peasantry in India have generally very good manners, and are exceedingly intelligent, from having so much more leisure and unreserved and easy intercourse with those above them. . . . Nine tenths of the immediate cultivators of the soil are little farmers, who hold a lease, for one or more years, of their lands, which they cultivate with their own stock. One of these cultivators, with a good plough and bullocks,

and a good character, can always get good lands on reasonable terms from holders of the villages [holders of lands belonging to the villages].” — Vol. I. pp. 76, 77.

From Elphinstone again, whose opportunities and qualifications were also of the highest order, — one of those large-minded and large-hearted Englishmen so often met with in India, whose wide acquaintance, for many years, with various races, languages, customs, opinions, virtues, civilizations, has taught him comprehensiveness,* — we quote as follows: —

“The condition of the country people is not, in general, prosperous. They are improvident and in debt. Violence of all sorts is extremely rare, drunkenness scarcely known, and on the whole they are remarkably quiet, well-behaved, and, for their circumstances, happy and contented. The husbandman rises with the earliest dawn, washes, and says a prayer; then sets out with his cattle to his distant field. After an hour or two, he eats some remnants of his yesterday’s fare for breakfast, goes on with his labor till noon, when his wife brings out his hot dinner; he eats it by a brook or under a tree, talks and sleeps till two o’clock, while his cattle also feed and repose. From two till sunset he labors again, then drives his cattle home, feeds them, bathes, eats some supper, smokes, and spends the rest of the evening with his wife and children, or his neighbors. The women fetch water, grind the corn, cook, and do the household work, besides spinning and such occupations.” (Vol. I. p. 335.) “The most prominent vice of the Hindoos is want of veracity.” (Ib. 378.) “The villagers are everywhere an inoffensive, amiable people, affectionate to their families, kind to their neighbors; and, towards all but the government, honest and sincere.” (Ib. 383.) “The townspeople are of a more mixed character, but they are quiet and orderly. On

* Bishop Heber more than sanctions the good opinion we have expressed of Elphinstone. We abridge two or three sentences from as many pages. *Vide* Vol. II. pp. 166 – 168, and, in a letter, p. 300. Mr. Elphinstone was at the time Governor of Bombay. “Mr. Elphinstone is, in every respect, an extraordinary man, of almost universal information, of most amiable and interesting character. He has seen more of India and the adjoining countries than any man now living, has been engaged in active political and sometimes military duties since the age of eighteen, and has found time, not only to cultivate the languages of Hindustan and Persia, but to preserve and extend his knowledge of the Greek and Latin classics, with the French and Italian, with all the elder and more distinguished English writers, and with the current literature of the day, in poetry, history, politics, and political economy.” He defends him from the charge some writer had brought against him of being “devoid of religion.”

the whole, if we except those connected with the government, they will bear a fair comparison with the people of towns in England ; among our laboring classes there are many to whom no parallel could be found in India ; but, on the other hand, there is no set of people among the Hindoos so depraved as the dregs of our great towns." (Ib. 384.) "The Thugs and Décoits are the worst criminals in the world ; but after all, the mass of crime in India (Thugs and Decoits included) is less than in England." (Ib. 385.) "Europeans sleep with every door in the house open, and scarcely anything is locked up against servants." (Ib. 386.)

There are a few inconsistencies in these reports, enough to show that the writers are drawing from observation, and not giving mere theories. A writer in Vol. XII., for 1849, of the *Calcutta Review*, looking at the subject from the English and Christian point of view, sometimes showing "Evangelical" preferences, says :—

"We are bound to state plainly and honestly our own impression, that, unless there had been a root of truth and good feeling in the original Hinduism, it could not have lasted to our day as a living system. The Great Ruler has seen it proper that these millions should not be left wholly without light." (p. 386.) "The Hindoos, generally speaking, in regard to moral conduct—apart from doctrinal considerations altogether—have shown themselves a highly estimable people. As fathers, husbands, masters, and even as neighbors, we may indeed challenge comparison between them and the mass of those who have had the advantage of European civilization. We find, in short, in the Hindoos, that harmonious coherence of domestic relationship, which we usually connect with religious obligation. There is that which demonstrates a root of good, amidst much that is faulty and false ; and convictions of singular potency, binding in a complete yet harmoniously working polity millions of people, for thousands of years." (p. 387.)

In making up our opinion on this subject, we must not overlook Mill, the eminent historian of India, who paints a very dark picture of the Hindoos. He is an able, honest, fearless writer, of great understanding and small imagination, an acute and just, but not a generous and many-sided critic. A disciple of Bentham, and more of a utilitarian than even his master, he was offended, and with some reason, at the rhetorical praises of the Hindoos and other Asiatics in which Sir William Jones sometimes too freely indulged, and was natu-

rally driven to the other extreme. He has been censured for speaking so confidently against the Orientalists, when he himself had not had their opportunities for personal observation. Indeed, with singular logic, he claims it as an advantage of his over the Orientalists, that he had not been in India. But living in India would not have changed his unfavorable opinion, might only have confirmed it. He was too little of a poet, too exclusively a logician, to appreciate and measure Hinduism in all its dimensions. His history, notwithstanding this defect, is of great value, and better than a monument of brass to his memory. Many of the authorities quoted by him to sustain his positions are Catholic and Protestant missionaries,—men who went to India with a picture before their minds of Juggernaut and all manner of hideous idolatry, and who kept their eyes too closely to that one view,—correct enough so far as it went, but by no means the whole of Hinduism, its mint, anise, and cumin only. On the other and brighter side of the Hindoo question, we have a list of great names, Orientalists or old Indians, or both, such as Jones, Colebrooke, Malcolm, Elphinstone, Munro, Sleeman, Wilson. Still, in reading them we shall do well not to forget Mill and the missionaries, just as one who would know America should read Hall and Trollope, as well as De Tocqueville, Chevalier, Von Raumer, and Gurowski. Bishop Heber sometimes speaks of the Hindoos favorably, at other times the reverse is true, though on the whole his judgment is favorable.

“Their general character is extremely pleasing to me: they are brave, courteous, intelligent, and most eager after knowledge and improvement, with a remarkable talent for the sciences of geometry, astronomy, &c., and for the arts of painting and sculpture.” (Heber’s *Life*, &c., Vol. II. p. 310.) “To say they are deficient in any essential feature of a civilized people, is an assertion I can scarcely suppose to be made by any who have lived with them. Their manners are at least as pleasing and courteous as those in corresponding stations of life among ourselves; their houses are larger, as convenient as ours according to their wants and climate; their architecture at least as elegant.” (Ib. 289.) “I really never have met with a race whose standard of morality is so low, who feel so little apparent shame on being detected in a falsehood, or so little interest in the sufferings of a neighbor, not of their own caste or family; whose ordinary conversation is so licentious.” (Ib. 292.)

This last extract, so severe upon the natives, was written only five months after he arrived in India, and before he could have learned much of the people except from hearsay. He could not yet have known enough of any Indian language to judge as to the "licentiousness of ordinary conversation." We have looked through many Missionary Reports, but find nothing bearing directly on this point except the following, — sufficiently condemnatory certainly, — from the Report of the American Missionary Seminary, Ceylon, 1833: —

"The truth is, the Hindoos are generally *unprincipled*. The moral precepts, such as they are, of their sacred books, are without sanctions. Children are early taught to deceive, to lie, to swear, to be impure; and as they grow up, they increase in the knowledge and practice of vices which cannot be named. The country is not only filled with licentiousness, but with theft, forgery, perjury, conspiracy of one against another, oppression of the poor by the rich, and the murder — generally before birth — of illegitimate offspring." "Their only rule of right and wrong is expediency." *

Our idea of the character of the Hindoos is so much more favorable than the popular notion, that we feel bound to fortify it by authorities sufficient to convince all candid minds, even at the risk of weariness to the reader. Sir John Malcolm well deserves to be heard: —

"I do not know the example of any great population, in similar cir-

* In contrast with the above, we quote from "Recollections of Northern India, by Rev. William Buyers, Missionary at Benares" (8vo, London, 1848): "However defective the standard of morality in India, it is not so low as some have imagined. . . . There is scarcely anything that would be regarded as a crime in England, that would not be regarded in the same light in India. Murder, theft, falsehood, hatred, strife, adultery, slander, &c., are universally condemned as sinful and deserving of punishment, while, on the other hand, benevolence, temperance, humility, truthfulness, honesty, fidelity, charity, obedience to parents, are inculcated by Hindoo moralists as well as by Christian, and the strict performance of all the duties arising out of these virtues is as much approved by the general sentiments of the people of India, as by those of the people of England." (p. 412.) This writer is an Orthodox Baptist, we believe. He further says, on the same page: "India perhaps is the only country where metaphysical speculations about the abstract nature of virtue and vice were ever prevalent among the common people. The Hindoos are exceedingly addicted to such speculations; but of all the hundreds of Brahmins and others with whom I have discussed such subjects in public, I never met one who did not acknowledge in private, that, after all, the distinction between virtue and vice was of an essential nature."

cumstances, preserving, through such a period of changes and tyrannical rule, so much of virtue and so many good qualities as are to be found in a great proportion of the inhabitants of this country. This is to be accounted for, in some degree, by the institutions of the Hindoos, particularly that of caste, which appears to have raised them to their present rank in human society at a very remote period ; but it certainly tended to keep them stationary at that point of civil order to which they were thus early advanced. With a just admiration of the effects of many of their institutions, particularly those parts of them which cause in vast classes not merely an absence of the common vices of theft, drunkenness, and violence, but preserve all the virtuous ties of family and kindred relations, we must all deplore some of their usages and weak superstitions ; but what individuals or what races of men are without great and manifold errors and imperfections ?” “ I have seen and heard much of our boasted advantages over them, but cannot think that, if all the ranks of the different communities of Europe and India are comparatively viewed, there is just ground for any very arrogant feeling on the part of the inhabitants of the former.” — *Central India*, Vol. II. pp. 440, 438.

We next quote from the Institutes of Menu, one of the most valuable sacred books of the Hindoos, written about the age of the Pentateuch probably.

“ Let not a man be querulous, even though in pain ; let him not injure another in deed or in thought ; let him not even utter a word by which his fellow-creature may suffer uneasiness ; since that will obstruct his own progress to future beatitude.” (Chap. II. 161.) “ Let him not, from a selfish appetite, be strongly addicted to any sensual gratification ; let him, by improving his intellect, studiously preclude an excessive attachment to such pleasures, even though lawful.” (Chap. IV. 16.) “ Let him pass through this life, bringing his apparel, his discourse, and his frame of mind to a conformity with his age, his occupations, his property, his divine knowledge, and his family.” (Ib. 18.) “ Gifts must be made by each housekeeper, as far as he has ability, to religious mendicants, though heterodox.” (Ib. 32.) “ He who receives a present from an avaricious king and a transgressor of the sacred ordinances, goes in succession to the following twenty-one hells : Tamisra, Naraca, [&c., &c. to] Lohangaraca, or the pit of red-hot charcoal.” (Ib. 87 – 90.) “ Let him not give even temporal advice to a Sudra.” (Ib. 80.) “ Let him not insult those who want a limb, who are unlearned, who are advanced in age, who have no beauty, who have no wealth, or who are of an ignoble race.” (Ib. 141.) “ Denial of a future state, neglect of the scrip-

tures, contempt of the deities, envy and hatred, vanity and pride, wrath and severity, let him at all times avoid." (Ib. 163.) "Even here below an unjust man attains no felicity; nor he whose wealth proceeds from giving false evidence. Though oppressed by penury in consequence of his righteous dealings, let him never give his mind to unrighteousness. Iniquity committed in this world produces not fruit immediately, but, like the earth, in due season; and advancing by little and little, it eradicates the man. Let a man continually take pleasure in truth, in justice, in laudable practices, and in purity; let him chastise those whom he may chastise in a legal mode, let him keep in subjection his speech, his arm, and his appetite. Wealth and pleasures repugnant to law let him shun; and even lawful acts which may cause future pain, or be offensive to mankind." (Ib. 170-176.) "Let no man, having committed sin, perform a penance, under the pretext of austere devotion, disguising his crime under fictitious religion. Such impostors, though Brahmins, are despised in the next life and in this. A wise man should constantly discharge all the moral duties, though he perform not constantly the ceremonies of religion." (Ib. 198, 199, 204.) "Let him reflect, with exclusive application of mind, on the subtle indivisible essence of the Supreme Spirit, and its complete existence in all beings, whether extremely high or extremely low. Let him observe the progress of this internal spirit through various bodies, high and low [transmigration]. By meditating on the intimate union of his own soul and the divine essence, let him extinguish all qualities repugnant to the nature of God. He who fully understands the perpetual omnipresence of God, can be led no more captive by criminal acts; but he who possesses not that sublime knowledge, shall wander again through the world." (Chap. VI. 65, 72-74.) "No man who is ignorant of the Supreme Spirit can gather the fruit of mere ceremonial acts." (Ib. 82.) "Content, returning good for evil, resistance to sensual appetites, abstinence from illicit gain, purification, coercion of the organs, knowledge of scripture, knowledge of the Supreme Spirit, veracity, and freedom from wrath, form their [the Brahmins'] tenfold system of duties." (Ib. 92.)

Deserving of special attention is the following noble recognition of conscience and man's higher nature:—

"The soul itself is its own witness; the soul itself is its own refuge: offend not thy conscious soul, the supreme internal witness of men! The sinful have said in their hearts, 'None sees us.' Yes, the gods distinctly see them, and so does the spirit within their breasts. O friend to virtue, that supreme spirit which thou believest one and the same

with thyself resides in thy bosom perpetually, and is an all-knowing inspector of thy goodness or of thy wickedness." (Chap. VIII. 84, 85, 91.)

Intermingled with the passages we are quoting is a good deal that is unimportant, considerable that is frivolous, some things that are objectionable (of which the worst is contempt for Sudras), and a little that is directly inconsistent with these elevated moral and spiritual ideas. To the Hindoo, however, there is of course no difficulty in explaining away those things that are unreasonable or objectionable. As we aim in these citations to show not merely the moral ideas of the Hindoos, but also to illustrate the manners and life of the people, and the degree and kind of civilization they had reached in the ninth century before Christ, we make such quotations as the following:—

"Much frequented places, cisterns of water, bake-houses, lodgings of harlots, taverns and victualling-shops, squares where four ways meet, large well-known trees, assemblies, public spectacles; old court-yards, thickets, the houses of artists, empty mansions, groves, and gardens;—these and the like places let the king guard for the prevention of robberies, with soldiers both stationary and patrolling, as well as with secret watchmen." (Chap. IX. 264–266.) "All physicians and surgeons acting unskilfully in their several professions must pay for injury to brute animals the lowest, but for human injury to creatures the middle, amercement." (Ib. 284.)

Returning now to Chap. I.:—

"Immemorial custom is transcendent law, approved in the sacred scripture and in the codes of divine legislators. Thus have holy sages, well knowing that law is grounded on immemorial custom, embraced, as the root of all piety, good usages, long established." (Chap. I. 108, 110.) "All the titles of law promulgated by Menu, and occasionally the customs of different countries, different tribes and families, with rules concerning heretics and companies of traders, are discussed in this code." (Ib. 118.)

From the repeated mention of heretics, it appears that they were common, and that the Hindoos in ancient times understood and appreciated, more or less, the principles of toleration, as they certainly do in modern times beyond any other people. There is evidence throughout the *Laws of Menu*

that the work is a Brahminic production, from the manifest partiality shown to the Brahmins. As proof of this, we need only adduce the following absurdity:—

“Let not the king, although in the greatest distress for money, provoke Brahmins to anger by taking their property; for they, once enraged, could immediately by sacrifices and imprecations destroy him, with his troops, elephants, horses, and cars. What prince could gain wealth by oppressing those who, if angry, could form other worlds and regents of worlds, could give being to new gods and mortals?” (Chap. IX. 315, 316.)

An enormous pretension, quite overtopping the claims of the popes, though at times a salutary check on the despotism of kings by affording a nucleus for popular resistance. But the power of the Brahmins, however outrageous in theory, is a different thing in practice. It wants centralized and efficient organization, and its claims, therefore, cannot always be carried out. It is the power of tradition and opinion, resembling more the authority of the pulpit in America than the priestly power in Italy; yet differing in some respects widely from both. The attentive reader of our few extracts from Menu will notice that they indicate an old and long established civilization, — so old that even then the eye was turned habitually to the past, — very different from the young and growing civilization of the Hebrews. Customs had long since crystallized into fixed forms. It is a closely compacted society, ruled by mind, and not by force. Hindoo society in the time of Menu must have been as old, at least, as Egyptian society in the time of Moses; and of more value and more firmly established. In studying the Hindoos, then, we are studying the remotest past, the oldest people in the world, (the Chinese may be as old, but are too different from us in language, in everything, to come into a comparison like the present,) a petrified civilization, “a living monument, the one surviving ruin of another state of man.” Every Hindoo, from the rajah to the ryot, if we will but study him as attentively as we do the hieroglyphs of Egypt, will tell us more of the primeval world than the monuments of Thebes or the marbles of Nineveh. Not that we suppose any connections — or at most anything more than partial influences — between the civiliza-

tions of the Ganges, the Euphrates, and the Nile ; but there are interesting analogies between these three indigenous civilizations, and also between the four partially derived and about equally valuable civilizations of the Arabians, the Hebrews, the Phœnicians, and the Persians.

One more illustration we must give of the moral ideas of the Hindoos, from the *Hitopadesa*, translated by Sir William Jones, and called by him "the most beautiful collection of apologues in the world." As a literary production, it is superior to the *Institutes of Menu*, and not inferior in moral, religious, and political wisdom. The reader of it is reminded sometimes of our *Book of Proverbs*, sometimes of *Æsop*, sometimes of *Molière*. It is ancient, but some centuries later than *Menu*, and would seem to indicate progress, — certainly in literature. It was first translated from the Sanscrit in the sixth century of our era, and is "extant under various names in more than twenty languages." Whether the good opinion of the great Orientalist is justified, the reader shall judge from a few extracts out of the many we have marked. In these selections, thrown together without order, most of the beauty is lost, and all of the liveliness ; but the dignity, purity, and honorable sense of self-respect appear even in these loose stones from a princely palace.

"The time of the wise is passed in the delights of poetry ; that of the foolish, in vice, in idleness, or in quarrelling. The moon is a friend to the night-flowers worshipping God. A man who meets no peril sees no good things. Circumspection in calamity ; mercy in greatness ; in assemblies, good speeches ; in adversity, fortitude ; in fame, resolution to preserve it ; assiduity in studying the scriptures ; — these are the self-attained perfections of great souls. A virtuous man should abandon both riches and life for the sake of others. May the greatness of the noble-minded of my tribe, my state, my countrymen, ever accompany me. The good are indulgent to ignorant minds, as the moon withdraws not her light from the mansions of a chandal [a man of the lowest caste]. He who bears no depraved passion, suffers all things patiently, and gives equal protection to all, surely rises to heaven. To a man of a noble disposition, the whole earth is related. How great a duty is it to take a tender care of our souls ! Let a man desert his native city for the sake of his country ; and the whole world, for the sake of his whole soul. What a rich man gives and what he consumes, that

is his real wealth. Many who read the scriptures are grossly ignorant ; but he who acts well is a truly learned man. Pains and pleasures revolve like a wheel. The goddess of prosperity hastens to inhabit the mansion of that brave man who lives contented, despatches his business, knows the difference of actions, is able to bear misfortunes, and is firm in friendship." (Book I.) "Riches not employed are of no use. Suffer no day to pass unfruitful in charity, study, and good works. He who points out the good he has done, snatches every merit away. That is a good action which is well intended. He is a man who is not subdued by his senses." (Book II.) "An ambassador, though a barbarian, must not be slain. A small army, if excellent, is a great one. A true hero speaks gently, boasts not of himself, is liberal, and no respecter of persons. In this world, broken with the motion of waves, life should be virtuously sacrificed for the benefit of others." (Book III.) "Providence is certainly the giver of wealth and poverty ; let a man, therefore, meditate first of all on Providence ; but not so as to prevent his own exertions. The acts of the virtuous are demonstrated by their fruits. Whether this person be of my tribe, or of another, is a consideration of the narrow-minded ; but that of the great-minded is to hold all the world related to them. He is truly wise who considers another's wife as his mother, another's gold as mere clay, and all other creatures as himself. Who would act unjustly for the sake of a body which either to-day or to-morrow may be destroyed by anxiety or disease ? Truth will outweigh a thousand sacrifices." (Book IV.)

It is a curious inquiry, and deserving more attention than it has received, what has enabled Hinduism to outlast all other civilizations. One cause, we think, may be found in the Hindoo village system, so admirably contrived to resist the devastations of conquest and the changes of empire. References to these most ancient and enduring communities are made by several English writers, but only incidentally, and never with the fulness and particularity required.* Some

* "Every village is a separate community or township, and has its own establishment of public officers and tradesmen. Under this simple form of municipal government the inhabitants have lived from time immemorial. They give themselves no trouble about the breaking up and division of kingdoms ; while the village remains entire, they care not to what power it is transferred ; its internal economy remains unchanged. However they may be scattered by the desolation of war, their affections still centre in one common and cherished spot ; insomuch that in 1817, as mentioned by Sir John Malcolm, when peace was established in Central India, by the expulsion of the Pindarries and other freebooters who laid waste the

clear-sighted Frenchman is wanted to point out to the English the principles and the philosophy of this fundamental institution, and thus do for them what De Tocqueville has done for the Americans in the matter of the New England township organization and town-meetings."* Unless the English get their attention fully turned to the value of these communities, there is danger that some well-meaning but short-sighted reformer, like Lord Cornwallis in his benevolent but unwise attempt to establish a landed aristocracy after the pattern of England, may find the villages inconvenient, and set himself to undermining them, thus pulling down a main pillar of Hindoo society. It is remarkable that Mill, an enemy to despotism and aristocracy, a republican in spirit, a man, too, who saw clearly and far, does not seem to have been aware of the importance, scarcely of the existence, of the village system; for his eye once turned in that direction, he would have gone to the bottom of the subject. There are two main particulars in which the village system in India differs from the township organizations of New England, — faults, as the New-Englander might at first think, but excellences in an Asiatic constitution of society. To these two points we invite investigation. In India, the land is held by the village in common, (subject always to the claims of the king, or emperor, or Company,) and is *rented* either directly to individual cultivators, or to some middleman who sublets it. In New England, the village community was also the *original* proprietor of the soil, (deriving from the crown,) but granted it out in *perpetuity* to individual cultivators, — the best system in a society where the central power is not likely to interfere in all local matters, as it does in France, Prussia, and the greater part of Europe. To keep back the central power, always

country, the inhabitants and officers of the villages reassembled from every quarter, and the resurrection of these communities into life and action seemed the work of a day." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 8th ed., XI. 514. This reference to Malcolm sent us to his "Central India," but we had to read through most of the two volumes before finding what we looked for, and then found it scattered here and there, and hidden away in the long and dry chapter on Revenue, Vol. II. From this, we get more facts than from any other authority. See also Martin's "British Colonies," Vol. Asia, 182, 183, and Mill, Book II. Chap. V.

* De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, Vol. I. Chap. V.

despotic and grasping in Asia, the village had an instinct of its more efficient power of resistance, and so interposed itself between the individual cultivator and the state, by retaining a sort of proprietorship of the land. The Asiatic state claims always the real ownership of the soil; but the village, without *directly* opposing this claim, secures, by passive resistance and the workings of old custom, the privilege of entering into a sort of treaty with the government in regard to the rent or tax, — the only thing the Asiatic state cares much for. The other point of difference between India and New England is, that the Potail, or head man of the village, is hereditary, and not elected by the people, as the selectmen of New England are, nor appointed by the central power, as in France. This, too, is a safeguard against the encroachments of the state. For even in America, though the people nominally choose their village officers (except the postmaster, one of the most important), yet how often is the choice influenced, and even controlled, by the predominant *national* party, while this party is managed by an oligarchy. Let some Napoleon get established in Washington, and ere long, finding the local assemblies and powers inconvenient, he would issue his proclamation declaring town-meetings inconsistent with public peace or with domestic institutions, and therefore unconstitutional, and take upon himself the appointment of selectmen and supervisors; and the national party would echo the presidential proclamation, and so farewell to town-meetings and liberty. The Potail, being hereditary, cannot be thus easily set aside. Here, then, under the proprietorship and hereditary organization of the village, the individual finds rest and security from imperial oppression, just as he finds shade from the burning sun under the overhanging branches of his palm-tree; and like his palm-tree, his village, with its hereditary officers, grows out of the friendly past. In three fourths of Europe, the central power has absorbed all local powers; not so in India. The reasons for this permanence of local powers through thousands of years, while dynasties have been rising and falling, conquerors coming and going, empires forming, culminating, and declining, we can find only in the peculiarities of the village constitution here pointed out.

It has been common to attribute the vitality of Hinduism to caste, — one of the causes, no doubt, of the wonderful strength and longevity of Indian society, but perhaps not the most powerful. Two writers of superior endowments — F. Schlegel, with his strong conservative instincts, and the Abbé Dubois, with his sharp French eye made sharper by a residence of half his life in India as a missionary — have half fallen in love with caste. “The democratical writers of a recent era,” says Schlegel, “have, in obedience to a sentiment natural enough to their false system, expressed a deep horror of caste. . . . I for my part am disposed to think that it is to this ancient and hereditary institution, however much of imperfection it undoubtedly involves, that this great and populous country owes that firm stability of its laws and customs, and that indestructible prosperity which the various conquests it has undergone, both in ancient and modern times, have been unable to shake or to undermine.” * Confusion of castes is to the Hindoo “the very abomination of anarchy,” like revolutionary times to the conservative Catholic, to whom it is a pleasant sight to see “the waves of anarchy breaking harmlessly against the everlasting rocks of an ancient and solidly compact system.” The Frenchman’s idea is, that there always have been and always will be classes in society, and that contentment and good order are best secured by stereotyping these classes into the unchanging form of caste.† The question is, whether the contentment and good order of the Frenchman and the permanency of the German may not be purchased at too high a price. Before deciding upon the good and evil of caste, let us understand what caste is, and wherein it differs from class among ourselves. In all civilized societies there are four distinctly marked classes. First, the Sudra class, or persons without property or skilled labor or a profession, — men who live from hand to mouth. In England, in France, in America, as well as in India, the Sudra class is large. In America it is easier to rise out of this primary class; but, while in it, the man’s condition is much the same as else-

* F. Schlegel’s *Philosophy of Life*, Lect. XIV. p. 308.

† Abbé J. A. Dubois, *People of India*, Chap. II.

where. Slaves of course are not included in the Sudra class. The second class, counting from below upward, is the Vasya, or commercial class, men of small property, traders, mechanics, farmers. The Chatrya, or next higher class, consists of warriors, chiefs, kings, the fighting and ruling class. Here also belong aristocracies, oligarchies, politicians, demagogues. It is the masculine, unscrupulous, physical-force class. Last of all comes the educated or Brahminic class, the scholars, artists, men of science, thinkers. According to the myths of the Brahmins, the Brahminic class was created first, but in fact the Sudra class is the oldest. All men started as Sudras, and out of this class grew next the class of warriors and chiefs, developing thus the savage state of society. Next we reach a middle class of cultivators with a few traders and mechanics, the Vasyas; and this we call the barbarous state of society. At length comes the scholar, the man of books, the Brahmin; and now we have all the four classes and civilization. Thus we see that Hindoo society is founded in nature and scientific classification.* The Brahmins, finding them-

* Abul Fazel, a distinguished Mohammedan writer, divides human society into four classes also, but in different order, thus: 1. Warriors; 2. Artificers and merchants; 3. Scholars; 4. Husbandmen and laborers. Remove the scholar or Brahmin from the third class and place him at the head, and we have the Hindoo classification. This difference in the order illustrates strikingly the difference between Mohammedan and Hindoo society. The former is essentially military, and based on force; the latter is civil and literary, and based on culture. See Ayeen Akbery, I. xix. We may refer to the work last cited, as a book of great value in these studies. It is the "Institutes of the Emperor Akber, by Abul-Fazl"; and is accessible to English readers in a translation by Francis Gladwin, from the original Persian. Among other things it gives incidentally and also expressly an account of the Hindoos. Written some two hundred and sixty-five years ago by a Mohammedan for Mohammedans, in old Persian, it is not likely to be too favorable to the Hindoos. It nowhere conflicts with our statements, and on all the points wherein the views of this article may be thought peculiar, to wit, the character of the Hindoos, their monotheism, caste, the function of the Brahmins, toleration, the value of Hindoo civilization in modern times, the Ayeen Akbery affords confirmation, often very strong, to the views we have presented. We extract a few sentences: "It has now come to light that the received opinion of the Hindoos being polytheists has no foundation in truth, for although their tenets admit positions that are difficult to be defended, yet that they are worshippers of God, and of only one God, are incontrovertible points." (II. 314.) One of the sects says that, "excepting the Deity, nothing exists, the universe being only an appearance without any reality, so that life is nothing but a dream." Another sect, charged with being atheists, "only disbelieve in a creator, saying that the universe is from eternity, and that nothing is annihila-

selves at the top of society, and liking their position, turned round upon the other classes and said, "This order of society is good, the best possible, heaven-born; let us keep it so. Let the four classes be stereotyped into castes." In this attempt they succeeded only in part, for nature is too strong even for Brahmins. Sudras became merchants, soldiers, kings; but the name of Sudra, the genealogy, still followed them. Brahmins became soldiers, traders; but the name and genealogy of Brahmin adhered to them. Then by the intermarriages of the four castes, provided for even by Menu, innumerable new castes and sub-castes are produced. Contrary to the common representations of most of our books, caste is only to a small extent a thing of rank and condition and occupation. It is a thing of endless and complex genealogies, of rites and food and forms, of petty precedences and prejudices. The banker is a lower caste man than the barber; yet the rich banker in India, as in Europe or America, can buy up a whole street of barbers, and do with them what he likes, as freely as among us.

We have called the Brahminic caste the caste of scholars, and not the priestly caste, as stated in the books. The Brahmin is, in truth, both scholar and priest, though more the former than the latter. Men of low caste or any caste may, and commonly do, attend to the routine of temple worship; but the Brahmin alone is the teacher of the Scriptures, the theological professor, the natural and moral philosopher, the educated man. In Egypt the priestly power seems to have been not mainly a moral power, like that of the Brahmins, but was organized, centralized, and capable of personal union with the kingly power. The king and the chief priest were

lated, but only disappears, the effect being absorbed in the cause, as the tortoise draws its legs into its shell; they believe man to be a free agent, and that he is rewarded or punished according to his good or bad actions." (Ib. 433-438.) The Hindoos "are vigorous enemies and faithful friends. They are renowned for wisdom, disinterested friendship, obedience to superiors, and many other virtues. Some have the disposition of angels, and others are demons." (Ib. 393.) In the twelfth century Rajah Jychund, then monarch of all India, residing at Kinoje, the other rajahs paying him homage, "was of so tolerating a disposition in religion, that many natives of Persia and Tartary were engaged in his service." (Ib. 106.) The villages are often spoken of, but no additional information respecting the village system is furnished. The Ayeen Akbery breathes throughout a remarkably tolerant spirit, learned of the Hindoos probably, certainly not from the Mohammedans.

often the same person; and this close union and identification at times of the two higher castes, quite destroyed the balance of society, so that ruin was the consequence; while the Hindoos by a nicer balance of caste and class have secured permanency. In India there is no chief Brahmin, can be none, except in the sense in which Goethe might be called the chief Brahmin of Germany; Bacon, Milton, Newton, chief Brahmins of England; Edwards, Franklin, Channing, Agassiz, of America. The Brahmin in India, like the priest in Egypt, may become king; but being only an individual, he does not carry with him to the throne the organized co-operation of his whole order. The distinctly religious function of the Brahmin will be considered, farther on, when we come to speak of religion in the European and more limited sense of the word. We have tried to find the central idea of Indian caste, but we suspect it contains only an unsuccessful attempt at a central idea,—an attempt to stereotype class, which resulted in stereotyping names, prejudices, genealogies. Caste is, for the most part, external, skin-deep, while class goes deeper; but though caste be a thing of the skin, its skin has become as thick and impenetrable as the hide of the rhinoceros. Class is natural, caste artificial; class is divine, caste human. Class, in the strict sense, without any infusion of caste, has never yet existed. Caste unmodified by class is forbidden by human nature. The individual, like society, starting as Sudra or laborer, may advance freely through all the natural classes, according to his capacities. Development is unshackled. In caste also much of the same thing in practice takes place, but with great hinderances often. It cannot tie down the Sudra to one occupation, but it can fix on him a label which sticks to him wherever he goes. He becomes a king,—there have been in India many such,—but he is labelled a Sudra king. Little the Sudra king may care for this, if truly a great man; but if only moderately great, he might have been kept back by this stigma from his legitimate place in society. Take away from caste all that is factitious, unnatural, stereotyped, and Hindoo society becomes excellent. Whether recovery from this plausible but pernicious mistake of the Brahmins is possible, and whether the road to progress

shall thus be reopened, is a question for future centuries, perhaps millenniums, to solve. However powerful caste may have been hitherto in the conservation of society, — as friends of progress we would fain hope its virtue in that particular has been overrated, — it seems nearly certain that with this obstruction Hindoo society can go no higher; and if no higher, then this last survivor of the primeval civilizations must at length, however remote the day, be crowded out by a society acknowledging the law of progress. This will be accomplished by a substitution of race, if it cannot be done otherwise. As the Hindoo castes have some of the peculiarities of the natural classes, so the European and American classes have some of the peculiarities of caste; though the balance of good is on our side, and of evil on theirs. In England, if a man's father or forefather was of low degree, that fact sticks to him till forgotten almost as if he were a Sudra. But if his blood can be traced back to the Plantagenet times or the Norman Conquest, it needs but little in addition to make him "respectable." Something of this we have brought over with us to America. If it is said there is nature at the bottom of all this, be it so; there is also nature at the bottom of Hindoo caste. Let us be just, and not put all the blame of caste upon the Hindoos. The difference between them and us is this: they undertake to impose laws, genealogies, ceremonies, upon the classes; we leave them free, in theory at least, to be directed by the sentiments, instincts, circumstances of society. Their bondage to caste admits considerable practical freedom; our theoretical freedom is not entirely free, as yet, from bondage to genealogy, prejudice, flunkeyism.*

Religion among the Hindoos spreads itself out over almost the whole of life. Laws, manners, worship, ceremonies,

* The subject of caste deserves an entire article or a volume. We are only able to throw out a few hints. In De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, Vol. II. Book III. Chap. I. p. 173, the reader will find some help to his thoughts, though there is no reference to *Hindoo* caste. See also Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, Book VI. Chap. VIII. of Martineau's translation, p. 585. But Comte falls into the common mistake of making the essence of caste consist in *hereditary occupation*. He speaks of caste in China, which is also a mistake. In McCulloch's *Geographical Dictionary*, Art. Hindustan, Vol. I. pp. 1106–1108, is a full and clear statement of facts. Mill does not on this subject do himself justice.

theology, science, philosophy, morals, education, are included. Among us religion is confined to ecclesiastical organization, worship, theology, and morals in part. Of morals we have said sufficient. Ecclesiastical organization the Hindoos have not. There is no Hindoo church. Caste is not a church; it takes no cognizance of theology or morals; with the *ceremonials* of worship it is strangely mixed up, but not with the *sentiment* of worship. But without a church, what becomes of worship, theology, morals? In our civilization it is taught as a first principle, a religious axiom, that, without a church, worship, theology, morals, all religion, would become extinct. Yet in India from time immemorial worship and theology have existed in full vigor; while morals, as we have seen, are as high as in the less favored portions of Christendom. The Brahmins are very numerous, and are divided into more numerous sub-castes, or "varieties, than any of the other classes." Some of the Brahmins reckon no less than two thousand distinct varieties in their order. Those who live by voluntary contributions, and perform no part of the ritual of worship, are in highest repute. "Next comes the Brahmin who lives by his industry and temporal employments, provided they be such as become the dignity of the order. The lowest of all are those Brahmins who perform the ritual of worship; and among these the meanest office is that of performing the service of the gods in the temples."* The Brahmins are not a priesthood in our sense of the term. Indeed, our word priest, when applied to them, is apt to mislead us, for it has a much narrower sense. The term Brahmin includes the idea of *savant*, philosopher, learned man, as well as priest. The various sub-castes of Brahmins are revered by their own immediate followers, but "almost all hold each other in contempt as pretenders." There is no centralized organization binding the Brahmins together. How then does worship maintain itself? A pagoda or temple gets erected much as an academy, or college, or bank, or hospital, among us. Temple servants, directors of ceremonies, priests as we say, — some of them Brahmins, some of them low-caste men, — gather

* McCulloch, I. 1107.

around the temple as they are wanted. Fakeers, or men of extraordinary piety, also come. Miracles are wrought. There is hook-swinging. Processions, sometimes imposing, sometimes amusing, draw the people out to be impressed or entertained. Even Europeans go, as to a theatre. In the art of processions the Hindoos surpass all other people. At the expense of a few dollars or tens of dollars they will accomplish more in this way than we can by as many hundreds. There is nothing of military order or stiffness in their processions; all is free and easy, yet without confusion. The grace of Hindoo costume and manners contributes to the effect. In Bombay, Singapore, and other places where there happens to be a variety of races and costumes, these religious processions are very striking, picturesque, interesting. There are no confessionals to drive the people to worship, but religious shows entice them forth to see and admire the gods. This spontaneousness of worship leads to idolatry, to foolish and sometimes abominable rites and ceremonies. Here is the weak side of Hinduism. From this side it has commonly been judged, and of course condemned, — very properly if this were all. A portion of this incidental grossness can better be cured by education than by direct repression. Immoralities, burning of widows, all breaches of law and order, the Company's government now prohibits, as it should do, cutting very deep into Hindoo prejudices sometimes, and thus endangering at times its own existence, as the present revolt will probably show, when all its causes come to be traced out. It is a peril which a wise and good government must not evade.

When we come to theology, the freedom of the Hindoos from ecclesiastical organization has its advantages. It leaves speculation free. A church would have prevented in part the growth of a monstrous mythology; but it would also have prevented in part that theological activity, that liberty and dignity of thought, which constitutes as striking a peculiarity among the intelligent in India, as the hideous gods do among the populace. There is much that is worthless, fantastic, erroneous, in the theological writings of the Hindoos, as there has been in the writings of all nations; but the errors die, the

truths are immortal. The best and shortest way to come at Hindoo theology is to quote directly from the Vedas and Menu. A single page is all the room we can afford for this purpose.

“May that soul of mine, which is a ray of perfect wisdom, pure intellect, and permanent existence, which is the unextinguishable light fixed within created bodies, without which no good act is performed, be united by devout meditation with the Spirit supremely blest and supremely intelligent. By one Supreme Ruler is this universe pervaded; even every world in the whole circle of nature. That Supreme Spirit moves at pleasure, but in itself is immovable; it is distant from us, yet very near us; it pervades this whole system of worlds, yet is infinitely beyond it. The man who considers all beings as existing even in the Supreme Spirit, and the Supreme Spirit as pervading all beings, henceforth views no creature with contempt. *They who are ignorantly devoted to the mere ceremonies of religion are fallen into thick darkness.* God, who is perfect wisdom, perfect happiness, He is the final refuge of the man who has liberally bestowed his wealth, who has been firm in virtue, who knows and adores that Great One.” See Sir W. Jones’s “Extracts from the Vedas,” Works, Vol. XIII. pp. 372, 379.

From the first chapter of the Institutes of Menu, found in Vol. VII. of Jones’s Works, we bring together a few selections to show the Hindoo ideas of creation and the origin of all things.

“This universe existed only in the first divine idea yet unexpanded, imperceptible, undefinable, undiscoverable by reason and undiscovered by revelation. He whom the mind alone can perceive, whose essence eludes the external organs, who has no visible parts, who exists from eternity, even He, the soul of all beings, shone forth in person. He gave being to time and the divisions of time, to the stars also, and to the planets, to rivers, oceans, and mountains, to level plains, and uneven valleys; to devotion, speech, complacency, desire, wrath; to the creation. He made a total difference between right and wrong, and inured these sentient creatures to pleasure and pain, cold and heat, and other opposite pairs. Animals and vegetables, encircled with multiform darkness, by reason of past actions, have internal conscience, and are sensible of pleasure and pain. All transmigrations, from that of Brahma to that of plants, happen continually in this tremendous world of beings,—a world always tending to decay. Thus that immutable Power, by waking and reposing alternately, revivifies and destroys in eternal

succession this whole assemblage of locomotive and immovable creatures." — I. 5 — 57.

Whatever may be thought of some of the conclusions of the Hindoos, their books afford ample proof of great activity, power, and spirituality of thought. He who thinks of the Supreme as a monarch sitting apart on his high throne, surrounded by his court of angels and archangels, — an anthropomorphic idea, — will find in the Hindoo theology a want of definiteness; and if definiteness be the measure of merit on this high subject, the anthropomorphic theologian has the advantage, and so too has the grosser anthropomorphite, the idolater. Colebrooke says: "If the doctrines of the Veds, and even those of the Puranas, be closely examined, the Hindoo theology will be found consistent with monotheism, though it contain the seeds of polytheism and idolatry."* There are various sects among the Hindoos. "Five great sects exclusively worship a single deity; one recognizes the five divinities adored by the others," but selects one god for daily devotion, and adores the others occasionally. Even these "deny the charge of polytheism," and justify their practice "by arguments similar to those elsewhere employed in defence of angel and image worship."* After the extracts given from Hindoo books, and the testimony of Orientalists, the reader will perhaps be disposed to admit the following conclusion of Elphinstone: "However inferior in spirit and energy and elegance to the Greeks, yet in their laws and forms of administration, the arts of life, the spirit of order, the Hindoos were the more advanced; their institutions less rude; their conduct to enemies more humane; their knowledge of God higher than that of the loftiest intellects of Athens in its best days." Colebrooke and Elphinstone both express the opinion, that the Hindoos in modern times are more given to idolatry than they were in the days of Menu and the Veds. With all deference to these high authorities, — and there are none higher, — we would suggest that theological inferences drawn from the best books of a people will differ, often widely, from conclusions derived from the prevailing popular practices and

* Asiatic Researches, VII. 279.

notions of the same people. A traveller in some parts of France, and much more in Italy, carrying with him notions of Romish Christianity derived from the best Catholic authors, would naturally conclude that the French and Italians of to-day have degenerated into grosser superstitions,—a very erroneous inference, as is well known. In all countries and ages there is a wide interval between the theology of the common people and that of the intellectual class, the makers of books, especially of books that live. Even now in Europe and America this is as true as in India, with only this difference, that the intellectual class in India is smaller in proportion to the millions. “God is a spirit,” say all Christians and Mohammedans, while multitudes of idolaters will admit the same. But what vast variety of meaning is attached to these words, not in different countries and churches alone, but in the same churches, and even in the same congregations! Although, therefore, the European who travels and resides in India may be shocked at the grossness of the superstition he everywhere sees, he cannot safely conclude there are no such thinkers in India now as there were in ancient times. Some of these modern thinkers we shall have occasion to refer to soon. Idolatry is patent and demonstrative; not so the refined theology of the intelligent. The repression imposed in most Protestant countries leads us to overrate the refinement and spirituality of the popular religion. Hence every now and then we are surprised to see Mormonisms and Millerisms springing up out of soil we had supposed incapable of growths like them.

The age of the Veds has been fixed in the fourteenth century before Christ. Some of the reasons given for this opinion we have not found very satisfactory, but one of them is. The solstitial points are spoken of in the Veds as being, one of them at the beginning of a certain constellation named, and the other in the middle of another constellation mentioned; astronomical computations show that “such was the situation of these cardinal points in the fourteenth century before the Christian era.”* The Veds are four in number, and are a

* Asiatic Researches, VIII. 493.

"compilation of prayers, with a collection of precepts and maxims entitled Brahmana; from which last portion"* are extracted the Upanishads, or theological tracts. As might be expected, there is "much disagreement and confusion in the gradation of persons interposed between the Supreme Being and the created world," for mythology is of popular growth; theology in the higher sense is from the philosophers.

The Brahmins are often condemned for pantheism; some of them, doubtless, go to an extreme in that direction, but most of them, probably, do not. Anthropomorphism, not pantheism, is the weak side of Brahminism; and the pantheism which has come in, or has existed from the beginning, is useful in neutralizing in part the anthropomorphism and idolatry.† It would be well for Catholic Christians to receive help in the same way, and even for some Protestants. For when we open some of our popular religious writers, the scientific eye detects a refined anthropomorphism cropping out here and there, showing that their ideas of the Deity are all borrowed from human government, human relations, human faculties. Anthropomorphism, carried to the extent of idol-worship, can commonly be corrected by a moderate amount of education; but it requires a higher education, often, to remove the more refined human deity. The wise man, however, will not be severe upon the supposed errors of men in either direction, — that of the too definite or that of the too vague, — remembering that he himself sees but in part, "through a glass darkly." Take away all our mistakes, our half-truths and smaller fractions of truth, and we might be left poor indeed, weak and confused. Happy is he who holds firmly yet kindly such fragments of truth as his faculties and culture can grasp,

* Asiatic Researches, VIII. 381.

† In some of our most popular and orthodox Christian writers may be found sentiments, which those who are strict to expunge all that savors of pantheism ought, if consistent, to condemn. Here is an instance from Cowper: —

"There lives and works
A soul in all things, and that soul is God.
The Lord of all, himself through all diffused,
Sustains and is the life of all that lives." — *Task*, VI.

This idea, though less common in Christian than in Brahminic literature, yet may often be found in our Christian books all the way back to St. Paul.

ready always to receive more truth from any quarter, however orthodox or heterodox. In the matter of caste the Brahmins are great bigots, but in theology they have the merit of greater liberality than many of their critics. Their theology is scattered through many volumes, and has never been condensed into compact and unyielding formulas. They are not organized into an efficient hierarchy, like the Church of Rome, nor into oligarchies, aristocracies, democracies, like the Protestant sects, all imposing restraints, more or less, upon thought. What, then, is to prevent their easy conversion to Christianity? The obstacles are great, — as many think, insuperable. Yet they receive kindly all attempts at conversion. When asked by Mohammedans or Christians to change their religion, they freely admit that other men's religions are best for them; they only claim that Hinduism is best for Hindoos. To put off their religion and put on that of the Christians, seems to them as absurd as it would be to put off their light and graceful cotton garments, so well suited to the climate, and to put on swallow-tail coats and stove-pipe hats; and nearly as impossible as to change their bronze and black complexions, which wear so well even into old age, for the marble faces of Europeans, which are only good while youth and health remain. As well renounce themselves as their religion, which enters into their laws, manners, literature, — constitutes their nationality, their civilization, — forms the groundwork of all their self-respect. The more intelligent of the Brahmins may sometimes admit that Christian ideas may to a small extent be adopted into Hinduism, but as to renouncing Hinduism itself, — "Never while the Ganges flows. Some of the laws of our Menu have become obsolete, others may become so; caste itself in some of its features may fade away; but these changes must take place only in obedience to the natural laws of society, not by any system of proselytism, which would destroy our self-respect and leave us the poorest of all Christians, pariahs in our sense and in yours; so, weak and good for nothing, we should only fall back into barbarism." Whither this ancient and remarkable system shall take its course, and whether it shall issue in something most resembling a Christianized Hinduism, or a Hinduized Christianity, none can tell. As

there have been in the past "sundry times and divers manners," it is not unreasonable to suppose there may continue to be in the future. Uniformity is not the law of progress. As Saxons and Christians, we are ambitious to carry round the world, and through the ages, our own ways of thinking and doing; but we may learn humility from Egyptian hieroglyphs, and Roman aqueducts, and Sepoy rebellions. The influence of England and its religion on the Hindoos is likely to be in proportion to the durability of the Anglo-Indian government. Still, we see how very little Mohammedanism, with all its aggressiveness, has been able to change the Hindoos in nine hundred years. The Mohammedans of India have themselves become partially Hinduized. That truly great man, the Emperor Akber, was in spirit as much a Hindoo as a Mohammedan. It is commonly believed that Mohammedanism would have overspread Europe in the eighth century but for Charles Martel and his victory at Tours. In India there was no Charles Martel nor victory of Tours, to turn back the conquering hordes of the North. Hindoo institutions, the laws and principles of Menu, alone interposed; and most effectual was the interposition. It is often said that the religion of the Hindoos is of less value than that of the Mohammedans, — a correct assertion, if caste be taken as an inseparable part of their religion, or if idolatry be regarded as its characteristic feature; but looking merely at theology and morality, the Brahmins are in advance of Islam. They take wider views, are more tolerant, are more ready to entertain new ideas. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans were showing, by the wars of the Roses, the burning of Joan of Arc and John Huss, what kind of religion and civilization they had attained to, a Brahmin, in reply to a Mohammedan who censured him for worshipping idols, said, "All religions, if practised with equal sincerity, are equally acceptable to God." For this heresy he was condemned by a council of Moolahs to die or turn Mohammedan. The Brahmin showed his sincerity by accepting death rather than the alternative.* In the seventeenth century, when only Milton and a few other

* Allen's India, p. 94.

Europeans had obtained glimpses of the true principle of toleration, Jeswunt Singh, a Hindoo Rajah, in opposition to an attempt of Aurungzebe to levy a tax on the religion of the Hindoos, made this memorable appeal :—

“ If your Majesty places any faith in those books by distinction called divine, you will there be instructed that God is the God of all mankind, not of Mohammedans alone. The Pagan and the Mussulman are equal in his presence; distinctions of color are of his ordination. It is he who gives existence. In your temples it is in his name that the voice calls to prayer; in our house of images the bell is shaken: still he is the object of our adoration. To vilify, therefore, the religion or the customs of other men, is to set at naught the pleasure of the Almighty.” Let it not be said that this is the inspiration of a single great soul; for, adds the historian,* “ Such were the sentiments that became common among all the Hindoos.”

The words of Sir John Malcolm may seem to Americans an exaggeration. If not, it would follow that the Hindoos of the seventeenth century were, on this point of religious toleration and charity, in advance of Christians, and nearer to the spirit of Christ himself; that they had, two hundred years ago, reached that point where only the better portions of Christendom now are. It would also follow, that their attainments in religious knowledge are much higher than popular opinion gives them credit for. Such we believe, from numerous and competent witnesses, and from considerable personal intercourse with Hindoos, to be the simple fact. One day, after a noisy and idolatrous procession of the Hindoos had taken place, happening to meet a Brahmin whom we had often met for purposes of business, we inquired of him why it was that his people worshipped idols. His reply would have done honor to Plato: “ What you see is only the *outside* of our religion, the *costume*, the fashion of the common people. Men of sense everywhere, in all religions, worship the One God. Our outside ways and forms are strange to you, as yours are to us, but underneath all this outside show and dress we unite in the

* Malcolm's Central India, I. 52.

same substantial truth." But why allow these idols, and especially such coarse and foolish ones? "Children have dolls and toys to help out their thoughts, and so the common people must have their idols, often rude ones." Why do you not teach them better? "That is hard;* take from them their idols, their outside forms and helps, and we take from them also the internal reality; we confuse their weak and ignorant minds. Ignorant and foolish people will and must have foolishness in their religion. In *your* country, have not the ignorant people foolish notions and ways in religion?" This home thrust was as unexpected as it was effective. For the exact words of a conversation which took place sixteen or seventeen years ago we cannot vouch, but only for the ideas, which cannot be forgotten. The Hindoos not only treat other religions with outward politeness, but with inward respect. They like to see the Buddhist going to his temple, the Mohammedan to his mosque, the Christian to his church, the Jew to his synagogue, the Pharisee to his sunrise salutations.

The country people of India, seeing travellers who stopped at the government bungalows walk regularly before breakfast, (walking for exercise is a thing undreamed of among Asiatics,) they concluded — a conclusion quite as philosophical as some of ours respecting them — that this walking to and fro was a religious exercise, and respected it accordingly; did not sneer or lament, as we are wont when witnessing new manifestations of the religious sentiment. Their religion consists in customs, habits, sentiments, principles, ideas, wrought into the whole of life from childhood upward, imbedded in the manners, adjusted to the country, the climate, the race, capable of some modification in the educated man, but no more admitting of entire change than the color of their hair or eyes. With his utmost tenacity of his right to be let alone in his religion, the Hindoo never assumes that the religions of other men are bad and false. He believes that to *them* their religions are true and sacred, as his is to him. He is educated to hold firmly his own religion, and to respect the consciences, feelings, preju-

* "To discover the Creator and Father of this universe is hard; and when discovered, it is impossible to reveal him to mankind at large." — Plato, *Timæus*, IX.

dices, of others. We are educated to believe that we have in our religion a monopoly of all religious truth and merit; that other religions are false and wicked; that it is one of our solemn duties to invade the religions of others, to thrust our faith upon them in all ways except that of force. It is not enough that we prefer Christianity above all other religions; we are called upon to *hate* other religions. Even from Unitarian writers, often charged with carrying their liberality to such an extreme as to evince indifference to all religion, we could make quotations showing that they also might take lessons in liberality from the Hindoos. The example of the Hindoos proves that boundless liberality to other religions is entirely consistent with the most ardent, and even fanatical, attachment to one's own. The "greased cartridge" rebellion is of itself sufficient proof that the Hindoos are not chargeable with religious indifference. Neither need anybody be, though liberal and tolerant to the widest extent. Strange that we should be importing into New England facts and arguments from the antipodes to prove a point like this.

Whatever may be our theory of divine influence and inspiration, we can hardly rise from the careful and candid study of Menu, the Veds, and the modern Hindoos, without the impression that the Infinite Being has not imprisoned himself, his energies, influences, inspirations, within any one religion or civilization; nor without respect for a polity, civil and religious, so efficient and so enduring. We do not forget that it is a common impression, even among those who have obtained correct views of the former civilization of the Hindoos, that they have in modern times degenerated. This degeneracy we doubt. That the usual effects of subjugation to foreign races are visible to some extent in India, is true; but we know of no other people who have stood out so successfully against such influences. Like other Asiatic peoples, they have shown little wisdom in organizing and maintaining imperial and central governments. Hence their subjugation. But imperfection in central organization is the very reason, perhaps, why they have succeeded so well in local governments, in village communities. They are inferior, and probably always have been, to the Mohammedans, and greatly inferior to the English,

in the art of imperial government, so that they have probably gained under the Mohammedans and English by this improvement in central government as much as they have lost by subjugation. If called upon to put Hinduism into our European scales and weigh it, we might say by way of approximation, — and approximation only, — that they are about at that stage of advancement where were found the French, the English, the Arabians, the civilized world generally, in the fifteenth century, with the single exception of the Italians, who then led the van of the human race. Just then the revival of learning, the invention of printing, the discovery of America, the Reformation, scientific development, — following each other in logical order, — have given birth to our marvellous modern civilization, as marvellous as that of Greece from Marathon to the Indus. In these four hundred years since the fall of Constantinople, we have left the Hindoos and some other races behind. It is not, however, one of the proofs of our superiority that we look back and undervalue the Hindoos; for in so doing we undervalue our own former attainments, so hardly won from the long past, and with helps from Rome, Greece, Palestine, Egypt, which the Hindoos had not. Macaulay thinks the people of India “quite as highly civilized as the Spaniards,” — a stronger statement than any we have made, perhaps a trifle too strong. So far as we can learn, they have, except in literature, exhibited the remarkable phenomenon of a stationary civilization for at least three thousand years, contrary to the first principles of our Western judgment, which includes progress as a necessary element in our idea of civilization. When a people cease to go forward, we take it for granted they go backward. Here then is a puzzle to arrest our thoughts.

Our survey of the Hindoos is very incomplete, unless we take into account their languages, their literature, their art, their philosophy, in which particulars they would show to better advantage than in those we have been considering. But only a book, not an article, much less the end of an article, would be sufficient for this examination.*

* On these topics we refer to the Works of Sir William Jones, Colebrooke, the

ART. III. — STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE POPULAR RELIGION AND OF LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY.

1. *Parting Words: a Discourse preached August 2, 1857, in Hope Street Church, Liverpool, on closing a Ministry of Twenty-five Years.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. London: E. T. Whitfield. 8vo. pp. 19.
2. *Common Sense applied to Religion: or, The Bible and the People.* By CATHERINE E. BEECHER. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1857. 12mo. pp. 358.
3. *Prospectus, containing Proposals and soliciting Subscriptions for a new Quarterly, the PURITAN REVIEW.* Boston. 1857.

WE always turn to a new production from the pen of James Martineau with deeper eagerness of heart, and with higher expectation of mind, than we do to the utterance of any other man. In whatever he writes, we look for the most exquisite graces of expression, for the mature results of profound experience and lofty wisdom, for the tonic breathings of a spirit of saintly purity and lonely elevation. The discourse now before us, though entirely free from forensic purpose, an unstudied effusion to meet an occasion which mingled the friendly memories of many years with parting sorrows and the chastened hopes of a serious enterprise in a new sphere, is full of its author's extraordinary genius, and is one of the worthiest expressions of Liberal Christianity it has ever been our fortune to fall upon. We have to thank Mr. Martineau for the rare delight, the precious instruction, the sacred impulse, his Sermon has given us. We hardly remember when anything has at once so moved and satisfied us. Wondrous depth and delicacy of emotion surcharge many of

"Asiatic Researches," "Asiatic Journal," and "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal." On the Hindoo Drama, see Westminster Review, April, 1857. On Hindoo Philosophy, consult Cousin, Lectures V. and VI. of Second Series. We refer our readers who are interested in the condition of India to an excellent article in the December number of Blackwood, on "The Religions of India," and another on "Our Indian Empire." We may add, that, so far as these show any coincidences of thought with our own views, they must be taken as affording to those views independent support of high character, as the article to which we add this note was printed before these essays were seen by its author.

its sentences with an irresistible pathos. "With sad affection I once more count and store the fruits of five-and-twenty years; then turn upon them the key of sacred memory, and depart." "Eternal things, and they alone, spread a blessed quiet behind the changes of our humanity,—an expanse of mountain verdure over which the sunshine and the shadows play; and *there* we must lay to rest the sadness of an evanescent life."

It is not noisy demonstrativeness nor bulk of words that tests the truth and measures the force of feeling. Vital fineness of quality is the thing. Grade, and not quantity, is the standard. A grain of musk is more odorous than a mountain of earth, and a drop of elixir worth more than an ocean of brine. One tone from the lips or one touch from the heart of Jesus conveys larger wealth of tenderness than freights the whole souls and lives of meaner men. Mr. Martineau's affecting plea,—on pages thirteen and fourteen of this Discourse,—for the fostering of the lesser pieties of life, that carry the upward look over a thousand resting-places up to the perfect Light, adds heavily to the debt of pleasure and profit, already so vast, which we owe him. It reveals in its author a yearning softness and power of sensibility, as much beyond the experience of ordinary men as it is above the comprehension of the critics who fancy his writings to be cold.

But having acknowledged the modesty and tenderness which compose the first charm of "Parting Words," we cannot refrain from paying our distant tribute of admiration for the magnificent example afforded in this Discourse of the union of a bold philosophy with a loving faith. We make especial reference to the passage—from page seven to page thirteen—where Mr. Martineau argues for the sympathetic presence of God eternally with our humanity. With a telling aptness of illustration equal to the vigorous decisiveness of the thought, he shows that the usual absence and silence of God are not compensated, but his omnipresence is limited, by exceptional miracle and occasional message; "for the sender cannot well say to his servant, 'You go there,' without implying, 'I stay here.' It is not 'once upon a time,' it is not 'now and

then,' — nor is it on the theatre of another's life to the exclusion of our own, — that we sigh to escape from the bound movements of nature into the free heart of God. We pine as prisoners, till we burst into the air of that supernatural life which God lives eternally."

We hail the publication of Miss Beecher's "Common Sense applied to Religion" with great satisfaction. Although the work contains much which, in our view, is erroneous, yet a very large part of it commands our unqualified assent. The method followed in the inquiry is of remarkable clearness, thoroughness, and effectiveness; every page is pervaded by an invariable spirit of courage, earnestness, and piety; and the general ability shown throughout the execution of the task must awaken admiration. The introduction, giving a sketch of the religious experience of the authoress, is full of power, and exceedingly instructive. We hardly know where to find a better exhibition of the shocking character of the Calvinistic theology, and of the awful spiritual disease it produces, than is, perhaps in a degree unintentionally, here furnished by Miss Beecher, in her account of the experimental working of certain "theological theories at war both with the common sense and the moral sense of mankind."

But, from our point of view, the most welcome contribution in the book is the appendix containing Miss Beecher's demolishing examination of "The Theological Dogma of a Depraved Mental Constitution." We here see a fine specimen of the way in which a fearless application of the principles of "common sense" always leads to the conclusions held by Liberal Christians. To show the irreconcilableness of the common doctrine, that men are born with a totally depraved nature, with any proper idea of God or justice, the following illustration is advanced. "Suppose a colony settles on an isolated island, which is found covered with the tobacco-plant. They clear their plantations, but find that, by an unintelligible arrangement, after every shower there is a fall of tobacco-seeds, disseminated from an inaccessible height by a machine erected for the purpose and constantly supplied. After some years they receive a missive from the king to

whom the island belongs, in which he informs them that tobacco is the chief object of his detestation; that it is doing incalculable mischief to his subjects; that it is the chief end of his life, and he wishes it to be of theirs, to exterminate the plant, and thus its use. He at the same time states that he is the author of the contrivance for scattering the seed, and that he keeps it constantly supplied, and claims that he has a right to do what he will with his own, without being questioned by his subjects. He then enacts, that any person who is found to use tobacco, or even to have a single seed or plant on his premises, shall be burned alive in a caldron of fire and brimstone. If, in addition to this, that king were to command supreme love to him, and perfect confidence in his wisdom, justice, and goodness, all this would but faintly illustrate the awful system under consideration, whose penalties are *eternal*."

The different Essays we have named, proceeding from quarters so different, lead us directly to the second part of the undertaking on which we began in our last number.

Taking up the subject where it was left in our last number, we pass next to say, that the first great force working for Liberal Christianity is Reason. The truth of things, the appearance of probabilities, the light of nature, the spontaneous suppositions of the mind, and all the necessities of a large and sound logic, lie full and clear in its favor. The advocates of the antagonist system know this, and have freely admitted it. They confess that their dogmas are revolting to human nature, contrary to the unregenerate understanding; but then, they argue, since man's nature is totally depraved, this dislike and rejection prove the truth and divinity of their creed, because whatever harmonizes with a discordant nature and wins a reprobate mind must perforce be false and evil! But it is very hard to make a man believe this, who thinks for himself. God made the mind and made the universe. However degraded and ruined the mind is, it discovers and recognizes the truths of science, and the truths of morality, distinguishes them from errors, groups them in concord, establishes them in faith, and builds machines, guides conduct, and organizes life in conformity to them. Why shall

it not as well be able to discover and recognize the truths of religion, and distinguish them from falsehood? The sphere of religion is but another part of the same great realm of God. Further, we are taught by the common preaching, that while men, as a common thing, know well enough what is right, they invariably prefer what is wrong; even when their moral perceptions are clear, their practical choice and action are sure to be perverse and sinful. Is God then the author of our discriminations, and the Devil the author of our volitions? Are we thus divided between two makers, and subject to two owners?

The popular theologians do not dare to leave the mind unembarrassed to act for itself. They know that it will, of the two, infallibly prefer the teachings of Liberal Christianity, and turn with scorn from the absurd tenets of the common creed. Accordingly, they seize every opportunity, early and late, to indoctrinate their pupils and hearers with their sectarian peculiarities. Perfectly aware that the only way to secure a lasting reception for their characteristic doctrines is by dint of authority, repetition, illustration, and persuasion, they spare no pains to instil them by assertion and education into their congregations, and by unceasing suggestions and applications of them to preserve their prevalence. Let them remain unenforced for a single generation, and they would well-nigh disappear from credit and from remembrance, — they are so foreign and unnatural, so inconsistent with experimental truth.

In the Popular Religion there is everywhere an entrapping network of technical and self-coherent logic, but nowhere any deep and sound reasoning. At the very outset, — the prime premiss of all, — it is absurd to suppose that, when God infinitely hates sin, he would freely foreordain the existence of a race which was immediately to become a total mass of depravity, compel him to suffer and die in its behalf, and still, even in spite of that, entail infinite horror on countless myriads. To a free mind, it is an incredible figment to start with. And then the system is pertinaciously buttressed by thick inferences of monstrous sophistry. Men commit sins; therefore human nature is totally depraved. As well say, Men

do virtuous deeds; therefore human nature is totally good! Sin violates the will of an infinite Lawgiver; therefore its punishment must be infinite. As well say, The eye looks into boundless space; therefore it is itself boundless! The clover has three leaves on one stalk; therefore God is trinity in unity; or, as Tupper puts it, "The tree of being with each trefoil leaf points at the trinity of God." As well say, There are four cardinal directions in the one space; therefore God is quaternity in unity! The Apostles were inspired to perform their mission; therefore the records which they penned are, even to every letter and comma, infallible expressions of truth. As well say, Elijah was miraculously caught up in a chariot of fire; therefore he rose in a perfectly vertical line! There is no reason in all this. It is but scholastic technicality to support arbitrary assumption. So far from being what it pretends, namely, a humble bowing of reason in faith before overwhelming "mysteries," it is a presumptuous attempt to explain everything with prosaic sharpness. Instead of setting forth impressive mysteries as reality presents them to us in life and nature, it holds up a set of brow-beating contradictions and theatrical fictions.

Liberal Christianity, on the contrary, offers a rational induction based on a careful survey of the facts. It clearly states what is clear, and leaves in vagueness what is vague. It says, men are free and tempted, sometimes doing good, sometimes evil; and out of the probationary struggle they are to win salvation. And these statements appeal to common sense. That belief which is kept up only by the suppression of reason cannot always stand. Let earnest inquiry become general, the yoke of fashion be shaken off by loyalty to truth, and the critical hour for the downfall of theological error would soon strike, and the vacant throne of authority be occupied by a more genial and beautiful form of faith, expressing the Divine Will as it is.

The second mighty ally of Liberal Christianity is Conscience. Its teachings and requirements harmonize with the intuitions of our moral constitution, while all the generous forces of natural ethics revolt against the moral principles involved in the popular religion. That God should, by an absolute

election from all eternity, predestine uncounted millions of souls to endless torture, for no ill which they have done, but purely of his own arbitrary pleasure ; — that Christ should by his undeserved sufferings create a fund of merit which may be transferred to the account of others, and save them from the penalties which they do deserve, thus making guilt and merit merchantable commodities ; — that a nature of utter depravity should be forced on innocent and unresisting generations as fast as they appear, making them, without any fault of their own, or any chance of self-rescue, the subjects of infinite hate and woe ; — that the intellectual credence of certain propositions, or the formal observance of certain ceremonies, should entitle some to immortal blessedness, while all who from ignorance, inability, or over-strong temptation fail of these artificial conditions, are remorselessly doomed for ever ; — these, and other kindred views, are almost incredible subversions of all honor and of all right. Their injustice and barbarity do the foulest violence to the very rudiments of the moral sense, to all rectitude, to all magnanimity. They are only tolerated under the drugging influence of the superstitious notion, so sedulously inculcated, that our moral convictions are unreliable, jangled, and diseased, and must be subjected to the rectifying hand of foreign authority. And even as it is, conscience writhes uneasily, with noble misgivings, and occasionally rises in rebellious reaction against the dishonorable load held upon it.

The profound instinctive morality of the breast has usually compelled artists, involuntarily, in painting their pictures of the Last Judgment, to represent the faces of the saved with features of angelic beauty, and expression of virtuous serenity ; and those of the doomed, distorted with fiendish passion and ugliness, full of degradation, sin, and rage. But, in accordance with the doctrine which teaches that all who throw themselves in simple confidence on the vicarious atonement are redeemed, no matter what their wickedness, and all others are condemned, no matter how great their goodness, these painters should depict on their canvas pious believers and formalists, their faces foul from lives of excessive lust, and furious with hate and pride, borne triumphantly aloft among the cherubim.

Also they should depict virtuous heathen and conscientious heretics, who have lived up to their highest convictions and their best opportunities, their features filled and radiant with saintly love and purity, clutched by devils and dragged down to the flaming pit, the great Judge nodding approval! The outraged instinct of fairness and right cries against such a view.

The common representation of the transmission of a ruined and condemned nature to all mankind from the first man is,—to quote Miss Beecher's thrilling illustration,—“as if a teacher should so construct traps for his pupils, that one little fellow, when forbidden to do it, should touch a spring that should cut off his own hand, and thus move other springs that would maim all the rest of the school, while the master lays all the blame on the child that disobeyed,” but visits the full punishment on each one! The doctrine does insufferable violence to the law of justice and honor, writ by God's own finger in our moral constitution. The eye, when diseased and inflamed in a certain manner, sees all things in a red radiance; but the healing tendency of its organization constantly strives to restore it to health, so that it shall look abroad and see nature again in the cool white light of truth. So conscience, under the perverse wrench, elaborate instruction, and morbid stimulus of the Popular Religion, sees its shocking dogmas appear justified and true; but, in unison with the truth of things and the laws of morality, it ever tends to rectify its perceptions, and to re-establish the authority of its normal intuitions. Whenever it recovers its rightful tone and independence, it is the fast friend of that rational religion which asserts exact justice impartially for every individual, and the fatal foe of a scheme which would necessitate the rejection of the mild and blameless Servetus, and the acceptance of the vindictive bigot who burnt him alive.

The third active propagandist of Liberal Christianity is the human Heart. The spontaneous sympathies of our nature repudiate that sectarian exclusiveness which limits the favor of God to a small clique, and launches a blasting curse on all others. Every tender feeling of the bosom refuses the theology which wraps the sunny domain of man in the gloom of

total depravity, and stigmatizes the surrounding scene of nature and life as a Satanic possession, whose legitimate motives are impulses to iniquity, and whose temporal prizes are lures to damnation. The instinctive yearnings of the heart, when it is not shrivelled by a freezing asceticism or inflamed by an acrid bigotry, go forth to brood lovingly over all the fair scenes of nature, all the sweet homes of men, all the hallowed ties and aspiring toils of society.

Liberal Christianity recognizes in the present phase of earth and history, not the execrable ruins of the Fall, but the evolving processes of Providence and the fulfilling destinies of the world. It beholds in every form of man in his natural condition, not an accursed outcast and demoniacal wreck, but, in spite of all his degradation, a sacred child of God, and a dear brother of humanity, even still too precious and divine to be despised or to be neglected. It conceives of God, not as a distant Monarch and pitiless Judge, an inexorable Decreeer, but as an omnipresent Providence and an affectionate Father, his relationship and disposition towards the world emblemized in the mild air and sunlight on its flowers, not in the terrible hail and thunderbolt on its roofs. This is the difference between the teaching of Christ and that of an Athanasius. The heart, unless perverted and enslaved by some foreign influence, will never hesitate in its choice.

Construct in imagination the picture of horrors which human life is, according to the scheme of a Jonathan Edwards. A relentless Sovereign throned in the distant sky; a ruined, reprobate, and helpless race, struggling and weeping across the earth; a bottomless, roaring hell, opening its jaws underneath; the thunders and lightnings of condemnation, rolling and flashing throughout the scene; the immense majorities of dying souls, dropping into the brimstone gulf; while a few favorites, by a mechanical device, are caught up into glory! Is this a view which a kind and healthy heart can credit or can endure? It is as shocking to the sensibilities as it is confounding to the understanding. In opposition to all this, the deep poetry of the heart, the strong soul of philanthropy, cling to the created and unlost divineness of nature, to the godlike worth and dignity of all the sweet affections and high

virtues of humanity. They will not confess that any cliff or glen, volcano or tempest, is the theatre and expression of Satan; nor abandon magnanimous deeds of friendship and self-sacrificing struggles of righteousness as filthy rags hateful in the sight of Heaven. But they persist to trace the just and loving habits of God in the solemn and benignant laws of the universe, to recognize the wooing symbols of his present attributes in all its beauties and mysteries, and to affirm the incomparable desirableness and the inalienable value of purity, humility, rectitude, forgiveness, and love, even when no "Evangelical" truth or rite has restoringly touched them with its occult charm. Men of a humane spirit, instead of enjoying a selfish personal salvation the more from its contrast with the general perdition, spread their sympathies out over all. They will not, cannot, abandon any to eternal damnation. They hasten to pity and embrace the weak and erring ones, the depraved and wretched ones. Their heart-strings are tied to the last wanderer. The thought of him in hell would shoot his tortures through them in heaven. Surely they are not better than God; and so the protesting throbs of the heart are cannon-balls against the old theology, to let a better faith in through the breach.

Another influential support of Liberal Christianity is the progress of Science and Philosophy. A growing enlightenment is abroad, an ever-enlarging perception of the harmonious conformity of truth and nature. Arbitrary hypotheses, plausible conceits, metaphysical assumptions, and logical technicalities, are going out of date, getting displaced by loyal study and notation of the phenomena, giving way to conscientious inferences of laws or probabilities drawn from careful induction. In consequence of this change of temper, this improvement of method, prodigious, even revolutionizing advances have been made in the knowledge of nature. A steady order of succession, an unvarying chain of linked sequences, is everywhere discerned. It is seen that there are no fickle whims, no arbitrary volitions, no incalculable tricks and fetches in nature; but that all is in order of cause and effect. Before the broad, shining, penetrative daylight of this discovery, physical superstitions, the dark and timid delusions

once so common, are fast dying out from the belief even of the ignorant multitudes. Astrology, sorcery, every old shape of supernatural jugglery, is tumbling into hopeless discredit.

The triumph thus achieved in the realm of science helps the approach of a similar triumph in the realm of ethics and religion. In this province of faith, Superstition, driven from other fields, still maintains a stand. But she holds a divided and struggling empire, into whose affrighted darkness the arrows of light are showering, and the regiments of truth are marching with all their banners spread. The instructive conquests of physical science have been followed by a corresponding improvement in philosophical thought. People are getting to see that the same regular succession, or uniform operation of cause and effect, universal prevalence of law, already acknowledged in the material, also holds equally in the moral and spiritual world,—is as true in the forces of character, the elements of experience, and the issues of human destiny, as it is in the processes of chemistry and among the moving bulks of astronomy.

In proportion as this fact is appreciated, the Popular Religion must go down before it. For the essence of that scheme of doctrinal faith is a reliance on arbitrary effects, on magic. The dogma of the resurrection of the dead at the blast of a trumpet when Christ comes, is, in its veritable basis and idea, but the resuscitation and enlargement, on an awful scale, of the old notion of *necromancy*. We mean, the same style of thought which produced the latter doctrine, supports the former. To believe that a trust in the blood of the atonement can cleanse a corrupted nature, and redeem a lost soul from hell to heaven, is to believe in sorcery. The compelling of supernatural regenerative grace, by muttering a creed or observing a ceremonial, is the conjuring of a pagan deity into his shrine by a spell, the commanding of a genie by rubbing a ring or saying *Abacadabra*. To say that the sprinkling of a person with a few drops of water, in the name of the Trinity, secures his otherwise forfeited salvation, is to assert the grossest form of magic. Yet it is said by the Popular Religion. Dr. James W. Alexander preached a sermon, but a few years since, in which he drew the following scene. A child, which

has been baptized in the faith of the atonement, lies dying. The Justice of God comes, and with gathered fury and uplifted arms prepares to spring upon the parting soul; but suddenly, seeing the mark of the sacrificial blood upon it, the disappointed avenger starts back, disarmed and baffled, and flees away! Such notions once found favor, but they must ere long disappear; for ignorance is a dark, hungry chasm in the mind, which superstition formerly fed with deluding phantoms and magic, but which education now enlightens and fills with truth. Every step of emancipating knowledge in science and philosophy pioneers the resistless coming and sway of a purer form of the Gospel than the one now commonly acknowledged.

Furthermore, Liberal Christianity has an ally, of as yet untested strength, in what may be called the Spirit of the Age. The foremost characteristics of the present period are essentially antagonistic to the Popular Religion, and in affinity with the contrasted system of belief and feeling, the Liberal interpretation of life and of its ends and means. There was an age when the world was hated, and the best thing a man could do was to bury himself in a monk's cell; but that age has gone. Never before was asceticism so much out of fashion as now, never monasticism so little in repute. To a degree hitherto unrivalled, dogmatic systems and metaphysical quibbles are contemptuously neglected, while common sense and practical morality are deferred to and are demanded. The most marked feature of the times is the absorption of people in industrial enterprises, business toils, and social plans; in scientific discoveries, mechanical inventions, and international communications. The railroad, steamship, electric telegraph, incessant travels, and a thousand allied forces, conspire to draw all mankind into one great family, knit by universal sympathies and common aims. These influences of the illumined and progressive world are more and more enlisting men in the fascinating labors, aspirations, and enjoyments of the present life. Less ghostly, less abstract, less remote, become the schemes and ideals of men. It is felt that the highest wisdom and the truest religion for man are the loyal use of his faculties, and the earnest

improvement of his opportunities in time and nature. He is to win his salvation, not by retiring to a hermitage, scorning the world, and engaging in miraculous spasms or Sibylline incantations; but by plunging into the round of active duties, with resolute fidelity and a philanthropic spirit, and bearing away from the arena of temptations the prize of cultured integrity. The liberal believer thinks that God made the world, and orders the course of affairs; and that he placed men on earth to work and be blessed here and now, as well as elsewhere and hereafter. God does not hold Eternity as a hostage for Time; for Time too is within his camp.

The consistent devotee of Calvinism or Catholicism — a man like Hopkins in the last century, or Newman in the present — has no part or lot, takes no interest, in the world, save as his theology touches the scene, making it the theatre of a forensic redemption, where he is forced to await the scenic winding up of all things. In the eyes of such a one, the squalor, hunger, ignorance, abject slavery, unimproving beggary, and boundless superstition in which the Italian *lazzaroni* exist, are far better than the ungodly education, liberty, wealth, refinement, progressive independence, and happiness of a high Protestant civilization. For does not that degradation lead up to Paradise, and this bright dignity plunge down to Purgatory? The earnest adherent of the popular theology, whether Papal or Protestant, is a stranger on the earth, hurrying to get into heaven. He has nothing to do here, except to hate the universal depravity, and receive a vicarious ransom. Sequestering his sympathies from miscellaneous humanity to the narrow household of the saints, he sighs for the blessed consummation of deliverance and the climax of time. This, — to quote one of his best representative writers, — this is what he says: "O most tender heart of Jesus, why wilt Thou not end this ever-growing load of sin and woe? When wilt Thou chase away the Devil into his own hell, and close the pit's mouth, that Thy chosen may rejoice in Thee, quitting the thought of those who perish in their wilfulness? But oh! by those five dear wounds in hands and feet and side, — perpetual founts of mercy, from which the fulness of the Eternal Trinity flows, ever fresh, ever powerful, — *if the world*

must still endure, at least gather Thou an ampler proportion of souls out of it into Thy garner!" But the real nineteenth-century man is not so, feels not so, believes not so. And all this must by and by be swept away by the mighty tendencies and spirit of the age, which so persuasively, with wedded motives of duty, reason, and interest, exhort men to make the most and the best of their present life, aiming by exhaustion of its natural possibilities to conquer a worthy inheritance in the immortal hereafter. The Liberal Christian who has attained to a just and wholesome interpretation of God's government, the world's purpose, and life's business, will not say, in the language of Dr. Johnson, "Standing on the earth, and looking up to heaven, I am always to feel that my chief duty *here* is to strive to get *there*." No, but he will feel that, while here, he is simply to fulfil the will of God as indicated in the constitution of things, doing the tasks laid on him, enjoying the good within his reach, with a glad and humble heart, making the best of himself and the present, letting the future take care of itself under the disposal of God. Not to get into a snug, luxurious heaven, but to grow for ever in spiritual nobility, is the glorious and never-flagging destiny of man. God is love, and man is the child of God. He too, then, is love; and

"Love is born of fire, fitted with mounting wings,
That at his highest he may winde him higher."

The heart is bursting from its superstitious swaddling-clothes, the conscience asserting its rightful supremacy, the intellect casting off its priestly fetters. Healthier forms of love and nobler forms of thought are emerging upon the stage. Men are neglecting metaphysical creeds and outgrowing sacerdotal puerilities. And we cannot help looking to the democratic genius of American civilization, especially to our great, new, free West, to see erelong an unparalleled development of this tendency, and in a less negative form than thus far appears. Emancipated as our people there are, so generally, from kingcraft, priestcraft, tradition, and establishment, — living and laboring under the most equal circumstances, in the freest conditions, with the most inspiring motives, between all the instructions of antiquity and all the incentives

of posterity, illimitable possibilities before them,—will they voluntarily reorganize the old sacramental and dogmatic theology, which makes salvation depend on a ceremony or an abstraction in the keeping of a priest or a book,—which, with its gloom of the Fall and its glare of the Pit, takes the smiling sunshine of God off from the meadow, and his brooding blessing out of the sky, converting human existence into a frightful probation, on a bridge of sighs, between a palace and a prison? Believe it not. Rather will they turn life itself—inspired by love, ruled by justice, and crowned by piety—into an all-convincing and universal religion, whose temple shall be floored by their prairies and its walls over-arched by their blue dome, whose hymns shall be the joys of a free nation, whose ever-repeated litany their industrial routine, whose altar the Rocky Mountains, the canopy of clouds its hung drapery, the sun and stars its candle-lights, the smoke of ten million hearths its incense, the Missouri and the Colorado its libations.

The final element of strength in Liberal Christianity, and of weakness in the Popular Religion, considering them as rival systems soliciting the allegiance of mankind, is contained in the easy and harmonious applicability of the former to actual experience and life, and the absolute impossibility of reducing the latter to practice and carrying it out consistently in life. That fits the working facts of man and the world; this is an impracticable theory, when tried jarring at every point, and refusing to make music with the necessities of the present state. It is difficult to estimate sufficiently the multiform modes and the vast importance of the influence thus indicated. Let us get at least some hasty glimpse of the fact, and of its chief manifestations. God, says Liberal Christianity, is the Author and Ruler of the present system of the universe, in all its spheres of nature, morals, and religion; the evil in it resulting, not from Satanic interference, or a Divine curse, but from the contingencies of finite things and the variable conduct of free beings. Man is the subject of an immortal destiny, which he is freely to fulfil in its first stages by the use of his natural faculties and opportunities in this world-theatre of time, and afterwards by a similar improvement of

God's gracious boons in another realm of existence. The practical inferences from these propositions are, that we should resist temptation, cultivate our powers, enjoy our blessings, love our fellows, and co-operate in all good enterprises, make the best of our chances, and, by draining the uses of the present, fit ourselves for the future. This view obviously harmonizes with our situation, and is the tacit theory according to which civilized mankind really aim to live. "To apply this theory to life, saving the limitations of our weakness and sin, is as natural as for water to run down hill.

But the established theology teaches that the world, in consequence of the Fall, is an accursed scene of evil, deserving only contempt and rejection, and mankind a mass of total depravity, worthy only of absolute hatred, even as God hates it. Now it is not in man to regard the world with disliking scorn, and his great brotherhood with utter loathing. He can only pretend to do it; and that pretence has to be kept alive by a constant effort unnaturally made, as water is elevated by a force-pump. The first consequence of the violence done to the facts by the common interpretation of life and duty, is that human nature stubbornly refuses to credit it in truth, only *shamming* a belief in hollow profession, while acting in direct contradiction to it. A careful observer must have noticed how sometimes the most scrupulous and pretentious "Orthodox" believers lead two irreconciled lives, holding one set of principles and sentiments in theory and ritual, carrying another into their ordinary practice, wearing long faces and droning doleful confessions in the vestry and the church, but eager and plotting, shrewd and ambitious, in the market and the caucus. The legitimate inferences from the popular creed cannot be really accepted, that is, lived out. By the doctrine of election, men have nothing to do here; they are merely puppets moved across the stage by the wires of predestination, into heaven or into hell. So horrid is the alternative of the helpless transit, that the soul is paralyzed with an anguish of terror, and cannot try to do anything; and should it try, is bound by fate. Now man knows better than this. He irresistibly feels that he has a multitude of duties in life, and ability to do them; and he cannot help undertaking them.

Again, by the doctrine of free will, supernatural grace, and eternal judgment, men have nothing else to do but to secure their salvation by the appropriation of Christ's atoning merit. Suppose a man to be placed, for five minutes, in a situation where it depended wholly on the care of his steps whether he should slip into a caldron of molten iron or pass into a garden of delights. Under circumstances of such terrific exposure, such climacteric agony, would he do anything else, think of anything else, except take heed how he was stepping? Well, according to the usual doctrine, heaven is above, hell is beneath, the fleeting hour of life is intermediate here. If men acquire an interest in the redemption offered by Christ, they shall inherit an eternity of inconceivable bliss in heaven; if not, they shall suffer an eternity of inconceivable agony in hell. If a man believed that, would he not, in his frantic intensity of desire to make sure of the infinite boon, put aside and forget everything else? Would he not wrestle and agonize, in all-absorbing penitence, and prayer, and tears, until he was certain that the white robe washed in the blood of the Lamb was on him? And yet how is it? Are not such men quite rare? Yes, the loudest professors take these infinite terrors and splendors quite coolly; find ample time to attend to other matters; and plainly care a thousand times more for making money, building houses, acquiring office and honor, moving in good society, marrying their children into fashionable families, than they do for acting consistently with their church belief. What would be thought of a peasant at the base of Vesuvius, who, beholding a flood of lava rushing down the mountain, should quietly busy himself in planting trees and trimming vines, instead of gathering his family and fleeing for life? What would be thought of a man, who, from the summit of a cliff, seeing hundreds of men, women, and children drowning in the waves below, instead of throwing over the life-preservers scattered around him, or lowering the strong rope with which he is provided, should amuse himself with drawing a picture of the struggling wretches, or, turning from them, should proceed complacently to regale himself with fruits and wine? Yet multitudes of people profess to believe that this life is an instant of probation, wherein they may

snatch an infinite prize beyond, or incur an infinite woe ; profess to believe that millions on millions are momentarily drifting into the endless lake of fire over which all are suspended, only those who lay hold of the atonement being saved ; and, instead of concentrating all the thoughts and energies of their souls upon getting a firm hold of that heaven-hung cord, and striving to toss it within reach of others, they laugh as merrily as any at the comic features and incidents of the times, find leisure to slander and pick flaws in the unbelievers, engage strenuously in the scramble for wealth and reputation, and, indeed, are as much taken up as most of their neighbors with the common labors and damnable vanities of the world ! By force of tradition and fashion, they talk one thing ; by force of truth and nature, they live another. It is often said of Unitarianism, that "it is a good doctrine to live by, but a poor doctrine to die by." And accordingly few "religious" phenomena are more frequent than for good Calvinists to live according to the Unitarian view of life, and then, at the last moment, hastily gather up the shreds of their "Orthodox" belief to die in. Which system is most complimented by the practice may safely be left to the decision of that common sense which teaches that a wise life is the real preparation for a becoming death, and a holy character the genuine condition of an auspicious entrance into eternity.

This gross inconsistency between doctrine and life is a fatal weakness in "Evangelicism," and the opposite harmony is an equal strength in the rival system. The world, seeing this war between profession and character, secretly laughs to scorn the creed which produces it. What a world of meaning is contained in the following graphic description, by Horatio Greenough, of a not uncommon character, — a character begotten between the severity of a conventional theology and the ease of a luxurious life ! "I have seen," — writes our great sculptor, who was not more gifted as an artist than he was remarkable as a thinker, — "I have seen a clergyman of the Established Church, who long appeared to me an over-grown automaton, in which the digestive apparatus was exaggerated. He was an incarnation of *vicarious* being. He seemed to have been taken into the world and done for. Inoffensive was he

and respectable; for he had been educated among scholars, — dressed by a tailor, and dressed well, — shaved by a barber, and well shorn, — insured by a solvent company here below, — saved by his Saviour in the world to come, so that one saw no obstacle to his translation to another sphere, except — his weight. Yet was all this only apparent; for no sooner was a trout-stream mentioned than the kaleidoscope revolved, the fog rolled from before his eyes, and he became animated and alert." Such a man is no more conscious of the contents of his creed, or the sentiments of his ritual, than a Congo chief; no more ruled and characterized by the distinctive principles of "Evangelical Christianity," than Alcibiades and Cæsar were.

The theology embedded in the common creed of the Church, save in the rarest instances, is not believed and cannot be believed; is not reduced to practice, and cannot be reduced to practice. If it were really credited and acted out, the course of civilization would stop, the development of mankind cease, and the world become a cursed wilderness of misery. For who would populate the everlasting fire-gorges of hell with his children? The Popular Religion, considered as a set of doctrines, is mostly a hollow shell, devoid of vital sincerity. Considered as a body of persons, its church-life is, for the most part, a ritual of conformity. At least four fifths of its professors in this country, if approached with a clear statement of the cardinal principles of Liberal Christianity, would confess their belief in them, and their honest rejection of the contrasted dogmas. If the "Orthodox" congregations do receive the system of doctrinal faith inculcated upon them, why do they not live in consonance? How happens it that *not one in fifty of their whole population ever pretends to experience saving grace, or to join the church?* If they believed that, unless they experienced saving grace and joined the church, they must roast in hell eternally, would they not experience saving grace and join the church, the means being always freely offered them? They do not believe it: it is a formality. The plain fact is, that the popular "Orthodoxy" is no longer an intelligently and earnestly accepted creed, but a respectable establishment, a hardened institution of traditions and rites, which people fall in

with as a matter of course. One important qualification is to be made to this statement; for justice demands, and we rejoice, in the very interests of our argument, to give our acknowledgment, that unquestionably a large class of devoted persons remain within the "Orthodox Church," making use of it as a working instrument of practical Christianity, for helping the poor, supporting missionaries, aiding good reforms, regardless of theoretical dogmas. But it is philanthropy and piety, worship and good works, that retain the presence and support of these persons; not any credit or care for the special theology to which they are treated, and which may all the time be extremely distasteful and false to them. An experienced and sagacious old Brahmin, a resident of Calcutta, has recently said, in a conversation reported for the London Times: "The great mass of the Hindoo population have no intelligent persuasion as to the principles of their religion. It is with them a matter of immemorial tradition, mythological legend, outward forms, civil and social usage." Precisely so is it also in "Orthodox" Christendom.

In this vast, old, dead, doctrinal institution — aside from the religious life and the practical virtue nourished within it by the spirit of God, through the order of nature and of grace — a process of undermining and decay is going on, which will inevitably overthrow it. The doctrine of the Trinity as three unconfounded Persons in one undivided Substance — once the most central and living doctrine of the Church — has quite deceased from debate and regard. The doctrine of the Vicarious Atonement, which shocks ethics as much as that did reason, is destined to share the same fate. The doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of Scripture has suffered damage in all quarters, from which it can never recover. The doctrine of Infant Damnation, once fulminated from almost every village pulpit, would not be tolerated now, save in exceptional instances, although it is an unavoidable inference from the logic of the creed. We say this doctrine, that an infant is as damnable as an adult, is contained in the creed; for, to quote fresh "Orthodox" authority, "is not a serpent a serpent at the earliest stage of its existence?" The ablest scholars, thinkers, and preachers of the day, even within the "Orthodox"

churches, have made softening innovations and modifications of the old theology, fatal to its integrity, and fatal to its permanence. From turret to turret the alarm-cries of the ancient watchmen are heard. How significant is the movement recently set on foot in the capital of New England to found an organ for Old Orthodoxy,—the “*Puritan Review*,”—to serve as a battery against the fearful heresies of Young Orthodoxy! The expressive plan is to secure its support by a joint-stock company of a thousand owners, “devoted to the advocacy of the true Puritan theology, as held by really sound men of different schools, in opposition to the latitudinarianism, new speculations, and new fellowships, by which it is believed the spiritual welfare of our churches is threatened”! Vain are all such attempts to check the course of fate. Liberal Christianity is destined to supplant the Popular Religion, as the Gospel supplanted Paganism; because it is a truer Thought, a kinder Sentiment, a healthier Motive, a more natural and genial View, a better Working System, in the long run, and for educated minds. The indications of its advancing victory, visible on every hand to an observant eye, are as numerous and striking, and are increasing as rapidly, as could be expected. There is every reason for courage and joy.

The one want of Liberal Christians, for the fresh speeding of their conquering cause, is courageous *consistency*. Cowardice, incoherence, incompleteness, are their chief enemies and ruinous weights. Aristocratic fastidiousness, squeamish taste, a tamed wisdom, are their bane, their impediment, their false gods. They have not spoken in the burning vernacular of the people on the hearty level of the average breast. Their tone, aim, and method are often the same as those of the “*Orthodox*”; while, in consequence of their sheer contrast of religious philosophy, they ought to be very different. Their instruction and exhortation in the Sunday school, the Bible class, the conference-room, the pulpit, are very much what they should be if they accepted the ruined ascetic philosophy of the Westminster Catechism, instead of the cheerful Gospel of Christ. We cannot rightfully expect any swift advancement of our great cause of an harmonious religion of truth, until we get rid of the cruel, diseased, magical Calvinistic and Sacer-

dotal mind, method, and aim,—discordant rudiments and vestiges of which yet linger injuriously among us. In place of these we must elaborate the costly results of Christian experience, criticism, and study into a complete system to work by. Then we must consistently work by it, willingly permitting any who are among us, but not of us, to drop away, if they are offended, and can find more congenial home and labor elsewhere. The loss of such persons would, as we regard it, be a gain; for the trimmer to popularity is a traitor to God. His presence destroys unity and zeal of action. Despised by all loyal minds, the farther he goes from them, the better it is for them and for their cause.

The teaching system which we want, as an unhampering alliance and an organizing instrument, is not a body of fine-spun dogmas, but one made up of the cardinal principles of common sense, devout faith, and brotherly works. Its characteristic key-notes should be filial worship and practical goodness,—in distinction from the crouching fear and exclusive bigotry to which the temper of "Orthodoxy" is often tuned. Such a system should draw into friendly league and effort, not only Unitarians, Universalists, and Christians, but all truly liberal believers; who, forming the genuine Broad Church of Christ, overlooking differences of opinion, cheerfully allowing individual liberty in such matters, each being responsible solely to his Master, should go forward in one spirit, for one work, on the common ground of experimental virtue and piety, subsidize the theological and moral energies of the age, and take benign possession of the religious world.

In fine, then, the strength of the Popular Religion and the weakness of Liberal Christianity consist in the strength and weakness of the appeal they make to the love of artificial logical system, to fancy, to the sensational feelings, to the indolent desire of escaping from personal responsibility, to selfishness, to party spirit and pride, to the liking for mechanical tangibility and ostentation, to the inclination to receive what is socially established in conformity with the fashion of the majority, and to the accumulated power of religious experience and prejudice educated for ages in accordance with the "Orthodox"

dogmas. On the other hand, the strength of Liberal Christianity and the weakness of the Popular Religion consist in the strength and weakness of their appeal to the conclusions of reason, to the dictates of conscience, to the sentiments of the heart, to the advancing results of scientific achievement, to the composite social influences and traits designated as the spirit of the age, and to the actual conditions and necessities of human experience in the present life. The strength of the Popular Religion obviously lies in historical causes, social accidents, factitious forces; its weakness, in its violent discord with truth and normal experience. But the strength of Liberal Christianity lies in the order of God's works, the laws of man's constitution, the inherent power of reality and harmonious experience; its weakness, in its unfitness to satisfy the morbid cravings engendered by perverse traditional education. It is plain enough which system possesses the intrinsic and enduring conditions of final victory.

We rejoice to admit that, among the earnest members of the "Evangelical" sects, there are a profound inward experience and outward practice of the religious life. But we must frankly question the right on their part—a privilege so often assumed by them—of denying in return the existence of anything of the sort among us. In all humility, but with firmness, we must be permitted to claim that there are Liberal Christians, too, who have felt something of renewing grace and known something of the divine life. Because we believe that God is one, and not three, are we therefore unable to love him when we contemplate him in his infinite perfections as our Father? Because we regard Christ, not as a sacrificed deity, but as the delegated revealer of God's truth, the loving Saviour, and the perfect ideal of humanity, is it therefore impossible for us gratefully to revere him, and to strive with a tender consecration to press after his steps in the keeping of his commandments? Because we accept the Bible as a heavenly treasure in an earthen vessel, a human medium and depositary of divine truth, and not as the pure and direct "Word of God," are we therefore incapacitated to study its contents with conscientious docility, to lay its promises humbly upon our hearts, and take its warnings solemnly to

our souls? Because we do not think that regeneration is solely the sudden and miraculous result of a long-awaited touch of ictic grace, are we therefore shut out from all possibility of repenting of our sins, weeping over our folly, with pangs and vows turning away from selfish ambition and every pleasant vice, rising above the world in an anguish and ecstasy of new convictions and purposes, to devote ourselves to the disinterested service of God and man? Because we do not imagine the Almighty as a selfish and jealous taskmaster, nor anticipate a scenic judgment-seat and a pit of endless fire, is it therefore inconceivable that we should ever be so moved by the manifest certainty that guilt will always meet retribution and virtue always wear a crown, by the present horrors of sin and glories of goodness, by the startling glimpses of God's attributes vouchsafed on every hand, by the mysterious wants and intimations of the soul in all life's deeper hours, as to seek with unutterable yearning for pardoning grace, for an assuring sanctification, for the mystic fellowship of the Holy Spirit?

It is, to say the least, hardly modest in our "Orthodox" brethren to claim, as they constantly do, a monopoly of earnestness and piety, of penitential tears, self-renunciation, and love of God, charging us with "inconceivable shallowness," "unregenerate pride," "rebellion against God," and "utter destitution of all experience of vital religion," granting us only a fair seeming of "outward righteousness which God hates." There are, as we gratefully believe, Unitarian and Universalist Christians, the richness, purity, health, and earnestness of whose religious experience — unreserved surrender to God and joyous communion with him — will bear a favorable comparison with any examples which the Calvinistic Churches furnish. There is no form or ingredient of healthy religious life which the doctrines of Liberal Christianity, in conjunction with the grace of God, are not amply competent to produce and nourish. The advantage possessed by the Popular Religion, through its dogmatic peculiarities, is in fostering, by help of traditionally educated sensibilities, exceptional instances of diseased modes and abnormal degrees of "religious" experience. Herein, in spite of the

temporary disadvantage, lie our ultimate strength and the ultimate weakness of our opponents. We say thus much, not in any spirit of boasting or of complacency, but simply in self-defence. Our prayer is, that the theological doctrines of our antagonist brethren, and our own religious experiences, equally guided by Christ's truth and love, may keep pace in approaching the standard of God's will.

ART. IV.—BUCKLE'S HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION.

History of Civilization in England. By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE.
Vol. I. London. 1857. 8vo. pp. xxiv, 854.

THIS is the most important work, in its line, from a British hand, which the world has seen for many a year. The theme is one of the greatest in the world. The author has treated it better, with more learning and profound comprehension, than any of his English predecessors. Who is Mr. Buckle? We know not. The name is new; this is his first work, as he thus tells us: "To my mother I dedicate this, the first volume of my first work,"—a pious and appropriate dedication, which promises other things to come.

No Englishman has written a more elaborate book in this century. It is learned also, though not so comprehensive in its erudition as we might wish. The list of "authors quoted" occupies fifteen pages, and comprises about six hundred titles and perhaps three thousand volumes. Half as many more are referred to in the copious and well-studied notes, which enrich the volume. Notwithstanding the imposing array which this catalogue presents at the first glance, its deficiencies, in a writer who thinks so meanly of the labors of his predecessors, are more remarkable than its seeming completeness. Not to speak of ancient writers, of whom only three are referred to, no mention is made of Grotius, Prideaux, Vico, Creuzer, Du Cange, Duchesne, Malte-Brun, Becker, W. v. Humboldt, Wachler, Hegel (*Phil. d. Gesch.*), Müller (J. v. and

C. O.), Fichte (*Grundz. d. gegenw. Zeitalt.*), Schelling (*Phil. d. Myth.*), Boeckh, Wachsmuth, Eichhorn, Savigny, Raumer, Heeren (*Gesch. d. Syst. d. Eur. Staat.*), Thierry, and a host of others whose writings bear more or less directly on the subject of this volume. The author speaks in the highest terms of the works of German philosophers, but names but four or five German books in his catalogue, — none of which are the works of the masters in the philosophy of history.

This volume is but half of the Introduction to the History of Civilization in England. How many volumes the history itself shall contain, we are not told. It is so bulky that we fear it will not immediately be reprinted here. The great cost of the original will prevent it from circulating much in a country where a laboring man may buy him his week's reading for a quarter of a dollar. But its contents are so valuable, that we shall make a careful analysis of the most important, though perhaps not the most interesting parts, and lay it before our readers, with some additional comments of our own. The paper will consist of two parts, — an abstract of the work itself, and some criticisms thereon.

The volume contains fourteen chapters: the first five are general, and relate to the development of mankind under various circumstances friendly or hostile thereto, — to the method of inquiry, and the influence of various causes upon civilization. The sixth is a transitional chapter, in which the author leads his readers over from his general laws to their particular applications. The other eight treat mainly of the development of civilization in England and France.

In Chapter I. he tells us that history is the most popular branch of knowledge; more has been written on it than on any other, and great confidence is felt in its value. It enters into all plans of education; materials of a rich and imposing appearance have been collected; political and military annals have been compiled; and much pains taken with the history of law, religion, science, letters, arts, useful inventions, and of late with the manners and customs of the people. Political economy has become a science; statistics treat of the material interests of mankind, their moral peculiarities, the amount of crime, and the effect of age, sex, and education thereupon.

We know the rate of mortality, marriages, births, deaths, the fluctuation of wages, the price of needful things. Physical geography has been studied in all its details; all food has been chemically analyzed, and its relation to the body pointed out. Many nations have been studied in all degrees of civilization. Put all these things together, they seem to be of immense value.

But the use of these materials is less satisfactory: the separate parts have not been combined into a whole; while the necessity of generalization is admitted in all other great fields of inquiry, and efforts are made therein to rise from particular facts to universal laws, this is seldom attempted in the history of man.

“Any author who, from indolence of thought or from natural incapacity, is unfit to deal with the highest branches of knowledge, has only to pass some years in reading a certain number of books, and then he is qualified to be an historian; he is able to write the history of a great people, and his work becomes an authority on the subject which it professes to treat. The establishment of this narrow standard has led to results very prejudicial to the progress of our knowledge. Owing to it, historians, taken as a body, have never recognized the necessity of such a wide and preliminary study as would enable them to grasp their subject in the whole of its natural relations; hence the singular spectacle of one historian being ignorant of political economy; another knowing nothing of law; another nothing of ecclesiastical affairs and changes of opinion; another neglecting the philosophy of statistics, and another physical science: although these topics are the most essential of all, inasmuch as they comprise the principal circumstances by which the temper and character of mankind have been affected and in which they are displayed.” — p. 4.

Accordingly, in the whole literature of Europe there are only three or four really original books, which contain a systematic attempt to investigate the history of man in the scientific manner belonging to other departments. Yet in the last hundred years there has been a great gain, and the prospects of historical literature are more cheering than ever before; but scarcely anything has been done towards discerning the principles which govern the character and destiny of nations. “For all the higher purposes of human thought, history is still miserably deficient, and presents that confused

and anarchical appearance natural to a subject of which the laws are unknown, and even the foundation unsettled." Auguste Comte, "who has done more than any man to raise the standard," contemptuously notices "the incoherent compilation of facts hitherto called history." The most celebrated historians are manifestly inferior to the great men of science; none of them is at all entitled to be compared with Kepler and Newton. Yet the study of history requires the greatest talents, on account of the complication of its phenomena, and the fact that nothing can be verified by experiment.

Hence the scientific study of the movements of Mind, compared with that of the movements of Nature, is still in its infancy. So in physics, the regularity of events and the possibility of predicting them are always taken for granted, while the regularity of history is not only not so taken, but is often denied. It is said, in the affairs of men there is something mysterious and providential, which hides their future from us, and so history has never become a science, but only an empirical narrative of facts. But the question comes, Is it so? Are the actions of men and societies governed by fixed laws, or are they the result either of blind chance or of supernatural interference?

In regard to all events there are two doctrines which represent different stages of civilization;—(1.) that every event is single and isolate, the result of blind Chance; or (2.) that all events are connected, and so each is the result of Necessity.* An increasing perception of the regularity of Nature destroys the doctrine of Chance, and replaces it by necessary connection. Out of these two doctrines of Chance and Necessity come the dogmas of Free-Will and Predestination.

As soon as a people has accumulated an abundance of the means of living, some men will cease to work; the most of those who are free from labor seek only pleasure, but a few endeavor to acquire knowledge and diffuse it. Some of the latter will study their own minds; such of them as have great ability will found new philosophies and religions, which often exercise an immense influence over the people who receive them. But these great thinkers are affected by the character

* He means *Necessitudo*, we take it, not *Necessitas*.

of their age, which accordingly appears in their philosophy and religion. Thus the doctrine of Chance in the outer world corresponds to, and occasions, that of Free-Will in the inner world; while the doctrine of Necessary Connection in nature corresponds to that of Predestination in man. Predestination is founded on the theological hypothesis that all is regulated by supernatural interference. Among the Protestants, this doctrine, accompanied with that of the eternal damnation of the non-elect, acquired influence through the dark and powerful mind of Calvin, and among Catholics from Augustine, who seems to have borrowed it from the Manicheans; but it is a barren hypothesis, lying out of the province of human knowledge, and so it cannot be proved either false or true. Free-Will is connected with Arminianism, and founded on the metaphysical hypothesis that all happens by chance; it rests on the supremacy of human consciousness, a dogma supported only by the assumption, (1.) that there is an independent faculty called consciousness; and (2.) that its dictates are infallible. But the first has not been proved; the second is unquestionably false, for though consciousness be infallible as to the *fact* of its testimony, it is fallible as to its *truth*. The present uncertainty in regard to the matter of consciousness shows that metaphysics will never be raised to a science by the ordinary method of observing merely individual minds; but that its study can be successfully prosecuted only by the deductive application of laws, which must be discerned by historical induction from the whole of those great phenomena which the human race presents. Homer, Shakespeare, and other great poets, have hitherto been the best investigators of the human mind; but they occupied themselves mainly with the concrete phenomena of life, and if they analyzed, as is probable, they concealed the steps of their process.

“The believer in the possibility of history is not required to hold either to Predestination or Free-Will, only to admit that, when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; that those motives are the result of some antecedents; and that therefore, if we were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.”

Now, as men's actions are determined by outward things, those actions must be uniform, and the same results must always follow from the same circumstances. All the progress and decline of men must come from the action of external phenomena on the mind, or that of the mind on the phenomena. On the one side is nature, the world of matter obeying its own laws; on the other, man obeying his laws. By their mutual action each modifies the other. A philosophical history can be made only on the knowledge of this action and mutual modification of man by nature and nature by man. The problem of the historian is to discover the laws of this twofold modification. First, he must inquire whether man affects nature most, or nature man; that is, whether physical phenomena are more affected by man than man by physical phenomena, or the opposite. That which is most active and powerful should be studied first, for, being the most conspicuous, it is easiest known, and when its laws are generalized, the unknown to be accounted for will be smaller than if the opposite course be pursued. But before he enters on that work, the historian will prove the regularity of mental phenomena, not by deduction from an assumed hypothesis, either metaphysical or theological, but by induction from almost innumerable facts, extending over many centuries, gathered and put into arithmetical tables,—the clearest of all forms,—by government officials who had neither prejudices nor theories to support.

The actions of men are of these two classes, — Virtues or Vices. If it can be shown that the vices vary according to changes in surrounding society, then it is clear the virtues vary also in like manner, though inversely. But if there be no such variations, then it must follow that men's actions depend on personal caprice, free-will, and the like, — on what is peculiar to the individual.

At first thought, it would appear that, of all vicious or virtuous actions, the crime of murder was the most arbitrary and irregular. But experience shows that it is committed with regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain circumstances as the movement of the tides or the rotation of the seasons. Thus it was observed that from 1826 to

1844 the number of persons accused of crime in all France was on the whole about equal to the male deaths in Paris; but the annual amount of crime in France fluctuated less than that of male deaths in Paris; the same regularity was observed in each separate class of crimes, all obeying the same law of uniform and periodical repetition. In other countries, also, variations of crime are less than those of mortality.

Suicide seems the most arbitrary and capricious of all murders, but this also observes a constant law. The average annual number of suicides in London is about 240. It varies from 213 to 266. In 1846, there was a great railway panic, the suicides rose to 266; in 1847 there was a slight improvement, and the suicides fell to 256; in 1848 there were 247; in 1849, 213; and in 1850 they rose again to 229. This crime, like many others, depends somewhat on the season of the year, and is more common in summer than in winter.

Facts of this kind "force us to the conclusion, that the offences of men are the result not so much of the vices of the individual offender as of the state of society into which he is thrown." And this induction cannot be overthrown by any of those hypotheses with which metaphysicians and theologians have perplexed the study of past events. This is the great social law, that the moral actions of men are the product of their antecedents, not of their volition. But, like other laws, it is subject to disturbances proceeding from minor forces, which meet the larger at particular points and cause aberrations. But these discrepancies are trifling. Hence "we may form some idea of the prodigious energy of those vast social laws, which, though constantly interrupted, seem to triumph over every obstacle, and which, when examined by the aid of large numbers, scarcely undergo any sensible perturbation."

Marriage has a fixed relation to the price of corn; in England, the experience of a century has proved, that, instead of having any connection with personal feelings, marriages "are simply regulated by the average earnings of the great mass of the people; so that this immense social and religious institution is not only swayed, but is completely controlled, by the price of food or the rate of wages."

The aberrations of memory also follow a general law. At London and Paris, the same proportionate number of persons drop undirected letters into the post-office. These things are so plain, that in less than a hundred years it will be as hard to find an historian who denies the regularity of the moral world, as it now is to find a philosopher who denies the uniformity of nature. This regularity of human actions and its dependence on certain conditions is the basis for scientific history.

In Chapter II. Mr. Buckle states the influence of physical agents on the organization of society and the character of individuals. The most powerful agents are food, soil, climate, and the general aspects of nature. The latter excites the imagination, and so sometimes produces superstition, which is the great obstacle to progressive knowledge, and imparts ineffaceable peculiarities to the national religion. The three former affect the general organization, and cause those large and conspicuous differences between nations which are often ascribed to some fundamental difference in the various races into which mankind are divided. But these ethnological differences are altogether hypothetical, while those caused by climate, food, and soil are not only real, but also capable of a satisfactory explanation. He condenses these three into one general term, Physical Geography, and tells the effects it produces.

1. The accumulation of wealth must always be the first great social improvement, for without that there is neither taste nor leisure for the acquisition of knowledge. In an ignorant people, — and all must start ignorant, — this accumulation will be regulated solely by the physical peculiarities of the country, that is, by the fertility of the soil, and by the energy and regularity of the work bestowed upon it. This latter depends entirely on the climate, which directly affects man's power of work, by enervating or invigorating the laborer, and also indirectly influences the regularity of his habits. Thus, in Northern countries, cold and darkness interrupt out-door work, and the laboring people are more prone to desultory habits; hence the national character becomes more fitful and capricious than it would be under a

better climate. The Swedes and Norwegians differ greatly from the Spanish and Portuguese in government, laws, religion, and manners, but all four agree in a certain instability and fickleness of character. This peculiarity, common to them all, is caused by the climate, which in the Southern countries interrupts toil by heat and drought, and in the Northern by darkness and cold. This effect of climate has not been noticed by Montesquieu, Hume, and Charles Comte, the three most philosophical writers on climate.

No nation has ever been civilized through its own efforts, unless it had a favorable soil or climate. Thus in Asia, civilization has always been confined to that tract which extends from the south of China to the west coast of Asia Minor, Phœnicia, and Palestine, while the barren country in the North has been peopled by rude wandering tribes, who are always kept in poverty by the nature of the soil; but yet, when they migrate thence, they found great monarchies, in China, India, and Persia, and equal the civilization of the most flourishing peoples. In Arabia, the Arabs have always been a rude, uncultivated people, their soil compelling them to poverty; but when established in Persia, Spain, and the Punjab, their character seems to undergo a great change. In the sandy and barren parts of Africa,—the vast plain which occupies the centre and North,—the people are always barbarians, entirely uncultivated, acquiring no knowledge, because they can accumulate no wealth. But in Egypt, the overflow of the Nile makes the country fertile; wealth was rapidly accumulated; the cultivation of knowledge quickly followed, and the land became the seat of a civilization which, though grossly exaggerated, forms a striking contrast to the barbarism of the other nations of Africa, none of which could work out their progress or emerge from the ignorance to which the penury of nature condemned them.

In the ancient world,—Asia and Africa,—the fertility of the soil had more influence than climate in civilization. But in Europe, climate is the more powerful of the two. In the former case, the effect depends on the relation of the soil to its produce, that is, of one part of nature to another; in the latter, the effect depends on the relation between the cli-

mate and the laborer, that is, between nature and man. The first is the less complicated relation, and came earlier into action, and hence civilization began in Asia and Africa, and not in Europe. But that form of civilization which depends on the fertility of the soil is not so valuable or permanent as that which depends on climate, for all effectual human progress depends less on the bounty of nature than on the energy of man which a favorable climate develops. And while the productive powers of nature are limited and stationary, the powers of man are unlimited. We have no evidence which authorizes us to put even an imaginary limit to the human intellect. So a favorable climate which stimulates labor, is a more valuable agent of civilization than fertility of soil, which feeds men with its almost spontaneous bounty.

The next thing to consider is the distribution of wealth,—what portion shall belong to the laboring classes, what to such as labor not. In a very early stage of society, the distribution of wealth, like its creation, is wholly determined by physical laws, which are so active as to have kept a vast majority of the inhabitants of the fairest portion of the globe in constant poverty. An inquiry into the distribution of wealth, therefore, is an inquiry into the distribution of power, and will throw light on the origin of social and political inequality. Wealth will be distributed between the laborers, the more numerous class, who produce it, and the non-laborers, the contrivers,—the less numerous but more able class, who direct the energy of the others. The laborers' share is called wages; the contrivers' share is profits. Wages will depend on the number of laborers, and that on the cheapness of food; so, in a country where food is cheap, laborers will abound and wages be low. Therefore an inquiry into the physical laws on which a nation's food depends is of the greatest importance.

The food of man produces two and only two effects necessary to his existence,—(1.) to supply the animal heat, and (2.) to repair the waste of tissues. The first purpose is accomplished by non-azotized substances containing carbon, but no nitrogen; the second, by azotized substances in which nitrogen is always found. In hot climates men require but little non-azotized food,—for the climate keeps up the temperature; and

less azotized food than in cold ones,—for, as they exercise less, the body has less waste to repair. So the inhabitants of hot countries will require less food than those of cold ones, and population will increase with corresponding rapidity. But the inhabitants of colder countries consume not only more food than those of warm countries, but more animal, carbonized or non-azotized food, which is more costly than is the other kind, for it is not, like vegetables, thrown up by the soil, but consists of the bodies of powerful and often ferocious animals, and is procured only with great labor. So, when the coldness of the climate compels men to use carbonized or animal food, even in the infancy of society, the men are bolder, more adventurous, than the vegetable-eaters of warm climates, gratuitously fed by the bounty of nature. Thus there is a constant tendency for wages to be low in warm countries and high in cold ones. In hot climates, food will be abundant, population will increase rapidly, and wages be low; while in cold countries the opposite result will follow.

In Asia, Africa, and America, all the ancient civilizations were seated in hot climates where food was cheap, the wages low, the profits high, and the laborer depressed. In Europe, civilization arose in a colder climate, where food was dearer, wages consequently higher, profits lower, and the laborers in a better condition. The Irish are the only great European people fed on cheap food; and the consequences presently appeared in the rapid increase of the laborers, their low wages, and miserable squalid condition, though in a country which has greater natural resources than any other in Europe. The matter of food and wages may be thus summed up: when the wages are invariably low, the distribution of wealth being very unequal, the distribution of political power and social influence will also be very unequal.

Civilization is old in India. The climate requires men to feed on vegetable, non-azotized food, on rice, the most nutritive of all the grains. Food is cheap, laborers abundant, wages low, profits high, in the shape of rent of land and interest of capital, the laboring people much depressed, the ruling class rich, insolent, and despotic. It has been so these three thou-

sand years, as appears from the ancient laws and maxims which determine the condition of the workingman.

These laws of fertility, soil, food, and climate are so invincible, that, wherever they have come into play, they have kept the laborers in perpetual subjection ; the people have no voice in the management of the state, no control over the wealth they have created ; they have always been tame and servile, their history recites no instance of their turning upon their rulers, no war of classes, no popular insurrections, not one great popular conspiracy, no revolutions among the people. Similar causes were at work in Egypt, in Peru, in Mexico, and produced the same results as in India : the date, the banana, and the maize were to the latter what rice was to the former. In all these countries civilization depended on the fertility of the soil, food was cheap, laborers abundant, wages low, profits high, the working class poor and enslaved, the rulers rich, insolent, and despotic. We have not space to follow the author in the interesting details of this part of his work, but only remark, in passing, that he does not seem to be entirely familiar with the aboriginal civilization, and is sometimes mistaken in his statements ; but his grand inductive generalization remains secure.

He thus sums up the result for Asia, Africa, and America : —

“ The great physical laws which, in the most flourishing countries out of Europe, encouraged the accumulation of wealth, but prevented its dispersion, secured to the upper classes a monopoly of one of the most important elements of social and political power. The result was, that in all those civilizations the great body of the people derived no benefit from the national improvements ; hence, the basis of the progress being very narrow, the progress itself was very insecure. When, therefore, unfavorable circumstances arose from without, it was but natural that the whole system should fall to the ground. In such countries, society, being divided against itself, was unable to stand. And there can be no doubt that, long before the crisis of their actual destruction, these one-sided and irregular civilizations had begun to decay. So that their own degeneracy aided the progress of foreign invaders, and secured the overthrow of those ancient kingdoms, which, under a sounder system, might have been easily saved.” — p. 107.

In Europe, civilization depended less on the fertility of the

soil, giving man its cheap spontaneous bread, more on the climate, which stimulated him to vigorous and regular activity, demanded a more costly food, and so prevented the too rapid increase of population. As a natural consequence, in Europe alone a permanent civilization has been established, and society so organized as to include all the different classes; and though the scheme is not yet sufficiently large, it leaves room for the welfare of each, and so secures the progress of all.

Having thus disposed of the influence of food, soil, and climate, which directly affect the material interests of man, in the accumulation and distribution of wealth, he next examines that of the general aspects of nature, which affect his intellectual interests in the accumulation and distribution of knowledge. The aspects of nature may be divided into two kinds, — such as affect the imagination by exciting feeling, terror, or great wonder, and such as affect the understanding, and excite men to study the details and causes of the phenomena about them. In all civilizations hitherto, the imagination has been active to excess. This appears from the superstitions of the ignorant, and the poetic reverence for antiquity which blinds the judgment of the educated and limits their originality. It is possible that the understanding may in turn tyrannize over the imagination. All the great early civilizations of Asia, Africa, and America were situated within the tropics, where nature is most dangerous to man, and its aspects most sublime and terrible, both in the constant phenomena, such as mountains, and the occasional, such as earthquakes, tempests, hurricanes, and pestilences, which powerfully affect the imagination.

This general statement is illustrated by examples of the superstitions generated by earthquakes and pestilences. The illustrations are not happy, they are almost puerile. He thus generalizes his conclusions: "There are certain natural phenomena which excite the imagination, incline man to superstition, and hinder the progress of knowledge. These phenomena are much more numerous out of Europe than in it," and give a peculiar character to Literature, Religion, and Art. To prove this, he compares the productions of a typical

Asiatic with a typical European country. India with Greece, — both “flagrant instances.”

The literature of India shows the most uncontrolled ascendancy of the imagination. There is little prose composition; works on grammar, law, history, medicine, mathematics, geography, and metaphysics are nearly all poems. The matter corresponds to the form; imagination, luxuriant even to disease, runs riot on every occasion. This appears in great national works, the *Ramayana Mahabharata* and the *Puranas*, and in geographical and chronological systems; in the exaggerated respect for past ages, which is “repugnant to every maxim of reason, and is merely the indulgence of a poetic sentiment in favor of the remote and unknown.” “It gave theologians their idea of the primitive virtue and simplicity of man, and of his subsequent fall from that high estate.” It “diffused a belief that in old times men were not only more virtuous and happy, but also physically superior in the structure of their bodies,” and lived to a greater age than is possible for their degenerate children. Thus the Hindoos say that in the most flourishing periods of antiquity the average age of common men at death was 80,000 years, and of holy men 100,000 years; but some early poets lived about half a million, and one king — his title is too long for our space — lived 8,400,000, of which he reigned 6,300,000. To glorify the *Institutes of Menu*, which are really less than three thousand years old, the native authorities declare they were miraculously revealed to man more than 2,000,000,000 years ago. The same characteristics appear in the Indian religion. Its mythology, like that of every tropical country, is based upon terror of the most extravagant kind. The most terrible deities are also the most popular. The same thing appears in the Indian Art, which is an expression of the monstrous.

Now in Greece the aspects of nature were quite different, nay, almost opposite; they gave a healthy stimulus to the imagination and the understanding, which led to the elevation of man. The Indians had more respect for superhuman powers, and turned men to the unknown and mysterious; the Greeks had more respect for human powers, and turned to the known and available. This peculiarity appears in the Litera-

ture, Religion, and Art of Greece, which are so well known that we need not follow Mr. Buckle in the details of his learned and careful comparison. The Greek literature was the first in which a systematic attempt was made to test all opinions by human reason, and vindicate the right of man to judge for himself on matters of supreme importance.

In Chapter III. he examines "the method employed by metaphysicians for discovering mental laws." Studying the whole of human history, he finds that, out of Europe, the tendency has been to subordinate man to nature, but in Europe to subordinate nature to man. So he divides civilization into two parts, Non-European and European. To understand the first, we must begin with the study of nature, the stronger force, while to comprehend the European civilization, which is characterized by a diminishing influence of physical agents and an increasing influence of mental agents, we must begin with man, who continually and progressively overmasters nature;—so that the average duration of life becomes greater,—the number of dangers thereto is lessened; the curiosity of men is keener, and their contact closer, than at any former period; and a more just distribution of wealth has taken place than in other countries. It is only in Europe that man has succeeded in taming the energies of nature, and compelling them to minister to him. He has extirpated ferocious beasts, overcome famine and the most frightful diseases, bridged the rivers, tunnelled the mountains, reclaimed land from the sea, and fertilized the barren spots of the earth. The most advanced nations of Europe owe comparatively little to the original forces of nature, which had unlimited power over all other civilizations.

European civilization differs from all others in this. It is characterized by the "diminishing influence of physical laws,"—he means *forces*,—"and an increasing influence of mental laws." The proposition will be proved in future volumes, but will be admitted in advance, he thinks, by all who attend to these two fundamental propositions: (1.) that the forces of nature have never been permanently increased, and never will be; and (2.) that the forces of man continually become more powerful by the acquisition of new means, either to control

the manageable operations of Nature, or to avoid dangers from those consequences which we can foresee when we cannot prevent them.

To discover the laws of European civilization, we must first know the laws of mind, which will afford the ultimate basis of history. The metaphysicians claim to have done this work; so it is necessary to ascertain the value of their researches, the extent of their resources, and the validity of their method. The metaphysical method consists in each observer's studying his own mind, while the historical method consists in studying many minds. The metaphysical method is one by which no discovery has ever yet been made in any branch of knowledge, as it is impossible for the metaphysician to isolate his mind from disturbing forces, and his method does not allow him to enlarge his survey, so as to correct the individual disturbance by the general fact gathered from many particulars.

Besides, there is yet another difficulty. There are two applications of this metaphysical method; with one the inquirer begins by examining his Sensations, with the other by examining his Ideas. Hence there are two classes of metaphysicians, the Sensationalists and the Idealists, who adopt different methods and arrive at opposite conclusions; the further they advance, the more they differ; they are at open war in every department of morals, philosophy, and art. They know no other method; no other application of it is possible, and so they cannot reconcile their antagonistic conclusions. Meaning by metaphysics "that vast body of literature which is constructed on the supposition that the laws of the human mind can be generalized *solely* from the facts of individual consciousness," Mr. Buckle says, "If we except a very few of the laws of association, and perhaps I may add the modern theories of vision and touch," — he refers to Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and Brown, — "there is not to be found in the whole compass of metaphysics a single principle of importance, and at the same time of incontestable truth." This defect in the conclusions comes from the fault in the method, — metaphysicians first raise a cloud and then complain they cannot see. Metaphysics can be successfully studied only "by an investigation of history so comprehensive as to enable us

to understand the conditions which govern the movements of the human race."

In Chapter IV. he compares the moral and intellectual forces or agencies, — he calls them *Laws*, — and inquires into the effect of each on the progress of society. In this investigation, he tries to avoid the method of the metaphysician, who derives his knowledge of men from the study of his own consciousness, exceptional, perturbed, and abnormal as it may be; and follows that of the naturalist, who takes so large a number of facts that the individual perturbations are but an infinitesimal quantity; and thence induces his general laws.

The progress of mankind, he says, is twofold: moral, relating to our duties, and intellectual, relating to our knowledge. This double increase of knowledge and virtue is essential to civilization. To be willing to perform our duty, is the moral part of progress; to know how to perform it, the intellectual. It is possible that there is a progressive increase of man's natural powers, intellectual and moral; but the fact has not yet been proved, and we have no decisive ground for saying that natural faculties would be greater in a child born in the most civilized part of Europe, than in one born in the wildest region of a barbarous country. We have no proof, he thinks, of the existence of hereditary talents, vices, or virtues, hereditary madness and disease. There is no progress of capacity, only of opportunity.

The moral powers — that is, in our philosophy, the power to know duty and the will to do it — have an extremely small influence over the progress of civilization. The great dogmas of morals, which are "the sole essential of morals," have been known for thousands of years, not a jot nor tittle has been added to them, while there is a continual increase in the knowledge of intellectual truths. The most cultivated Europeans do not know a single moral truth not known to the ancients, while the moderns have made most important addition to every department of ancient knowledge, and have created new sciences which the boldest thinkers of old times never thought of. So it is plain man's progress depends on the intellectual, which is the progressive agent, not on the moral, which is but stationary.

Besides, intellectual achievements are permanent; they are put in the terms of science, and, in immortal bequests of genius, become the heirlooms of mankind. But good moral deeds are less capable of transmission, less dependent on previous experience, and cannot well be stored up for future men. So, though moral excellence be more amiable than intellectual, it is less active, less permanent, and less productive of real good. The effects of the most active philanthropy, the most disinterested kindness, reach but few, do not last long, and the institutions they found soon fall to decay. The more we study, the more we shall

“see the superiority of intellectual acquisition over moral feeling. There is no instance on record of an ignorant man, who, having good intentions, and supreme power to enforce them, has not done far more evil than good. And whenever the intentions have been very eager, and the power very extensive, the evil has been enormous. But if you can diminish the sincerity of that man, if you can mix some alloy with his motives, you will likewise diminish the evil which he works. If he is selfish, as well as ignorant, it will often happen that you may play off his vice against his ignorance, and, by exciting his fears, restrain his mischief. If, however, he has no fear, if he is entirely unselfish, if his sole object is the good of others, if he pursues that object with enthusiasm, upon a large scale, and with disinterested zeal, then it is that you have no check upon him; you have no means of preventing the calamities which, in an ignorant age, an ignorant man will be sure to inflict.”
—pp. 166, 167.

To prove this discouraging proposition, he cites the case of religious persecutors, who are not bad men, nor bad-intentioned men, but only ignorant of the nature of truth, and of the consequences of their own actions. It was the most moral of the Roman Emperors, Aurelius and Julian, who persecuted the Christians; and in Spain, “the Inquisitors were remarkable for an undeviating and incorruptible integrity.”

Religious persecution is the greatest evil man ever inflicts on man; “all other crimes are of small account” compared to this. It is intellectual, and not moral, activity which has ended it. The practice of war is the next great evil, and in diminishing that, the moral feelings have had no share at all, for the present moral ideas relating to war were “as well understood and as universally admitted in the Middle Ages,

when there was never a week without war, as they are now, when war is deemed a rare and singular occurrence." It is intellectual, and not moral, actions which have done this great work. For every addition to knowledge increases the power of the intellectual class, and weakens the military class. It is a significant fact, that the recent Continental war was begun by Russia and Turkey, the two most barbarous nations in Europe. The military predilections of Russia are not "caused by a low state of morals, or by a disregard of religious duties," but by ignorance; for as the intellect is little cultivated, the military class is supreme, and all ability is estimated by a military standard.* In England, a love of war, as a national taste, is utterly extinct; this result has not come from moral instinct or moral training, but from the cultivation of intellect, and the rise of educated classes, who control the military. As society advances, the ecclesiastical spirit and the military spirit never fail to decline. Thus, while, in Greece, some of the most celebrated poets, orators, philosophers, and statesmen were also warriors, since the sixteenth century Europe has not produced ten soldiers who were distinguished either as thinkers or writers. "Cromwell, Washington, and Napoleon are perhaps the only first-rate modern warriors" who were competent to govern a kingdom and command an army.†

Three things have weakened the power of the military class,—the invention of gunpowder, the discoveries of political economy, and the application of steam to the purposes of travel. We have no space for an analysis of his argument here.

Hitherto Mr. Buckle's remarks have been general, and belong to what may be called the universal part of transcendental history; but in Chapter V. he turns his attention more especially to England. He selects this as a typical country,—an *instantia flagrans*,—in which the universal laws of human development are interfered with less than elsewhere, and where for some centuries the people have not been much

* In sustaining his assertions here, Mr. Buckle should take comfort from the somewhat celebrated preamble of our Congress in 1846, "Whereas war exists by the act of Mexico,"—she being the less intellectual power of the two.

† His contrast here of Marlborough and Wellington is well put, and worth remembering.

troubled by the two great disturbing forces, the authority of government and the influence of foreigners. England has borrowed nothing by which the destinies of nations are permanently altered, and affords the best example of the normal march of society, and the undisturbed operation of those agencies which regulate the fortunes of mankind.

Germany and the United States are not typical countries, like England. In the first, the philosophers are at the head of the civilized world, but the people are more prejudiced, ignorant, superstitious, and unable to guide themselves, than the people of England or France. The great authors write books for each other, not for the people, and the dull, plodding class remains uninfluenced by the knowledge of the great thinkers, and uncheered by the fire of their genius.*

"In America we see a civilization precisely the reverse of this; . . . a country of which it has been truly said, that in no other are there so few men of great learning, and so few of great ignorance. In Germany, the speculative classes and the practical classes are altogether disunited; in America, they are altogether fused. In Germany, nearly every year brings forward new discoveries, new philosophies, new means by which the boundaries of knowledge are to be enlarged. In America, such inquiries are almost entirely neglected: since the time of Jonathan Edwards, no great metaphysician has appeared; little attention has been paid to physical science [!]; and, with the single exception of jurisprudence, scarcely anything has been done for those vast subjects on which the Germans are incessantly laboring. The stock of American knowledge is small, but it is spread through all classes; the stock of German knowledge is immense, but it is confined to one class." — p. 220.

The progress of European civilization depends on the accumulation and distribution of knowledge; and so he must take a country in which knowledge is both normally accumulated and diffused. These conditions are happily united in England, which he will portray as the central and heroic figure in the historic group, but sketch in the other nations, who play special and subordinate parts in this great drama of civilization. He will study Germany for the laws of ac-

* This sweeping remark of Mr. Buckle is founded probably on his impressions of Southern Germany. It is not true of Prussia or of Saxony.

cumulation of knowledge; America, for those of its diffusion; France, for the political form of the protective spirit; Spain, for its religious form. Thence he will induce the general laws, and, in subsequent volumes of the history itself, apply them deductively to England.

The progress of a nation depends partly on the method its thinkers pursue in their investigations, whether it be deductive or inductive. The Germans favor the first, the Americans the last. The English thinkers are inductive, the Scotch deductive;—Simson, Stewart, Hutchinson, Adam Smith, Hume, Ferguson, Mill, all pursue the deductive method. No country possesses a more original and inquisitive literature than Scotland; but in none equally enlightened does so much of the superstition of the Middle Ages still continue. There is hostility between the speculative and practical classes.

By Religion, he means the theological ideas and the ritual service; by Literature, "everything which is written"; and by Government, not the complex of institutions, laws, and modes of administration, but simply the privileged classes who rule officially. He says a nation's progress does not depend on its religion, literature, or government. This proposition he defends at length: a nation's religion, literature, and government are only effects of its civilization, not also causes thereof; no progressive country voluntarily adopts a retrogressive religion; no declining country ameliorates its religion. Savages are converted to Christianity only by becoming civilized. A religion too much in advance of a people can do no present service, but must bide its time. Thus the Hebrews continually relapsed from the monotheism which Moses taught. The Romans, with rare exceptions, were an ignorant and barbarous race, ferocious, dissolute, and cruel; polytheism was their natural creed; they could not comprehend the sublime and admirable doctrines of Christianity, and after that seemed to have carried all before it, and received the homage of the best part of Europe, it was soon found that nothing was really effected. Superstition but took a new form; men worshipped the Virgin Mary instead of Cybele. The Catholic religion is to Protestantism what the Dark Ages are to modern times.

Accordingly, the most civilized countries should be Protestant. In general, it is so; but sometimes a foreign force fixed the religion of the people, which does them small service. Thus Scotland and Sweden are Protestant countries, but more marked with superstition, intolerance, and bigotry than Catholic France. The French have a religion worse than themselves; the Scotch have one better than themselves; and in both cases the characteristics of the people neutralize those of their creed, and the national faith is altogether inoperative.

"Literature in itself is but a trifling matter." (!) Its value depends on its communicating real knowledge, that is, an acquaintance with physical and mental laws. To look upon an acquaintance with literature as one of the objects of education, is to make the end subordinate to the means. Hence there are "highly educated men," so called, whose advance in knowledge has been retarded by the activity of their education. They are burdened with prejudices which their reading only renders more inveterate; for literature is not only full of wisdom but of absurdities also; so the benefit of literature will depend on the skill and judgment with which books are selected and studied. Europe would have made more rapid progress in the seventh and eighth centuries, if all knowledge of the alphabet had been lost. For the noble works of antiquity thereby preserved were not used at all, and letters helped only to spread the superstitious regard men so much delighted in at that time.

Government is still less the ally of progressive civilization; for "no great political improvement, no great reform, either legislative or executive, has ever been originated in any country by its rulers." Able thinkers find out the abuses, devise the remedy, convince and persuade the people, and force the rulers to adopt the improvement; and then, the people are expected to admire the wisdom of the rulers! Thus, the repeal of the Corn Laws in England was not the work of the ministry in Parliament, but of the political economists, who proved that protective restrictions were absurd; and thus the repeal of the Corn Laws became a matter, not of party or of expediency, but merely of knowledge: when the diffusion of knowledge reached a certain point, the laws must

fall. Besides, all great reforms consist in undoing an old wrong, not in enacting a new right; the tendency of modern legislation is to restore things to that natural channel whence preceding legislation turned them away. The ruling classes have interfered so much with the development of mankind, and done so much mischief, that it is wonderful civilization could advance at all. In England, for the last two centuries, they had less power than elsewhere, but have yet done such a great amount of evil as forms a melancholy chapter in the history of the human mind; excepting certain laws necessary to preserve order and prevent crime, nearly all has been done amiss. All the most important interests have been grievously damaged by the rulers' attempt to aid them; thus, the effort to protect trade nearly ruined trade itself, which would have perished had it not violated the laws by smuggling. The economical evils of this protective system, its injuries to trade, are surpassed by its moral evils,—the increasing of crime. The attempt to protect religion increased only hypocrisy and heresy,—he might have added cruelty and atheism; the effort to keep down the rate of interest on money has always raised that interest. Still more, all the great Christian governments have made strenuous efforts to destroy the liberty of the press, and prevent men from expressing their thoughts in Politics and Religion, the most important of all subjects. Even in England, the rulers tax paper, and make the very thoughts of men pay toll.

“It is truly a frightful consideration that knowledge is to be hindered, and that the proceeds of honest labor, of patient thought, and sometimes of profound genius, are to be diminished, in order that a large part of their scanty earnings may go to swell the pomp of an idle and ignorant court, minister to the caprice of a few powerful individuals, and too often supply them with the means of turning against the people resources which the people called into existence.”

In England the rulers have less power than elsewhere; and the progress has been more regular, more rapid, and less violent and bloody. She has shown the world “that one main condition of the prosperity of a people is this,—that its rulers shall have very little power, and exercise that little very sparingly.”

So the growth of European civilization is not due to Religion, Literature, or Government, but only to the progress of Knowledge, which depends on the number of truths known, and the extent to which they are known,—the accumulation and distribution of knowledge.

In Chapter VI. Mr. Buckle treats of the origin of history, and the state of Historical Literature during the Middle Ages. In this History of History, he finds that, in the last three centuries, historians have shown an increasing respect for man's mind, and have more than ever attended to the condition of the people and the diffusion of knowledge. His sketch of the progress of history from the oral ballad, up through all stages of monkish absurdity, is amusing and curious. We must pass it by, however, to speak of what seems more essential to the understanding of his positions.

In Chapter VII. he gives an outline of the History of the English Intellect, from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century. To escape from the melancholy condition of the Dark and Middle Ages, there must be an increase of doubt. Knowledge is the condition of progress, doubt of knowledge. Scepticism is "hardness of belief," an increased application and diffusion of the laws of evidence and the rules of reasoning. "In physics, it is the necessary precursor of science; in politics, of liberty; in theology, of toleration," — and, he might have added, of truth.

"To scepticism we owe that spirit of inquiry which, during the last two centuries, has encroached on every possible subject, has reformed every department of practical and speculative knowledge, has weakened the authority of the privileged classes, and thus placed liberty on a surer foundation, has chastised the despotism of princes, has restrained the arrogance of nobles, and has even diminished the prejudices of the clergy."

No single fact has so extensively affected the different nations as the duration, amount, and diffusion of their scepticisms. In Spain, by means of the Inquisition, the Church prevented the publication of sceptical opinions: there, knowledge and civilization are stationary. But scepticism first began in England and France, and was most widely diffused; and there "has arisen that constantly progressive knowledge to which these two great nations owe their prosperity."

Mr. Buckle then shows the growth of doubt in England, and, as its consequence, the increase of religious toleration, and the decline of the old ecclesiastical spirit. It is the authority of the secular classes which has forced toleration on the Christian clergy. Elizabeth at first balanced the Catholics and Protestants, allowing neither party the preponderance; in the first eleven years of her reign, no Roman Catholic was put to death for religion, and afterwards, though men were undoubtedly executed for their opinions, yet none dared state their religion as the cause of their execution.

Jewel's Apology was written in 1561; Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity in 1594; Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants in 1637: each is typical of its time;—in Jewel, ecclesiastical authority is the basis, and reason the superstructure; in Hooker, reason is the basis, and authority the superstructure; while with Chillingworth, authority disappears, and "the whole fabric of religion is made to rest upon the way in which the unaided reason of man shall interpret the decrees of an omnipotent God." This fundamental principle was adopted by the most influential writers of the seventeenth century, all of whom insisted on the authority of private judgment. The ecclesiastical spirit declined; able men devoted their talents to science.

"What used to be considered the most important of all questions is now abandoned to men who mimic the zeal without professing the influence of those really great divines whose works are among the glories of our early literature." "Theological interests have long ceased to be supreme; and the affairs of nations are no longer regulated according to ecclesiastical views."

Sir James Mackintosh said, that unless some revolution, auspicious to priestcraft, should replunge Europe in ignorance, "church-power will certainly not survive the nineteenth century."

"In England, where its march has been more rapid than elsewhere, this change is very observable. In every other department, we have had a series of great and powerful thinkers, who have done honor to their country, and have been the admiration of mankind. But for more than a century we have not produced a single original work, in the whole field of controversial theology."

For more than a century no valuable addition has been made to that immense mass of divinity which continually loses something of its interest among thinking men. Both military and ecclesiastical power decline before the progress of civilization.*

In the reigns of James I. and Charles I., great attempts were made to restore the fading power of authority; but the dead could not be revived. Even the Puritans were more fanatical than superstitious.

We have not space to examine Mr. Buckle's profound investigation into the reign of Charles II., when so severe a blow was struck at the tyranny of the Church and of the nobles. In those few years, clerical property was made amenable to Parliamentary taxation; the clergy were forbidden to burn a heretic, or make a suspected person criminate himself in the trial. It was fixed that all money bills must originate with the House of Commons; that the Peers have no original jurisdiction, only appellate, in civil cases. The prerogatives of purveyance and pre-emption were abolished, and the king could not vex the property of his subjects; the Habeas Corpus Act made their persons also secure; general impeachments fell to the ground, and the liberty of the press became a fixed fact; the feudal incidents which the Norman conquerors had imposed, military tenures, wardships, fines for alienation, forfeiture for marriage by reason of tenure, aids, homages, *escuages*, *primer-seisins*, and other mischievous subtilties, all went to common ruin. This was done in the age of Charles II.: the king was incompetent, the court profligate, the ministers

* In his summing up on this point, the author gives the following explanation of his use of the word *scepticism*. "By scepticism I merely mean hardness of belief,—so that an increased scepticism is an increased perception of the difficulty of proving assertions; or, in other words, it is an increased application, and an increased diffusion, of the rules of reasoning, and of the laws of evidence. This feeling of hesitation, and of suspended judgment, has, in every department of thought, been the invariable preliminary to all the intellectual revelations through which the human mind has passed; and without it there could be no progress, no change, no civilization. In physics it is the necessary precursor of science; in politics, of liberty; in theology, of toleration. These are the three leading forms of scepticism: it is therefore clear, that in religion the sceptic steers a middle course between atheism and orthodoxy, rejecting both extremes, because he sees that both are incapable of proof." — p. 327.

venal,—all these in the pay of France; there were unprecedented insults from abroad, frequent conspiracies at home, a great fire and a great plague in London!

“How could so wonderful a progress be made in the face of these unparalleled disasters? These are questions which our political compilers are unable to answer; because they look too much at the peculiarities of individuals, and too little at the temper of the age in which those individuals live. Such writers do not perceive that the history of every civilized country is the history of its intellectual development, which kings, statesmen, and legislators are more likely to retard than to hasten; because, however great their power may be, they are, at best, the accidental and insufficient representatives of the spirit of their time; and because, so far from being able to regulate the movements of the national mind, they themselves form the smallest part of it, and, in a general view of the progress of man, are only to be regarded as the puppets who strut and fret their hour upon a little stage; while beyond them, and on every side of them, are forming opinions and principles which they can scarcely perceive, but by which, alone, the whole course of human affairs is ultimately governed.” — p. 358.

Even the vices of the rulers served the people's cause.

“All classes of men soon learned to despise a king who was a drunkard, a libertine, and a hypocrite; and who, in point of honor, was unworthy to enter the presence of the meanest of his subjects.”

His reckless debaucheries made him abhor all restraint, and to dislike the clerical class, whose profession at least presupposes more than ordinary purity. From the love of vicious indulgence, he disliked the clergy; and he conferred the highest dignities of the Church on feeble or insincere men, who could not defend what they really believed, or did not believe what they really professed. Such were Juxon, Sheldon, and Sancroft, Archbishops of Canterbury, and Frewen, Stearn, and Dolben, Archbishops of York. But Jeremy Taylor, who married the king's illegitimate sister, daughter of Joanna Bridges, and Barrow, both men of great talents and unspotted virtue, were treated with neglect. In consequence of this filling great ecclesiastical offices with little, and sometimes wicked men, and banishing the noble men to obscure positions, the power of the Church continued to decline, and religious liberty to increase. The clergy attempted to retrieve their power, by re-

viving the doctrine of Passive Obedience, and Divine Right; but this only increased the opposition of the people. The Anglican clergy were friendly to James II. before he came to the crown, using all their strength to defeat the bill which excluded him from the succession. They rejoiced in his elevation. They sustained him, while he persecuted the dissenters, but when he issued his Declaration of Indulgence, which nullified the Test and Corporation Acts, the established clergy broke from him, and dissolved this "conspiracy between the crown and the Church." They looked on, in silence, while the king proposed to turn a free government into a despotism. They saw Jeffreys and Kirke torture their fellow-subjects, the jails crowded, the scaffolds running with blood. They were well pleased that Baxter should be thrown into prison, and Howe driven into exile. They insisted on passive obedience to a Lord's Anointed, because these victims opposed the Church. But when James attempted to protect men hostile to their Church, the guardians of the temple flew to arms. They refused to obey the order, united with the dissenters, and overturned the throne. The only time when the Church made war upon the throne was when the crown declared its intention of tolerating, and in some degree of protecting, the rival religions of the land. When James subsequently promised to favor their order, they repented of their work. They opposed William, "that great man, who, without striking a blow, saved the country from the slavery with which it was threatened." They continued to intrigue for the restoration of the dethroned tyrant, because his successor was the friend of religious liberty.

The power of the Church continued to decline.

"Under two of the most remarkable men of the eighteenth century, Whitfield, the first of theological orators, and Wesley, the first of theological statesmen, there was organized a great system of religion, that bore the same relation to the Church of England that the Church of England bore to the Church of Rome." "In the eighteenth century the Wesleyans were to the Bishops what in the sixteenth century the Reformers were to the Popes."

But after the death of their great leaders, the Methodists produced no man of original genius, and, since Adam Clarke,

none of their scholars has had a European reputation. In the time of William, the dissenters were estimated as about one twenty-third part of the population; in 1786 they were one fourth; in 1851 they were two fifths of the whole.

The advance of the sceptical spirit, and the triumph of religious liberty, are shown by yet other things, — the separation of theology from morals and politics. The one was effected late in the seventeenth century, the other before the middle of the eighteenth; and both were begun by the clergy themselves. Cumberland would construct a system of morals independent of theology; Warburton taught that, in dealing with religion, the state must look to expediency, not revelation; Hume, Paley, Bentham, and Mill have carried their doctrines much further. The Catholics are already admitted to Parliament; the Jews will soon be there. The power of clerical oppression was still further weakened by the great Arian controversy, "rashly instigated by Whiston, Clarke, and Waterland," by the Bangorian controversy, by Blackburne's work on the confessional, the dispute on miracles, the exposure of the gross absurdities of the Fathers, the statements of Gibbon relative to the spread of Christianity, — "important and unrefuted," — the "decisive controversy between Porson and Travis respecting the text of the heavenly witnesses," and the "discoveries of geologists, in which, not only was the fidelity of the Mosaic cosmogony impugned, but its accuracy was shown to be impossible."

This spirit of inquiry reached classes hitherto shut out from education. In the eighteenth century, for the first time, schools were established for the lower classes on the only day they had time to attend them, and newspapers on the only day they had time to read them; circulating libraries first appeared in England; printing began to be established in country towns. Then, too, for the first time, were efforts made to popularize the sciences; literary reviews began then; book-clubs, debating-societies amongst tradesmen, date from the same period. It was not till 1769 that the first public meeting assembled in England, where an attempt was made to enlighten Englishmen respecting their political rights.* Then the proceedings

* For the author overlooks the political preaching of the Puritans.

of the courts of law and Parliament were published, and political newspapers arose. The great political doctrine that persons, not land or other property, should be represented, was then promulgated, and the people, for the first time, were called on to decide the great questions of religion, which they were not consulted on before.* The word "independence," in its modern acceptation, does not occur till the beginning of the eighteenth century. Authors began to write in a lighter and simpler style, which all men could understand. Literary men found a wider public, and were no longer dependents on the caprices of the privileged class.

Our author then traces the reaction against this spirit of civilization, and thinks it fortunate that, after the death of Anne, — a weak and silly woman, — the throne was long filled by the two Georges, "aliens in manners and in country, one of whom spoke our language but indifferently, and the other not at all," — "and both profoundly ignorant of the people they undertook to govern." The crown and the clergy could not work together to resist the progress of mankind. But the reactionary movement was greatly aided by the character of George III. ; despotic and superstitious, he sought to extend the prerogative and strengthen the Church. Here is the picture of that monarch, such as our fathers, looking across the ocean, saw him.

"Every liberal sentiment, everything approaching to reform, nay, even the mere mention of inquiry, was an abomination in the eyes of that narrow and ignorant prince. Without knowledge, without taste, without even a glimpse of one of the sciences, or a feeling for one of the fine arts, education had done nothing to enlarge a mind which nature had more than usually contracted. Totally ignorant of the history and resources of foreign countries, and barely knowing their geographical position, his information was scarcely more extensive respecting the people over whom he was called to rule. In that immense mass of evidence now extant, and which consists of every description of private correspondence, records of private conversation, and of public acts, there is not to be found the slightest proof that he knew any one of those numerous things which the governor of a country ought to know; or, indeed, that he was acquainted with a single duty of his position, except

* For the author overlooks the theological preaching of the Puritans.

that mere mechanical routine of ordinary business, which might have been effected by the lowest clerk in the meanest office in his kingdom." — pp. 405, 406.

During the sixty years of his reign, Pitt was the only great man he willingly admitted to his councils; and he must forget the lessons of his illustrious father and persecute his party to death. George III. looked on slavery as a good old custom, and Pitt dared not oppose it. The king hated the French, and Pitt plunged the nations in a needless, wicked, and costly war. He corrupted the House of Lords by filling it with country gentlemen remarkable for nothing but health, and lawyers who rose to office chiefly through the zeal with which they favored the king and repressed the people.

Mr. Buckle gives a nice and discriminating account of Burke, "one of the greatest men, and the greatest thinkers, who has ever devoted himself to the practice of English politics." We have seen no picture so just of this great man when sane, and also when madness had made him the most dangerous of lunatics. But we must pass it by, — and also his account of the American Revolution, and the reaction in England occasioned by the troubles in France.

Chapter VIII. relates the history of the French intellect from the middle of the fifteenth century to the reign of Louis XIV. It is one of the most learned, original, and instructive chapters in the book. Great events pass before us, and also great men, — Henry IV., Montaigne, Richelieu, Descartes, and their famous contemporaries. But we have no time to look at them.

Chapter IX. is devoted to the "History of the Protective Spirit and Comparison of it in France and England." We must submit a short analysis of its contents.

Modern civilization began to dawn in the tenth and eleventh centuries; in the twelfth, it had reached all the nations now civilized. The people began to rebel against the clergy, who had once protected them against the military rulers. This is the starting-point of modern civilization. Then the clergy began systematically to punish men for heresy; inquisitions, torturing, burnings, and the like, became general. Then began an unceasing struggle between the advocates of Inquiry and the advocates of Tradition. Then the feudal system

began, and set the example of a large public polity, in which the clerical body, as such, had no place. Accordingly there came a struggle between feudality and the Church. European aristocracy began, and in the organization of society took the place of the Church. William the Conqueror brought feudalism to England, but made each vassal dependent on the king, not merely on his feudal superior; while in France the great lords and their vassals were independent of the king. Hence arose the great difference between the English and French aristocracy. The former, being too feeble to resist the king, allied themselves with the people to uphold their common right against the king; the people acquired a tone of independence and lofty bearing with the habits of self-government, and founded their great civil and political institutions. In France, the great lords resisted the people. Hence, when the feudal system declined in the fourteenth century, in one country the French king took the authority, and power became more and more centralized, while the English people took it in the other, and power became progressively diffused. When evil days set in, and the invasions of despotism have begun, liberty will be retained, not by those who show the oldest deeds and longest charters, but by those most inured to independence, and most regardless of that insidious protection which the upper classes throw around them. Men can never be free unless they are educated to freedom, and that training is by institutions, not books,—by self-discipline, self-reliance, self-government.

The protective spirit was strong enough in France to resist the Reformation, and preserve to the clergy the forms of this ancient supremacy; in England it was opposed by the great nobles,—who are to politics what the priests were to religion,—but carried by the people. At the accession of Elizabeth there was an intimate connection between the English nobles and the Catholic clergy; she therefore must choose her ministers from the commoners; hence came the two Bacons, the two Cecils, Knollys, Sadler, Smith, Throgmorton, and Walsingham,—the most eminent statesmen and diplomatists of her reign. The Pope taunted her with excluding the ancient nobility, and raising obscure people to honor; the rebellion of

1569 was the rising of the great families of the North against "the upstart and plebeian administration of the queen." At first, James and Charles tried to revive the power of the two great protective classes, the nobles and the clergy; but they could not execute their mischievous plans, for there arose what Clarendon called "the most prodigious, the boldest rebellion that any age or country ever brought forth." This was an outbreak of the democratic spirit; the political form of a movement of which the Reformation was the religious form.

In Chapter X. Mr. Buckle makes a comparison between the English Rebellion and the contemporary Fronde, and shows that the energy of the protective spirit in France caused the failure of the latter. In France, the people, not accustomed to self-government, intrusted the conduct of this rebellion to great noblemen; in England, they took the matter into their own hands, and carried it through.

Chapters XI. and XII. treat of the age of Louis XIV. and his successor;—of the protective spirit applied to literature, of the consequences of the alliance between the intellectual and the governing classes, of the reaction against this spirit, and of the distant preparations for the French Revolution. Both chapters are well studied, rich in learning, in critical judgment on men and things, and full of original opinions. No writer, we think, has given so just an account of the good and ill of Louis XIV., and surely none, of the progress of the French mind during that period. We are compelled to pass them over. No man has given so careful and exact an account of the character of Voltaire, and the good services he rendered to the world.

In Chapters XIII. and XIV. Mr. Buckle discusses the historical literature of France, from the end of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, and the proximate causes of the French Revolution, after the middle of the eighteenth century. They are learned, exact, and profound. But we have no space for an analysis.

The plan of Mr. Buckle's book is quite faulty, both confused and defective. When he began to print, we doubt if

he knew exactly what he would do. At first he appears to intend writing a *Universal History of Civilization*; he lays down his rules accordingly, and begins his work. But finding at length the difficulties greater than he imagined, he says he has abandoned his original scheme, and reluctantly determined to write, not the history of the civilization of mankind, but that of a single country (p. 210); and accordingly selects England as the best type of normal developments (p. 221).

He has no preface or special introduction to this volume. He does not, at the outset, tell his readers what he intends to do, on the whole, and how many volumes he designs to regale them with; and then distribute the work into its several parts, and lay before us a plan of the entertainment, with a bill of fare, showing what we are to feast upon, and when each special dish is to appear. In various parts of the volume he hints at his plan, rather vaguely intimating what he intends to do. Thus the Introduction is scattered piecemeal throughout a volume of nearly a thousand pages.

On his title, the book is called "*History of Civilization in England*," but the "running-title," at the head of each page, is "*General Introduction*," of which it seems this volume is but a part,—one or two more on the same preliminary theme being hinted at. Only the first six chapters are, properly speaking, *Introductory to the History of Civilization*; the rest are the actual *History of Civilization in England and France*.

The volume is divided only into Chapters, not also into Books, and the arrangement of the Chapters is not very good; so the author is often forced to repeat what had been sufficiently said before. As the work is not completed, perhaps it would be excessive to ask for an index,—such as generous Mr. Macaulay so kindly throws in with his magnificent composition; but we think the reader of so big a book has a right to claim a copious table of contents at the beginning, and a descriptive "heading" on each of the nine or ten hundred pages. But Mr. Buckle gives us neither the one nor the other. Besides, the titles of the chapters do not always sufficiently indicate the contents.

But these faults can be easily corrected in the next edition, which is sure to be called for, when the public recovers from

this painful but healing panic. We would modestly hint to the author the following scheme for his grand work.

A Preface, setting forth the purpose of the work and its probable extent. The volume itself might thus be divided into Books and Chapters. Book I. Transcendental History. Chap. I. Resources and Purpose of the Historian; Chap. II. Regularity of Human Actions, and the Causes thereof; Chap. III. Influence of Physical Forces on the Development of Man, on the Organization of Society and the Character of Individuals; Chap. IV. Examination of the Metaphysical Method of Investigating the Spiritual Faculties of Man; Chap. V. Comparison of the Power of the Moral and Intellectual Faculties,—their relative Influence on the Civilization of Mankind; Chap. VI. The Effect of Religion, Literature, and Government on that Civilization.

Book II. Origin of Historical Literature in general, and its Progressive Development in Europe, from the Decline of the Classic Nations to the end of the Middle Ages.

Book III. Outline of the Intellectual History of the English, from the end of the Middle Ages till the end of the Eighteenth Century.

Book IV. Intellectual and Moral History of the French, from the end of the Middle Ages to the end of the Eighteenth Century. Chap. I. General Outline thereof, till the Accession of Louis XIV.; Chap. II. General History of the Protective Spirit, and a Comparison of its Special Effects in France and England; Chap. III. Comparison between the French and English Rebellions of the Seventeenth Century; Chap. IV. Reign of Louis XIV.,—Effect of the Protective Spirit on Literature, and of the consequent Union of the Intellectual and the Governing Classes; Chap. V. Reaction against the Protective Spirit,—Remote Preparation for the French Revolution; Chap. VI. Progressive Developments of Historical Literature in France, from the end of the Middle Ages to the end of the Eighteenth Century; Chap. VII. Proximate Causes of the French Revolution, after the middle of the Eighteenth Century.

We do not say this is the best possible arrangement of the valuable matter which Mr. Buckle spreads out before us, but

one better than the present; and likely to save some confusion, and to spare both writer and reader some repetitions which now embarrass the development of his great thoughts.

There is a little confusion in his use of terms. Thus he uses the word Law, when he means Force, Power, or even a special human faculty. We take it, a Law is not a force (or power), but the constant mode of operation in which that force acts: it is the manner of a cause, not the cause of a manner. He often speaks of the progress of mankind, or a nation, but does not tell what it consists in. Speaking generally, we suppose the progress of mankind may be summed up in these three things:—1. The development of man's natural faculties. 2. The consequent acquisition of power over the material world. 3. The organization of men into small or large companies having corporate unity of action for the social whole, and individual freedom for the personal parts. It would be an improvement if the author would favor us with a definition of Civilization, which might properly be made in the Preface.

The author's style is clear and distinct, not ambitious or ornamented. We often pause to admire a great thought, a wide and felicitous generalization, or a nice account of some special detail, nay, to question the truth of a statement of fact, or of a philosophic induction; we never stop to puzzle over a difficult sentence. Now and then he rises to eloquence,—the elevation of his language coming from a moral, and not a merely intellectual cause. We do not always agree with the argument, but remember no instance in which he uses a sophism, or practises any trick on the mind or emotions of his readers; he never throws dust in their eyes. Sometimes the evidence he offers is obviously inadequate to convey the writer's certainty to the reader; then he confesses the fact. We remember no ill-natured line in all the book, no ungenerous sentiment. It is written in the special interest of no class, nation, or race, but in the general interest of mankind.

We must now mention in detail some things which seem to require a little further notice at our hands.

He says (p. 3) we are enabled to compare the condition of

mankind in every stage of civilization, and under every variety of circumstance. We think the collection of facts is not yet quite adequate to convey an idea of the lowest stage. Man's existence may be divided into six periods, — the wild, savage, barbarous, half-civilized, civilized, and enlightened. Scholarly men know little of the first; for many years it has not been a favorite subject of research. Lafitau, Monboddo, Meiners, and others, have collected important facts; many more still lie unused in the works of travellers, geographers, and naturalists. Within a few years Colonel Sleeman related some exceedingly interesting particulars which came under his notice in India;* we refer to the children brought up by the wolves in Hindustan, and subsequently reclaimed. Captain Gibson of New York has told some things highly important if true. Scholars know little of the condition of the wild men who are below the savage, though now and then one of that class is exhibited in our great towns as a show. But, as mankind started from this primeval condition, it becomes important to study those tribes which have advanced least from it, and such isolated persons as Colonel Sleeman speaks of, who occur, from time to time, even in Germany and France, and to gather together the facts scattered in the works of ancient and modern writers, from Herodotus to the travellers in the American interior. The cannibals of Polynesia may shed much light on the historical development of the human race. Writers make great mistakes through their ignorance of the primitive condition of mankind.

Mr. Buckle says we cannot make experiments in civilization, and thereby determine either facts of man's nature, or laws of his developments, and thus it is more difficult to master human history. This is true; but at this day so many human experiments are taking place spontaneously, that a philosopher need hardly ask for more, even if he had power to make them directly. Thus we have all the five great races before us, — to adopt that convenient division, — living separately in some places, and mingling their blood in others. There are nations in all the six stages of development, except the lowest, and perhaps some even in that condition, or very near it; it is a wide range from the Dyaks of New Guinea to the Royal

* See Sleeman's Rambles, noticed elsewhere in this volume.

Academy of London. There are five great forms of civilized religion still in the full tide of experiment,—the Brahminic, Buddhistic, Jewish, Christian, and Mohammedan,—not to mention Mormons. Catholicism and Protestantism stand side by side in Christendom; there are many Protestant sects experimenting on mankind. The three great forms of government, and many transitional forms, may be studied in their actual works. The experiment of labor is tried in many forms, from slavery to entire unrestricted freedom. Polyandria still prevails as an institution in Siberia, and other parts of Asia,—nay, in all the great towns of the world as a profession; what is the instancial life of the tribe in Tartary, as it once was in Scotland, is the exceptional life of the individual harlot in London and Boston. Polygamy can be studied in Turkey and Utah, where it is a lawful institution, and in many places in its unlawful forms. In the United States we have three races of men, Ethiopian, American, Caucasian, here living separate, or there mingling their blood. In one part of the Union the public takes great pains to educate and foster the laboring people; in another, the public makes it penal to educate them. There are few experiments a philosopher would wish made with mankind, which mankind is not making without his advice. We think, however, of two not yet attempted. One is to allow women the same political rights as the men; the other, to put honest men in political office. Neither has been tried as yet.

Mr. Buckle denies that there is any original difference in the faculties of different races of men.

“Original distinctions of race are altogether hypothetical.” “We have no proof of the existence of hereditary talents, vices, or virtues; we cannot safely assume that there has been any permanent improvement in the moral or intellectual faculties of man, nor have we any decisive ground for saying that these faculties are likely to be greater in an infant born in the most civilized part of Europe, than in one born in the wildest region of a barbarous country.”—p. 161.

We are surprised at this statement, coming from a man of such a comprehensive mind, and one so exceedingly well read in many departments of human thought. Looking at the matter on a large scale, it seems to us that the difference in the

natural endowment of different races is enormous. All the great, permanent, and progressive civilizations are Caucasian. The Mongolian in China is no longer progressive; — no other race has reached the enlightened state. All the six forms of civilized religion, Brahminic, Hebrew, Buddhistic, Classic (Greek and Roman), Christian, Mohammedan, are Caucasian. All the great works of science, literature, poetry, eloquence, and the fine arts are from the same race. So are all the liberal governments, — the democracies, republics, aristocracies, limited monarchies. No other race ever got beyond a despotism limited by fear of assassination. Surely the inductive philosophy would compel an inquirer to infer an original difference of faculties in the races themselves. What odds betwixt even the Greeks and the Romans, the French and English, the Irish and the Scotch! In America the original difference of faculties in the African, the Indian, and the Caucasian springs into the mind as readily as the difference of color comes up before the eye. The obstinate and ferocious Indian will fight, he will not be a slave. He may be broken, not bent. The pliant and affectionate African seldom fights, and rarely takes vengeance, and is easily sent into slavery. The Indian boy and girl refuse education, or take it unkindly. How many experiments have been made in Massachusetts and New York! They all came to nothing.

Look at the matter on a smaller scale. The individual inheritance of qualities, we had thought, was abundantly made out in the case of man, as of the humbler animals. The same historic face runs in the family for generations, the same qualities appear. Genius appears to be an exception to this. Writers on phrenology we thought had proved this long ago. We can hardly suppose Mr. Buckle ignorant of any important work, but this matter of inheritance has been lately discussed with great learning by M. Prosper Lucas.*

We find national character as the result of three factors. There is a geographical element, an ethnological element, and an institutional element. Mr. Buckle admits only two, the geographical and institutional. If, in the Middle Ages,

* In his *Traité philosophique et physiologique sur l'Hérédité Naturelle*. Paris. 1850. 2 vols. 8vo.

the Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Norsemen had settled in France instead of England, and there mixed their blood, does any one think this Teutonic people would have now the same character which marks the Celtic French? What a difference between the Spanish and English settlements in America! Is there no odds in the blood? What a difference between the Greeks of the age of Pericles and the mongrel people — part Greek, but chiefly Roman, Celt, and Slave — who occupy the same soil to-day! Climate, soil, aspect of nature, is still the same; what an odds in the men!

“ Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild,
Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields;
Thine olive ripe as when Minerva smiled,
And still his honeyed wealth Hymettus yields;
There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds,
The free-born wanderer of thy mountain air;
Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds,
Still in his beams Mendeli's marbles glare;
Art, Glory, Freedom fail, but Nature still is fair.”

The difference between the mythology of India and Greece, we think, was caused more by the ethnology of the people than the geography of their lands.

Mr. Buckle assumes that the Swedes and Spanish are a fickle people, inconstant and unstable, and finds the cause of that peculiarity in their climate, which renders out-door work irregular. We have found no proof of national fickleness in either people.

He gives a terrible portrait of the destructive deities of the Hindoos. Siva is represented as a hideous being, encircled by a girdle of snakes, with a human skull in his hand, and wearing a necklace composed of human bones. He has three eyes; the ferocity of his temper is marked by his being clothed in a tiger's skin; over his left shoulder the deadly cobra di capello raises its head. Dourga, his wife, has a body of dark blue, while the palms of her hands are red with blood: she has four arms, one holding the skull of a giant; the hands of victims are round her waist; her tongue lolls out from her mouth; her neck is adorned with a ghastly row of human heads, which hang dangling there. Mr. Buckle attributes this horrible deity to the effect of the aspect of nature, filling

the mind with terror, and forcing it to call up "shrieks and shapes and sights unholy." But, alas! these Hindoo conceptions of God are less hideous than the Deity set forth by our own Jonathan Edwards. No Hindoo could believe in eternal damnation. Siva and Durga would have shrunk from the thought of tormenting new-born babies for ever and ever.

Mr. Buckle speaks of the regularity of crime, the certainty of its annual amount. But he fails to notice some other important facts connected with crime. Such offences as theft, violence to the person, beating of women, and the like, are confined, almost entirely, to the poorest class of the community. A more careful inquiry shows that the criminals of this class either have a bodily organization which impels them to crime, or else have been exposed in early life to influences of education which incline them that way: so that, with many, crime is either organized in them, or institutionized upon them.*

What we most object to in Mr. Buckle's *Transcendental History* is his estimate of the moral powers; he thinks they have little to do with the progress of mankind. He says (pp. 158, 159) there is a twofold progress, moral and intellectual; to be willing to perform our duty is the moral part; to know how to perform it is the intellectual part; the influence which moral motives, or the dictates of the moral instinct, have exercised over the progress of civilization, is exceedingly small, while the intellect is the real mover in man's progress.

Here we differ widely from him. It seems to us that a man must know his duty, be willing to perform it, and also know how to perform it; and that there has been a continual progress in these three things. He says, quoting from Sir James Mackintosh, *Morals have hitherto been stationary, and are likely for ever to continue so* (p. 164, note 15). But, if we read history aright, there has been a continually increasing knowledge of natural right, a continual spread of knowledge

* What Seneca says of man in general, is mainly true of these unfortunates. "Fata nos ducunt; et quantum cuique restet, prima nascentium hora disposuit. Causa pendet ex causa, privata ac publica longus ordo rerum trahit." — *De Prov.*, V. 6.

among larger and larger masses of people; and more and more are animated by moral motives,—the desire to do a known right. He says the great moral systems were the same three thousand years ago as they are now; we think this statement greatly deceptive. Take an example. Did the Hebrew Law say, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor"? It restricted neighborhood to men of the same country. When Jesus explained the word as meaning whoso needed the aid a man could give, he represented a great moral progress since the Law was written. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": these words are adequate to express the moral feelings of a good man to-day, as well as when first uttered; but how much more they include now than then!—removal of the causes of poverty, drunkenness, crime,—protection to the deaf and dumb, the blind, the crazy, and the fool. There has been no change in the multiplication-table since the days of Pythagoras, there will be no change of it; but the knowledge of it has been spread among many millions; that knowledge has been applied to many things he never thought of; and there has been a great development of the mathematical faculty in mankind.

Mr. Buckle says the influence of a man of great morality is short in time, and not extensive in space. In both statements he is mistaken. For the good man directly incites others to imitate and surpass his excellence; the tradition of it remains long after he is dead, and spreads over all the civilized world. Besides, the moral idea becomes an institution or a law, and then is a continual force in the new civilization itself. A moral feeling can be organized, as well as an intellectual idea. The law forbidding murder, theft, the slave-trade, piracy, and a thousand other offences, was a moral feeling once. So a hospital, an almshouse, a school, a college, was once only the "dictate of the moral instinct." He says, "The deeper we penetrate into the question, the more clearly shall we see the superiority of intellectual acquisitions over moral feeling." (p. 167.) He should invert the sentence. He says the Spanish Inquisitors were highly moral men, no hypocrites, but remarkable for an undeviating and incorruptible integrity; with conscientious energy "they

fulfilled their duty." Now it is quite clear that the leaders of the Spanish Church were men of large intellect, carefully cultivated, learned, adroit, familiar with the world. But we should say they were men of very little morality. The conscience, the power to discern right, was so little developed, that, if they were learned, they did not know it was wrong to tear a girl to piece on the rack, because she could not believe that the Pope was infallible. We should not say a man's mind was well developed, who did not know that one and one make two; should we say a man's conscience is well developed, who does not know it is wrong thus to torture a girl?

He says (p. 220), "The stock of American knowledge is small, but it is spread through all classes." If by knowledge he means "an acquaintance with physical and mental laws," as on p. 246, it is not true that the amount is small in comparison with other countries; though acquaintance with literature is certainly quite rare. But when he says "little attention has been paid to physical science," we think him much mistaken. He thinks philosophical inquiries are "almost entirely neglected." It is not quite true. If no great metaphysician has appeared since Jonathan Edwards, as he truly says, how many has England produced since Berkeley? Dr. Hickok's "Rational Psychology" is a more profound book than that of Jonathan Edwards. Three things go to make a great metaphysician;—power of psychological analysis; intuitive power to perceive great truths, either by a synthetic judgment *a priori*, or by a comprehensive induction from facts of consciousness or observation; power of deductive logic. Jonathan Edwards was great only in the last, and least of all. America is more devoted to practical affairs, and certainly has done little in metaphysics. But from the death of Newton, in 1727, till the end of that century, how little England did in mathematics! We wish it were true that knowledge is so widely diffused as he says. But alas! there are four million slaves who know nothing, and as many "poor whites" who know little.

We shall not pursue these criticisms.

"Ubi plura nitent in carmine, non ego paucis
Offendar maculis, quas aut incuria fudit,
Aut humana parum cavit natura."

Mr. Buckle has given us one of the most important contributions which any Englishman has yet made to the philosophy of human history. We wish we had adequate space to point out its excellences in detail; but the analysis and the extracts we have given must suffice for the present. We congratulate the author on his success. We are sure the thoughtful world will give him a thoughtful welcome, and if his future volumes, which we anxiously look for, shall equal this, he is sure of a high place in the estimation of mankind.

ART. V.—PHYSICAL AND CELESTIAL MECHANICS.

Physical and Celestial Mechanics. By BENJAMIN PEIRCE, Perkins Professor of Astronomy and Mathematics in Harvard University, etc., etc. *Developed in Four Systems of Analytic Mechanics, Celestial Mechanics, Potential Physics, and Analytic Morphology.* Vol. I. *Analytic Mechanics.* Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1855. 4to. pp. xxxix, 496.

WE have recently spoken of the testimony borne by zoology to the doctrines of Christian faith. We are now called upon to welcome a contribution from the opposite end of the hierarchy of natural science to the riches of our spiritual domain. The volume on Analytic Mechanics, which has been so eagerly expected by the small circle of mathematical readers in our country, has been published, and will raise still higher the reputation of its author, who already stands at the head of mathematicians on this continent. It is not to be expected, that, in a journal of this character, we should give any account of the mathematical contents of such a book, consisting as they do, in great part, of a purely technical handling of the purely physical problems of the universe. But there are, scattered throughout it, hints and suggestions that come precisely within the scope of these pages. It will be seen that Professor Peirce announces three other volumes as in preparation. The three as yet unpublished proclaim,

in their very titles, their relation to theological science; but one would not expect from the simple title of *Analytic Mechanics* any reference to spiritual things. Yet the mind of our author is ever rich in suggestions upon every topic, and he has too much intellectual honesty to conceal any of his views. The problems of the universe might have been approached as simple questions of motion, under which form they would require only *Geometry* and *Algebra* for their solution. But our consciousness of power invariably interprets motion as a phenomenon of force. A purely geometrical view has seldom been taken of any question of mechanics. In the opening chapter of his treatise, Mr. Peirce gives us his views of the nature of force, as always residing in a will. The conception which the Positive School call childish, and declare to be outgrown with increasing culture, has, it thus appears, not been outgrown by the first mathematician in America, any more than by the first zoölogist in the world. He is unable to separate the perception of motion from his conception of cause, or to disjoin his conception of efficiency from that consciousness of power whence it sprang. It is only through the consciousness of efficiency in himself, that he can interpret motion as an effect of force; nor can he separate his conception of force, which lies outside himself, from the conception of a Will in which that force resides as a power. He deems it no more childish to believe in a personal God who sustains the motions of the heavenly spheres, than to believe in the existence of men as the cause of the motion of a train of cars, which he might see by chance on looking from his study window.

To this Boscovichian view of the immediate action of the Divine Will in producing the physical changes of nature, there can be but two objections, — one arising from the immense multitude of volitions requisite at every instant; the other, from the invariability of law to which the changes are subject. The striking lines of the poet, —

“ Ever fresh the broad creation,
A divine improvisation,
From the heart of God proceeds,
A single will, a million deeds,” —

do not express the immense and overpowering number of the deeds; which at each instant are not only a million, or a million times a million, but are more numerous than it is possible for any arithmetical skill to express. And those who have been ready to acknowledge that all things proceed from a single Will, have sometimes shrunk from the conception of such infinite power of omnipresent attention. Yet surely this is a reasonable view, and there is no real difficulty in conceiving the absolutely Infinite One as the author of an infinite number of volitions at each instant. The other objection is equally void of weight. So long as force is under the control of will, it is true that it is free from the necessities of law. But what is law, except the embodiment of thought? And what is there unreasonable in this supposition, that will may be guided by wisdom? A reasonable man acts according to a plan, and subjects himself voluntarily to rules, because he knows that in obedience to wise law is alone found a true liberty. Now the Divine Wisdom, seeing all things from the beginning, sees what rules for his own action will best accomplish the end which he proposes. The law of gravity, being the best of all possible laws for the purpose of an organized creation, will be adopted and adhered to by the Power that created and upholds all things. If it be asked where is the necessity for the adoption of any law at all, we answer, that there is a double necessity, arising from the spiritual and from the physical universe. The simple physical order of the universe cannot be maintained without the establishment of law, for that order is simply synonymous with the action of law. Nor would the physical creation be, as it was designed to be, the great school-room of the human race, were it not subject to laws at once invariable in their execution and simple in their terms. The fact that these laws of the universe are simply the modes in which a Divine Will acts, is not only made plain in the volume before us from a metaphysical stand-point, but, as we have shown in a recent article, may be proved from the fact that the order has been repeatedly interrupted, and a new order commenced, in a manner that clearly indicates an intelligent Will, as the cause of the state before and of the state after the change, as well as of the change itself.

So far from keeping out of view his belief in what the Positive School term the childish conception of a personal God, Mr. Peirce acknowledges still further his conviction that the material universe was made for the instruction of man, and was formed with reference to man's intellectual powers. And it is certainly a striking fact in the history of science, that the various departments of human knowledge have advanced, with a pace not only inversely proportioned to their intrinsic difficulty, but in direct proportion to the attention which they would attract from an unlearned eye.

The economical needs of the farmer and the sailor forced the attention of the world, in early ages, to the study of astronomy and of geometry. For centuries these two branches were pursued, and independent progress made in each. The Greek mathematicians pursued the investigation, for example, of the conic sections, altogether independently of any physical considerations. The ellipse was to them a purely theoretical curve, and the immense amount of labor and the wealth of genius bestowed upon the investigation of its properties (an amount and a wealth which few of our contemporaries appreciate) seemed, to the men of that age, to be wasted upon idle speculations. Meanwhile the facts of the planetary positions were more and more carefully studied, and became better and better known, until Kepler grouped all the observed facts under his three simple laws. But in the expression of one of those laws he finds himself obliged to use that very ellipse whose properties had been demonstrated two thousand years before. Galileo at nearly the same time resumed the investigation of the laws of mechanical force, and that, too, without the least reference to the motions of the heavenly spheres. But Newton, taking Galileo's laws, Kepler's laws, and Apollonius's doctrine of the conic sections, combined thus the contributions of two thousand years of mathematical and astronomical study into the one simple law of gravity.

Up to this period, mathematics and astronomy were almost the only natural sciences; and simple as the laws of astronomy are, they had tasked the genius of our race for twenty centuries before they were fully understood. They had fur-

nished a stimulus to mathematical inquiry, and, in return, had rewarded the geometrical student with new facts in astronomy.

And now it seems as though the purpose of the great Teacher of our race in making the heavens conspicuous and glorious were becoming manifest. It would be easy to imagine an earth on which perpetual clouds should by night conceal the starry hosts. But from our earth the stars are brilliantly visible, and the study of their motions has developed mathematical science to a degree that renders it possible for man to investigate the more intricate departments of the physical world; to trace the laws of light, of heat, and of magnetism. The laws of planetary motion, although they required two thousand years of study for their discovery, are simplicity itself in comparison with the intricate laws that govern the motions of these subtile agents. What then shall we say of those geometrical problems which are suggested by the phenomena of organized life? It is certain that everything which is manifested in space and time must be subject to mathematical law; and if we admit, as we are forced to do, the existence of a Being whose wisdom devised and whose will carries into execution the laws of all the physical universe, we must perceive that, in placing us upon this planet, he has given us a virtual command to study all his works, and to discover all their laws which are within the grasp of our understanding. What endless tasks of patient mathematical investigation are to be found in the forms of plants and animals! Agassiz may instinctively seize the form, and reproduce it upon the blackboard, with his magic crayon. But this will not satisfy the soul which feels that there must be, in each form of beauty, a law of formation, capable of being expressed in the language of analysis. The geometer will hold it as a sacred duty not to rest content until he has unfolded, as far as his power permits, the divine symmetry and beauty of the laws which produce the symmetrical and beautiful forms of the organized creation. He feels, so long as flowers and plants are before him, that he has not yet read the most attractive treatises upon his science, contained in the "elder Scripture writ by God's own hand."

Taking this view of the nature of force, — namely, that it is the interpretation which the consciousness of freedom can alone suggest for the phenomena of the universe, — Mr. Peirce must, of course, look for intelligent purpose in every manifestation of force. But he will not look for it as a critic and observer, but as a sympathizing reader. So long as we study anything merely as critics and observers, there is danger lest we fall into a habit of fault-finding. In order to understand any work of art, we must behold it from the same point of view which the artist took. Indeed, we do not fully understand such a work, a play of Shakespeare for example, until we try to construct it for ourselves. Nor does it follow, that, if we succeed in reconstructing it, we are at all equal in genius to Shakespeare. There is no comparison between doing a thing without a model, and copying it from a model. The intellect of him who copies, and even copies well, may be infinitely lower than that of the original artist. No man understands why the plans and persons and details of plot were introduced in a play of Shakespeare, until, educated and inspired by the reading of the play, he endeavors to rewrite it, puts himself into Shakespeare's place, forms the plot, imagines the characters, and tries whether he can develop it with better details, and make the characters act and speak more consistently with their types of human nature. Then will he find out how great a work it is, and how wonderful the genius which has written it in its present form; but in no other way can he attain the highest appreciation of the genius of that master poet of our race. Thus would Mr. Peirce reverently endeavor to form the material world anew, to put himself in the Creator's place, and rewrite the dramas of creation, and of history, well assured that in no other way could he attain such an exalted conception of the Creator's mind, so just an apprehension of the creative plan. Now this, it may be observed, is a larger view than that of Paley, and wider even than that of Agassiz. Paley compares the world to a watch, and says, as the adaptation of the wheels and pinions to each other, and to the main purpose of moving the hands at a given rate, proves the existence of a watchmaker, so the numerous adaptations of means to ends in the physical world

prove the existence of a designing Creator. This is, as we have said in speaking of Agassiz's Contributions to Natural History, a correct formula of logic. The marks of design in the world do prove the existence of a designer. But, says Mr. Peirce, this is not the highest mode of proof, the highest way of approaching the subject. Look at a work of art, the Apollo Belvedere, for example, and we do not find in its connection of parts, and their adaptation to each other, any system of means and ends, or marks of design. Yet upon every limb and feature there are stamped the marks of great intellect, and great power in the sculptor's mind. In the subservience of every part to one æsthetic effect, in the harmonious fitting of all the parts to produce one beautiful whole, there is a higher proof of the action of mind than there would be in any adaptation of parts in a scheme of mere usefulness; and a proof of a higher order of mind. Now there is this subservience of all the parts to one æsthetic effect in the universe. The material world is not only a work of use, of a connection of parts to produce required physical results, but it is a work of art, a magnificent work of art, producing æsthetic effects of the utmost grandeur. When we look at the universe in this light, we shall see that it is more remarkable as a work of intellect, than if we examine it merely with regard to its adaptation to uses, its mechanical connection of causes and effects.

But, continues our author, the universe is not to be regarded merely as a work of art of any kind, either useful or æsthetic, but as a most remarkable philosophical combination of the highest ideas that our intellect can grasp; such a combination as the best mind in its highest state of activity would form, if it were unlimited in power. It is when we look at the universe in this light, not as a creation so much as a development of thought, that it assumes its most wonderful aspect. It is by taking this point of view, that we are enabled to solve some of the most difficult problems which have ever been proposed to the human mind. This is most truly taking the position of the Creator, and endeavoring to create the world anew.

But let us go back for a few moments to Paley's view of the adaptation of means to ends. Maupertuis, in his cele-

brated principle of the least action, has given us the most exhaustive statement from this point of view. It is, says this celebrated philosopher, unworthy of the Divine Mind to suppose it using any more force than is absolutely requisite to fulfil its purposes ; hence, in every operation of nature, we may safely take for granted that there is a minimum expenditure of power. But, inasmuch as grace consists in acting with the least exertion, it follows that every work of nature is the perfection of grace. Thus from an axiom of mechanics, we pass to an axiom of art, that what is natural is most beautiful. In regard to the mechanical axiom, it can be justified by a direct appeal to observation, and to those laws of space and time concerning which there can be no doubt. Maupertuis's principle of least action bears the most rigorous examination, whether from the observations of physical science or from the deductions of mathematics ; but corresponding axioms of optimism in other departments are not capable of such a test. But let the establishment of the principle of least action strengthen the faith of practical men in those truths which to the man of poetic insight need no confirmation, — that what is natural is most beautiful, and that what is natural is, in all instances, what is wisest and best.

It is in the third and fourth volumes of this series that we shall receive the richest suggestions for the theologian's thought. These volumes are to be devoted to topics which have been handled by no other writer than Peirce, — *Analytical Morphology*, upon which he has read papers at several scientific meetings, and *Potential Physics*, upon which he gave a course of lectures for the Smithsonian Institution. *Analytical morphology* treats, by means of the highest calculus, of questions that pertain to form, — to form as adapted to the embodiment of thought, or to the fulfilment of functions. To this department belong those discussions, to which we have often alluded, concerning the forms of organized beings, scarcely a step in which has yet been taken. How rich the promise from this quarter is, may be inferred from the results of the one or two investigations already made. To one of these we have already twice alluded, — the remarkable coincidence between the arrangement of buds on plants, and the order of time in the revolution of

the planets; the same numerical law, expressed geometrically in plants, and algebraically in planets. Another has reference to embryology. Mr. Peirce has shown that the form of a fluid enclosed in a perfectly elastic sack floating in another fluid, can be expressed always by one formula, but will assume four different forms, from a variation of the "constants." And these are the very forms assumed by the embryos of the four branches into which the zoölogist divides the animal world. Is it not an irresistible conclusion, that this algebraic formula was known to the Divine Mind, and that an equivalent formula was actually the thought upon which the animal world was patterned? It does not follow, when we have discovered a formula expressing a natural form, that it was the formula upon which the Divine thought acted, — since we do not know all the formulas which may be made to embrace the same truth, and of course do not know which formula is absolutely the best; but a simple extension of Maupertuis's doctrine gives us assurance that, in the Divine thought, every form must be expressed by the simplest possible formula.

In the volume entitled *Potential Physics*, the author proposes to develop a train of thought which, we suppose, is entirely original with him. How, he asks, should we make a world, if we had no pattern to guide us, and no material out of which to form it, except the power of our own minds? What else could we do than endeavor to clothe each attribute of our thought with power, and to learn in what variety of independent forms we could manifest power? We will, as an example, consider the elements of number, of time and space, and endeavor to put into popular form some of the views of the Smithsonian Lectures, which our author proposes to clothe with scientific language in his volume on *Potential Physics*. How should we combine these simple ideas, of number, space, and time, with the idea of power? How has power been manifested in connection with these ideas in the actual creation? The element of number consists in the power of counting units; the first element of this power is the power of forming units, and of separating the things that we can count. The simplest type of this separation is in chemical differences. If the creation of a world had been intrusted to

us, and we had received no hint from the examination of an existing world, we might have begun by making simply one substance, one set of atoms. But with the combinations of one kind of atoms, it is evident that we could have made but a small variety even of apparent differences. In order to increase the variety, we should have made new substances, and then, by the combination of those originally different substances, we could readily form a great variety of compounds, from a comparatively small number of simple elements. With one unit of hydrogen, and one unit of oxygen, we might form a third compound unit, that would be neither oxygen nor hydrogen, but a new substance. When two units are different and combined, the result is not an enlargement of either unit, but the formation of a new one, a couple. Add to this couple one of the original units, and you evidently have a triplet, an entirely new unit. On taking the couple, and adding the other original unit, you would get a different triplet, a fifth unit, formed from simply two. Thus, with a small number of original units, we might form an almost endless set of combinations, that is, an endless list of new substances. Thus, with a very few original elements, we should be at no loss for a very great variety in the world which we were forming. Now this very simple process is that which was actually employed in nature. When men discovered it, they made a great discovery, which marked the age, and made a new era in science. If a man had created anything in which he had embodied this idea, it would not be considered a great discovery in another man to detect the law by which he had framed it. But this discovery of definite proportions in chemistry was a great discovery, because it proved that the Mind which made the chemical differences of nature had the same perception of the relations of number that we have. This idea of numbers combining to form new units, would lead to other curious results of a somewhat similar kind, such as have been developed in the investigation of the theory of numbers.

Suppose we should combine A and B in such manner that B should always follow A. Suppose, now, we should make another combination, in which B always preceded A. It is

manifest that this might be considered a different substance. Now in nature we actually find that it sometimes is a different substance. A different position of the atoms changes very frequently the chemical character of the substance. This has been particularly noticed in vegetable chemistry; plants, for instance, formed of chemical triplets differ in their botanical character from those formed of doublets; and, what is more precisely to the point, those formed of two triplets are entirely different from those composed of three doublets. Even when the six elements are the same, it makes a difference whether they are arranged in three pairs or in two triplets, — a difference not only in chemical character, but in botanical character. The difference between three times two and twice three is purely an intellectual difference, and yet it leads in vegetable chemistry to a botanical difference. Now we should have made such differences in our creation of a world, for we should not otherwise embody our intellectual conceptions of number; and since we find that it is also so in the universe about us, is not that a proof that the Mind which constructed the universe has the same perception of the law of permutations that we have?

But these permutations would in some cases extend further. The unity of progression is an element of our intellectual action; and if we change the triplet A B C to B C A, the law of progress leads us to make another change to C A B, and then again to A B C. Now this law of alternate generation of one couplet from another, or of three triplets from each other, is found actually embodied in the universe; as is the case in the alternate generation of plants, and of some animals. A seed, says Professor J. D. Dana, produces a bud, a bud a flower, and again a flower a seed. In like manner, there are worms, whose children are an entirely different worm, but their grandchildren are like their grandparents again; and thus these two kinds of worms spring alternately from each other.

How far we might be induced, in our imaginary creation of a world, to extend all these laws of number, it is hard for us to say; but we should, merely from the inherent desire of our minds for unity and correspondence, introduce the same num-

bers into different parts of our creation. Thus, an architect, having introduced certain numbers and proportions into one part of his building, will, simply for the reason that he has introduced them there, use them in every other part of the structure to which they are applicable. And we find that this very thing has been done in the universe, in the correspondence, for example, between the planets and plants. A certain series of numbers not remarkable in themselves, 1, 3, 5, 8, 13, have been introduced into the arrangement of the times of revolution of the planets about the sun; and precisely the same numbers are to be found also in the arrangement of leaves about the stems of plants,—a part of the universe so removed from the planetary arrangement, that there can be no doubt that the correspondence of the astronomical and botanical numbers arose simply from the fact, that it was the same Mind that superintended all the work of creation.

To Pythagoras, who first saw this idea of the embodiment of number in the universe, it seemed as if this were the whole secret of creation; as if from number alone he could form the universe. But we now know that, although a widely pervading and valuable element of thought, it is not the sole key to the mysteries of nature; that, there are other fundamental ideas embodied in the physical world. Such, for instance, is the element of time. How should we introduce this into our proposed creation? What is it in its simplest form? It is partly opposed to number. Number exists in isolation, in separation, in the individuality of parts. But time is conceived of only as continuity, as uniformity, as a perfect connection of parts, indissoluble even by Omnipotence. Now in what way, and under what laws, could we introduce this law of time into the creation? There are but two conceivable modes. One is the necessity of continued progress, of an unceasing flux of all things. The other is, that this progress and flow should be continuous and inseparable, so that the state of to-day shall exactly replace that of yesterday, and be exactly replaced by that of to-morrow,—so that each moment of the flow shall be the precise equivalent for the preceding; in other words, that the effect should be the measure of the

cause, the cause the measure of the effect. Thus the metaphysician has made this the definition of a cause, that it should be an invariable antecedent. This idea of time is thus embodied in the universe, and pervades the whole. But it is not, any more than number, the whole idea. We should, in our creation of a world, naturally have introduced this succession of cause and effect. Constituted as our minds are, we could not have avoided it. We could not have done otherwise than to have made to-day the child of yesterday and the parent of to-morrow,—the effect the measure of the cause, the cause the measure of the effect. Now since we find in the universe this remarkable and beautiful dependence of effect upon cause, we know that the mind of the Deity conceives of time as our finite mind conceives it. Yet those philosophers greatly err, who suppose that cause and effect are all that is to be found in the universe; who think that there is nothing but logic to be consulted in our examination of nature; who think that there is no other way of discovering truth and beauty than by a logical investigation. Invaluable as our powers of logic are, they are among the least of our powers. And if we have found our ideas of number and time embodied in the universe, we shall find here also the highest ideas which we should embody in our imaginary world. Let us, however, dwell for a moment on the mode in which Mr. Peirce would combine the simple idea of space with that of power, in his *Potential Physics*. We cannot, of course, give it in the perfected form in which it may appear in the promised volume, nor even in his own words before the Smithsonian Institute; but only as we have gathered it from the reports of the Institute Lectures, and from papers with which he has favored the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Space differs from time in one important particular; like time, it has continuity, and cannot be conceived of as separated; but, unlike time, its continuity does not depend on progress, its continuity is fixed. A still more important difference between time and space lies in their dimensions. While time flows in but one direction, space extends in all directions. Now in what way should we introduce this ele-

ment of space into our proposed universe? We cannot answer this question without first analyzing our idea of space, that we may attach our idea of power to the parts of our ideas of space. Space has two elements, distance and direction; and its laws must be of two kinds, one depending upon distance, the other upon direction. So far as distance is concerned, there is nothing arbitrary; all is fixed and rigid. But in direction we have an infinite variety among which to choose. In time we can only go up or down the stream, to a later or earlier period. In algebra, therefore, which is the science of time, we can treat only of two directions, the positive and its reverse. Multiplying by a negative multiplier gives, in algebra, a product lying in a direction the reverse of that of the multiplicand. Or to multiply by a negative unit simply reverses the direction of the multiplicand. Multiplying a second time by the negative unit again reverses the direction and makes it positive. A double reversal of direction is simply a restoration to the original direction, and no better or more philosophical explanation can be given of the product of two negatives becoming positive. It is simply a case of the more general law that two negatives are equivalent to an affirmative. But in space we have a greater variety of elements. In reversing the direction of a line, lying, for example, in a horizontal plane, and pointing to the north, we may turn the north end through the east, or through the west, through the zenith, or through the nadir, or through any intermediate point, and still, when the reversal is complete, find the north end pointing south, the south end north. In the change of direction in space, therefore, there is something arbitrary; an infinite variety of paths through which we reach the same point. Therefore, in our proposed creation, while we may clothe the element of distance with invariable laws, the element of direction will always allow opportunity for the exercise of free will. And we shall introduce free agents into our imaginary creation; we must introduce them; since we have will ourselves, we shall not feel satisfied until we have embodied it in our world. Now, how is it in the actual universe? The great powers of gravity and of statical electricity, which act directly upon the ele-

ment of distance through fixed laws, govern the inorganic world; while the element of direction is connected with dynamical electricity, and the chemical forces, through which voluntary motion is produced. All the voluntary motion of animals is effected through forces whose laws are those of direction, rather than those of distance.

A more intricate and curious argument may be drawn from what is called, in mathematics, the imaginary symbol. A negative or minus quantity, in algebra, is properly a period of time, counted in the opposite direction to that which we were before considering. But a straight line may, by virtue of the continuity of space, illustrate a period of time. A motion in the opposite direction upon that line will measure a *minus* in space, just as a mental transfer in the opposite direction through a period of time measures a *minus* in time. Now, let us suppose that, in space, upward is *plus*, and downward *minus*. If we point a rod upward, and then turn it upon its lower end as a pivot, pointing it downward, we have reversed its direction, thus multiplying it by -1 . But if we make the vertical rod horizontal, and then from a horizontal position turn it to that in which it points downward, we have divided the whole motion of reversing into two equal parts. If the whole reversal is a multiplication by -1 , then the changes from vertical to horizontal, and from horizontal to pointing downward, are two equal multiplications, whose product is -1 . Each of these changes through a right angle is therefore a multiplication by $\sqrt{-1}$. Now this quantity, $\sqrt{-1}$, has been called imaginary; and in algebra it is imaginary, because reversal in time cannot be divided into parts. But this symbol, in geometry, as we have seen, signifies a real thing. It simply signifies turning through a right angle. Yet how artificial it appears! We feel that we might introduce it into our creation, but perhaps we should not; it seems to us too complicated a thought. In the real creation, however, it is present; and no man, competent to judge, can dispute its presence. Nothing is more certain than that this most transcendental and mystical conception is actually embodied in the physical universe. When a ray of light passes out of water into air, it is bent from the perpendicular; as is well known by all who

have observed the effect of refraction in looking at things under water. Now, by the law which governs this refraction, there must be an angle at which the ray of light, attempting to pass out of the water, shall neither go out nor go in, nor stay between the two. This is physically impossible. What, then, can be the fate of the ray? We find, by experiment, that in this case it does not come out of the water, but is wholly reflected back into the water. Apparently this is a violation of the law of refraction; but the mathematician, computing more carefully the action of the light, finds a more comprehensive law, whose truth is confirmed by a variety of experiments, both upon reflection and refraction, and upon the curious phenomena of polarization, that singular change which light undergoes, to a greater or less extent, upon being reflected, or being transmitted through certain substances. This law of the mathematician is written in an algebraical formula, which, in the case where the light is totally reflected, becomes for the refracted portion imaginary, that is, it contains $\sqrt{-1}$. But if we interpret the imaginary symbol to signify revolution through a right angle, the formula will lead us to the same result as experiment; showing that the refracted portion is really reflected into the water. This interpretation of the imaginary has, therefore, been adopted by nature, or rather by the Creator of nature. The intellect that made all things views this mystical and abstruse subject in the same manner in which we view it. At least our view of it is comprehended in the view which is the basis of the formation of light.

Every element of human thought will, according to Mr. Peirce, be found somewhere embodied in the manifestations of the Divine thought. The mathematician, when pursuing his wildest views and speculations upon the most abstruse relations of number, time, and space, is actually exploring, in anticipation of the physical inquirer, some part of the material world. Not only does his philosophy lead him to this result, but the history of science confirms it, in many noted instances. The most familiar, and perhaps the most striking instance, is to be found in the doctrine of the conic sections. The Divine Mind was preparing the world, through the speculative researches of the ancients on the conic sections, for the great

physical questions of astronomy, solved during the last two centuries. In like manner, in the time of the Bernouillis and of Newton, there was a great problem of isoperimetry which engaged much of the time and power of those intellectual giants. It was deemed by their contemporaries the wildest dreaming, the vainest waste of strength. Yet now the whole universe is reduced to a problem of isoperimetry. A wild dream of the eighteenth century is the sober mode of exploration of the nineteenth.

There are important consequences to be drawn from this doctrine that every element of our minds is embodied in the creation. Thus, if all the simple intellectual elements are to be found thus clothed in matter, then also, says Mr. Peirce, our ideas of justice shall be found embodied in history. Our highest ideas, not only of justice, but of love, must find their response, their embodiment, in the actually existing universe. In tracing back the introduction of the successive classes of animals, it is evident that they are all united into one system, not by the law of cause and effect, but by a far higher law, that of intellectual design; so that in the first created animal we can see the plan which was to be completed in the creation of man. When the first animal was formed, the idea of man's nature, the idea of placing man upon earth, was in the Creator's mind.

In this earliest period of creation, he adds, was also foreshadowed the embodiment of our highest ideas of justice and of love. Before the earth had a green thing upon its surface, the creation of the solar system and its arrangements contained the ideas, that the earth was to be the abode of intelligent races, of the children of the Creator. The physical world contains in itself a prediction of the intellectual and moral world, and thus foreshadows all that was to be done in accordance with the moral elements of love and justice. From a scientific examination of the world, we should therefore expect to find, in history, a revelation of God's being, — a revelation of the moral law, and the advent of a Redeemer, who should satisfy our highest ideas of justice and love, by revealing to us the conditions of our forgiveness, and appealing to our hearts through the mighty eloquence of suffering goodness.

From science alone, if our science were wide enough to embrace our moral ideas, and read the moral economy of the world, we should expect to find justice and love exhibited in history, in their highest possible form. And we do find this exhibition, in the revelations recorded in history, and especially shown in the words and acts and suffering of the Saviour of men. Without these manifestations of Divine Love, the world would have been but half a world. The plan announced in the formation of the stars and the earth would not have been fulfilled. Our scientific examination of the universe would have pronounced it defective; and we should have felt the great drama of history to be wanting in unity of plot and of character. Just as surely as the embryo contains the perfect animal, and proves that the perfect animal was contemplated by the Mind that formed the embryo, just so surely does the physical world contain the moral, and prove that the builder of the material universe is the same being who formed man in his own likeness, and planted within us those ideas of holiness, justice, and love, which could be realized only by the scenes of Gethsemane and Calvary.

ART. VI.—REVIEW OF CURRENT LITERATURE.

“NEW CHURCH” THEOLOGY.

THERE are certainly some very taking qualities in Mr. James's books. You go over them as you go over a very wet meadow,—stepping from one green tuft to another,—keeping your feet dry while you can find tufts to step upon,—collecting charming flowers, often finer than you can find on the upland,—but often stopping to see where in all creation you shall step next,—and often, indeed, compelled to plunge directly into water, slime, or mud,—and to thank yourself, if not the meadow, if you ever come out at all. In such walking, one never arrives at the point he started for. He is, indeed, very apt to go back to the point he started from,—to give thanks that he comes off so safely as that, and to eschew wet meadows till he has forgotten that experience.

In these regards, indeed in most regards, the new book * is just like the others. There are very good epigrammatic statements in it. But

* Christianity the Logic of Creation.

what connects them together, — whether anything connects them together, indeed, — is hard to say. The title is good, though, it must be confessed, different readers would interpret it in different ways. This is the essential statement of the book regarding Christ: "I mean to say that the birth, life, death, and glorification of Christ spiritually imply that infinite love and wisdom constitute the inmost and inseparable life of man, and will ultimately vindicate their creative presence and power by bringing the most degraded and contemned forms of humanity into rapturous, conscious conjunction with them."

The book accepts throughout, and uses the symbolic language of the Swedenborgian theology. Mr. James's position is of a profound admirer of Swedenborg, who profoundly despises the Swedenborgians. He ranks these with the "spiritual jugglers" of the present day, of whom he says some sharp and clever things.

The main argument of the book seems to be the following. Nature is not absolute, but the outer covering of man's spiritual nature, of universal humanity. Nature is to be seen only in a light superior to her own, and is simply a *mirror* of the Divine Creation. The natural world is only the foundation of, and exists for and through, the spiritual world, or the universal mind of man. Nature can never tell us how things exist in themselves, but only how they appear. Nature is no absolute or positive existence, but only the mere inverse and negative aspect of spirit. "Water is the perfect fusion or union of oxygen and hydrogen, just as the living *me*, the conscious individuality, is the perfect fusion or union of the unitary and universal life." God is incarnate in humanity. He loves human nature, and this manifestation of God in humanity itself is the real creation. Hence creation has but just begun. The strictly human life begins only when the animal and moral ends, and to be man is all that the creative Love and Wisdom desires in its creature. This creation of a Divine natural humanity continually proceeds, and the true theatre of revelation is man's *historic* or really human consciousness. "History means nothing else than the evolution of the distinctive human form, and is the gradual vindication of a Divine natural humanity." Christ brought, for the first time, the infinite creative love into perfect harmony with man. The Divine Incarnation is a universal truth, which, though completely revealed in Christ, is not to be limited to his personality, any more than the external revelation of a truth is to be confounded with its interior substance.

IN further illustration of this argument, we publish, at the writer's request, the following letter from a "Student of Swedenborg," for the benefit of those of our readers who may wish to learn the views of a very respectable branch of the Christian Church on one of the main points of Christian doctrine. It is hardly necessary for us to say that these views are not our own. The Christology here set forth is neither that of the Church, as established by her Councils, nor that of the understanding, but that of a third party, represented in the subjoined communication. Its Christ is not the God-man of genuine orthodoxy, — God united with a man in one person, — but God appearing in the

form of man, and human only (apart from the manifestation) in the sense in which God from everlasting, according to this writer, is human. The doctrine, in short, if we understand it, is essentially the Monophysite faith, which vainly endeavored to establish itself in the Greek Church in the sixth century; or the kindred Monotheletism, which both the Greek and the Latin Churches rejected in the seventh.

We are glad to welcome any reverential setting forth of those analogies of the natural and spiritual worlds, which aid us to apprehend how the Divine Spirit is present everywhere in the hierarchy of nature, and especially in the birth and life of the human soul. But the fallacy of any logical process to make evident the dogmatic proposition here urged will be clear, we think, to the intelligent revision of the writer. To attempt a definition of Divinity by abolishing the *differentia* of humanity, and saying that God is "nothing but infinite Man"; to quote the expression that life and power are "given" to Christ, as an evidence that they are "underived"; and to speak of "discrete degrees" as if they differed in any way except orthographically from "differences in kind," — are examples of a loose style of reasoning, which rather mar than help the true interpreting of those analogies. As to the main point, if the argument for the "Supreme Divinity of Jesus Christ" means anything, it means that his will, affection, thought, were absolutely and personally identical with those of God; that he had no individuality as a man, and no human affection other than the love the Infinite feels for all his offspring; that the volition which prompted a word of sympathy or rebuke, at the very same moment, and in the sphere of the same consciousness, was controlling the movements of the stars and the great courses of Providence. For so stupendous an assumption we need quite a different order of proof from anything here attempted, and a degree of evidence from the nature of the case wholly unattainable.

For Emanuel Swedenborg we have an immense respect, founded chiefly on his skill as engineer, and on two publications, — the *Opera Philosophica et Mineralogica*, and the *Oeconomia Regni Animalis*. Not that we have read these works, but we believe them, on competent authority, to have been valuable contributions in their day to the sum of human knowledge.

Toward the close of his life he occupied himself with seeing and publishing visions. Some of these we have read, and are indebted to for here and there a pregnant hint of spiritual truth. But, on the whole, we doubt if the man who leads that kind of life is the most reliable authority in matters of religion. From all that we know or can venture to guess of the ways of the Most High, we judge that Divine Wisdom reveals itself by quite other methods and instrumentalities.

With the disciples of "The New Church," as they are pleased to call themselves, we desire to stand in friendly relations, as we do with seekers of truth in all directions. Barring the conceit of packed and portable light, which they share, we fear, with most sects, and their eagerness to methodize spirit by framing it in large and small compartments, we know of them only what is kindly and wise, and can

pardon their proneness to trace every rill of truth they encounter to the Swedish tank.

For us, too, the idea of the "New Church" is a great and precious reality. But whether that Church is likely to be bound to the keeping of a sect, whether Swedenborg had any design of founding a sect, and whether his writings and his credit have gained or lost on the whole by sectarian associations, are questions which we cannot at present undertake to decide. — EDITORS.

New Church Unitarianism.

A Letter from a Student of Swedenborg to the Editors of the Christian Examiner.

MESSRS. EDITORS:— Will you allow me to offer, in your pages, a few suggestions, in accordance with the above caption, and for the purpose of cultivating a better acquaintance between two classes of Christians, which, I think, at this day, is demanded for the interests of truth. I am a believer in the "New Church" form of faith, so far as I understand it, concerning the Supreme Divinity of Jesus Christ, as the most essential and vital point of Christianity. But I have been frequently pained at the misconceptions in regard to it, which might, perhaps, be obviated by a simpler and more philosophical presentation of it. I have observed that certain expressions of Swedenborg, taken alone and unexplained, and certain misunderstandings as to the philosophy of this belief, have contributed to perpetuate prejudices where none need exist.

As between Swedenborgians and Unitarians, it is granted that there is but one only God, in one Person. Here is a point of argument, in the outset, very conciliating, it should seem, in any controversy between them. But now the question arises, How can Christ be absolute and supreme in his Divinity? Is he that one God? Is he the Supreme Being, the Infinite One, the Father, &c.?

There is not the slightest objection among Unitarians to acknowledging that God was in Christ, — that the Father was manifested in him, and (with the exception of the merely humanitarian portion of them) manifested differently from any other human manifestation of the Divine. Many of them admit his birth into this world without the instrumentality of a human father. But they will not admit that he was God, the very Divinity, the Father himself, so appearing. Why not? Aside from all Scriptural considerations, I think the most usual objection is, that he appeared in the form of a man; that he was born a child, of a human mother, and grew up gradually to stature and wisdom; and that it is utterly irrational to suppose such a being to be the very God of the universe. Truly, here is a stumbling-block to the natural man, a rock of great offence. But I think it is so only to the natural man. Let us see now if the difficulty is not all in our own minds. We think we are simple sometimes, when we are only superficial, and involved in intricacies which have grown from the mere letter, the mere husk of the Word. What is the difference between Divinity and humanity? We answer, the only difference is the *infinity*, the *perfection*, and the life *underived* of the former. In other

words, God himself is MAN, — infinite and essential Man. Dr. Channing has well said, "Our only idea of God is the idea of our own spiritual nature, perfected and expanded to infinity." Now, why should it be such an insuperable objection to the absolute Divinity of Jesus Christ, that he was such a man? He *ought* to be Man if he is God, if he is Divine, for God himself is nothing but infinite Man. The Lord had indeed, in this world, before his glorification, an imperfect human nature derived from the Virgin Mother, and in *this* humanity was liable to temptations. But as he had no human father, the *inmost* soul of the Lord was Divine and pure from birth; it was the very Divine Essence itself, — Jehovah God, — which was never tempted, and never was anything else than absolute and supreme Divinity.

But, in this sense, is not every man divine? and is not God in every man, as in Christ, the difference being only in degree? Truly, the difference is only in degree, but this matter of degree runs up into a stupendous philosophy. If any man will master Swedenborg's doctrine of degrees, and particularly the distinction between what is termed "Continuous and Discrete Degrees," he will have the whole matter in brief. We cannot undertake to do full justice to the subject here; we simply premise, that in these two kinds of degrees is contained the gist and philosophy of the whole matter.

Let it be admitted, then, that the Deity himself must exist in different and distinct degrees, in his own abstract and vitalizing Essence, independent of any concrete and visible manifestations. If there were not degrees of distinction in the Divine Mind, there could be none in the manifestations of nature. But inasmuch as there are these degrees in nature, they must exist in the Divine Mind. The one is the outbirth of the other. All natural manifestations are but the outbirths and correspondences of the distinct things in the Divinity.

The degrees of which we here speak may be seen in the different kingdoms of nature, — in the mineral, vegetable, animal, human. No one has ever failed to recognize the dividing lines between these several kingdoms, but philosophers have disagreed about the mode and kind of division, and the *modus operandi* of the work of creation. Some contend for a simple continuity of development from mineral into vegetable, into animal, into man, — the ape family being the nearest approximation to the human. Others maintain a distinct line of visible demarcation between the kingdoms, and recognize in the creation of *whole orders at once* a new manifestation of creative power. This last is what we mean by the "discrete degree." It is not a degree of mere continuity, — one thing passing into another, — but a degree signalized by a different and greater separation, a *discontinuance* of the former process, a discrete operation and commencement of something new.

We may assume, then, at least three distinct degrees in the Divine Essence, corresponding to the mineral, vegetable, and animal developments in the kingdom of nature. Now, it is not true, not scientific or philosophical, to say that the mineral kingdom was continued up as high as it could be, and then, by the same continuing process, was

merged into the vegetable; or that the vegetable was continued up as high as it could be, and then, by a continuation of the same process, transmuted into animal. Each of these cases involves a new creation. After reaching the climax of mineral and of vegetable existence, another discrete degree of the Divine Essence was made operative, which took effect and form in the matrices of the mineral, of the vegetable world; and vegetable and animal nature were born into being.

Let it be observed that each of these degrees of the Divine Essence was at first *immanifest* in the pure and spiritual Deity, and then manifest in material nature. Thus that degree of the Divine Spirit which may be called the Divine immanifest mineral essence, was afterwards manifest in visible material nature. And that degree of the Divine Spirit which may be called the Divine immanifest vegetable essence, was afterwards manifest in the natural vegetable world. And so with the animal, and so with the human. But let it be distinctly understood that each of these degrees is discrete, and not simply continuous. They are continuous in one sense, for all of nature had its origin in the Divine Essence, and is an outbirth from that Essence. But we must distinguish between simple continuity and compound or discrete continuity. The degrees within a separate kingdom, or within separate parts of that kingdom, are instances of the simple-continuous; the separate kingdoms themselves are instances of the discrete-continuous.

It is just so with man. He was not developed by mere continuity from the animal kingdom; he is not a mere continuation of the oyster or the ape; but, after the animal kingdom had reached its climax, under the divine creative process, another degree of God's divine life, the yet unmanifested *human* essence, was similarly evolved and incarnated, and God was made manifest in man.

I have used the word *matrices* in the above suggestions. I still adhere to it. I do not pretend, in the account I here give of the origin of man, to say that he originated from the womb of any animal. But I believe the analogy hinted in that phrase to be substantially correct. There are male and female principles and substances even where there is no matter, — even in pure spirit, in God. Now then I say, that somehow the first humanity was from the matrices or *feminine receptivities* of the animal creation before it. The animal kingdom was necessarily previous to the human, as the vegetable was to the animal, and the mineral to the vegetable. The one could not exist before the other. The *feminine principle* in each previous kingdom of nature had to be made the receptacle of a new influx, and the instrument of the succeeding one. Creation is a sexual process throughout, a begetting by Divinity, and a bringing forth of Nature. In God himself we recognize the male and female principles. And the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom, which furnish in humanity the male and female distinctions, have also conferred them upon all other existences. Creation is a *conception and a birth*, and in each of the successive processes of the Divine incarnation in nature, it may be said, with philosophic truth and strictness, that God was the Father, and Nature, in her female departments, was the Mother, of each discrete and distinctive kingdom.

And now, what more was ever claimed for Christ? The miraculous birth ascribed to him is precisely that which we have affirmed of the commencement of each of the great kingdoms of nature, namely, that they severally arose without any natural parentage, except on one side, — that the Divine Creative Spirit was the Father, and Nature the Mother, in all these productions. Christ is, in fact, the next ascension into nature of the Divine Principle. It is the Divine itself, as yet unmanifested in the natural world, coming out by an interior way, and taking conceptive effect and form in the human kingdom, and in the female department of it, and thus, again, God was the Father, and Mary the Mother, of the Divine Man, Christ Jesus!

The simple truth is,* there has been a *constant succession* of "miraculous births," which are capable of being rationalized. And this is the order in which they stand: Mineral, Vegetable, Animal, Human, Divine, — every one of them conceived of God the Father, in the wombs of Nature, and born into the world. Creation has been, from the first, a continual effort to put forth the human form, because God is in that form. This effort is manifest in the most rudimental products of creation, — in the fins of fish, for example, where the five fingers of a man are incipiently shadowed forth. In the higher animals we see more distinctly the approach to the human form. Then man appears, and, lastly, God himself has developed himself, or rather *ultimated* himself in nature, at the summit of all created existence, and above it, inasmuch as the inmost *soul* of the Man Christ Jesus was the pure Divine Essence itself, different from any other man. But how different? Different in nothing, I say, but in the infinity, the perfection, and the life underived. As a seed stops not till it produces a seed, so God ceased not in his divine operations until he unfolded and produced all the Divine qualities, in a perfect GOD-MAN: for as the human being has two natures, spiritual and animal, so Christ had two natures, divine and human.

I trust I have not gone over this matter of the *degrees* of the Divinity to no purpose. The difference between Christ and any other man is only in degree, but the degrees are everything. God himself is nothing but infinite Man, Christ is Man, and man is man. But God and Christ are one as being the essential, creative, underived Essence, and differing only in that Christ was the presentation and embodiment of that Essence to human senses. God and man are one only in the sense that man is a *recipient* of the Divine Life, having the same qualities, but derived and finite. The Lord Jesus Christ had a personal individuality of his own, by which he acted as Deity, and not as man, except in the human nature derived from Mary. God not only dwelt in him, but he was God manifest in the flesh. God himself being nothing but Man, — infinite and essential Man, — Christ is the outward manifestation of that Man; the Divinity brought out to human view; the very Divine Essence itself, in its highest perfection, ultimated to the last natural degree; the Supreme God manifested; not God manifest by

* See "Introduction to the Compendium of Swedenborg's Writings."

a miraculous or ordinary *man* in the flesh, but God himself manifest in the flesh, for the great purposes of human redemption and salvation. Not a second person in a trinity of persons, but the one only Divine Person, who, in himself and in first principles, being for ever invisible and immanifest to all created beings, is yet made visible and manifest in this form of himself which he puts forth to human and angelic vision. In the simple language of the Scriptures, — “No man hath seen God [the great divine immanifest Principle] at any time. Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape. The only begotten Son [called the Son by manifestation and apparent derivation], he hath declared him [or brought him forth to view].” And “he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father.”

Here arises a question as to the *Personality* of God. Although this is not denied in words, it is denied in thought, by many who would be considered sound and faithful in theology. It is sufficient to remark, that God is Love and Wisdom, and these are personal qualities. They do not pertain to things impersonal. It is the difficulty experienced by the finite mind of conceiving the infinite in person, that leads many to deny strict personality in God, as setting limits to the Divine nature. But herein consists the exceeding value and beauty of the divine manifestation in Christ. The truth is, we can never see the infinite but in the finite. And the Substance of Deity cannot exist unorganized, any more than the spirit or soul of man can so exist, or any more than an angel can so exist. Indeed, it is because God is an organic Man, that every man is so. Man is in God's image, in every sense. In saying this, we would not be understood to attribute material shape to God, but still a functional nature and organism. If God had no organism, he could not create man with one. Man is an *outbirth* from that infinite organism, Christ is the *especial*, the very and divine manifestation of God in his own form. We have no ability to see, or even conceive of God, as a Person, out of Christ, or out of that infinite God-Man of which Christ is the finite presentation. Therefore, in condescension, He so manifests himself.

“But do you,” says an objector, “look upon Christ as the Supreme God?” I answer, I look upon him as the *veriest* supreme, in Essence, so presented to us in Form. “What! as your Heavenly Father?” Yes, all of the Father that we can spiritually appreciate or understand. The Father manifested in the Son, if you please, but that Son the very Divine Essence itself. We can, indeed, suffer our natural thoughts and imagination to go *outside* of the Lord Jesus Christ, and to wander through the universe. And we can see the power and wisdom and beauty of the Divinity everywhere. But where to us is the Father, simplest and briefest, and most supremely? In the Son; and that Son the Divine Form itself.

“So round and round we run,
And ever the truth comes uppermost.”

And herein consists the glory of the New Church that is to be. It is not *tri*-personalism, but *uni*-personalism. It presents a distinct image

to the eye of the mind, and is a final resting-place for the unsettled affections, and the universe-traversing thought.

Surely we are to have a New Church, but not a bigoted, sectarian one, nor anything which requires a surrender of our own judgment to the mere *dictum* of Swedenborg. But the Church of the Future shall be one of flowing garments, grand and splendid, full of spiritual things, and composed of all who believe in the Lord and obey his commandments. All its truths shall be set in holy light to the God-given reason; it shall descend with a company of angels, four-square upon the earth, — the Holy City, the New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven.

THE NEW CYCLOPÆDIA.

IN scale of dimensions, it seems to us that the new enterprise of the Messrs. Appleton * is exactly what it should be, — less cumbrous than the noble quartos of the "Britannica" and "Metropolitana," and far more complete than the excellent compends which have so well served us in the past. The work is clearly needed, and the time for it seems well chosen. A glance at the book-lists of the last few years or months shows how much has been done, by special cyclopædias and dictionaries of science and art, to bring the accumulating mass of knowledge into such shape as to make the task a possible one. Here we have promised fifteen volumes of closely packed columns, of clear enough print for easy consultation, and condensed enough to hold a vast amount of matter, — not too bulky for convenient handling, nor small enough to exclude anything of valuable detail. And this is precisely the most desirable pattern for such a work.

We cannot express quite the same satisfaction with all the mechanical details. We assent half unwillingly, if it must be, to the excluding of all pictorial illustration. The common eye craves here and there at least some simple wood-cut, which might tell at a glance more than a column of description. It seems to us, also, that more use might be made of tabular forms of statement, which are so much better than any other way of condensing information for easy reference. The excellent article on *Anthracite* is an exception, on both these points, enjoying an advantage which we are sorry is not shared by many others. As another deficiency to the eye, we regret the absence of paragraphs, or, still better, the use of bold type here and there, to mark the change of topic. Twenty-eight solid columns on *Agriculture* give us a great mass of information, historical, scientific, and practical, without a single break, and with scarcely a clew to guide one to the special point in the extended treatise which he may be in search of. We trust these defects will be remedied as the work goes on.

The great merit of such a work must be, of course, its completeness as a book of reference. This will depend mainly on its faithful use of

* The New American Cyclopædia: a Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by GEORGE RIPLEY and CHARLES A. DANA. Vol. I. A — Araguay. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

existing compends and authorities ; and a fair test will be the absolute number of topics which it treats. In this regard, we believe, the present work challenges comparison with every other. More than two thousand works of reference, we are told, were constantly consulted in its preparation. It comprises more than twenty-five hundred separate heads of information, — in precise numbers we reckon 2,531, — varying from the single-line notice of some obscure Pope to the elaborate historic or scientific memoir. This is more than twice the number in the corresponding portion of the “*Americana*,” and nearly a half more than in the last edition of the “*Conversations-Lexikon*.” In general, a due balance and proportion is kept in the allotment of space. The departments of special fulness are what they should be, — practical science and American history. Thus the longest paper is that on *Agriculture*, which, with those on *Agricultural Chemistry* and *Schools*, would make some seventy-five of our pages ; and next to it, that on *John Adams*, equal to thirty-five. Especially, great attention has been paid to the latest discoveries in Chemistry, Mineralogy, and Natural History. We instance *Aluminium* as of peculiar interest just now. In several cases details are indulged in which belong rather doubtfully to a work of this class, and give it a needlessly technical air. Thus, of the eight columns on *Albuminuria*, at least seven belong to a special medical treatise ; and in a “popular dictionary” *Anthelmintics* is surely a very strange and hard way of spelling *Worms*. On the other hand, *Acclimation*, *Aliment*, *Amputation*, *Antidote*, *Appetite*, are lively, brief, and practical, just what such articles should be. Again, the argument for the use of Anthracite in locomotive steam-engines belongs rather to a pamphlet than a cyclopædia, and must be settled by facts before half the volumes can be published. A slight tendency has been observed, as in the titles *Anger*, *Adverb*, and a few others, to make this a dictionary of words, as well as of facts and things. Still it is better to err on the side of abundance ; and we should not mention these instances, or allude to the excessive length in others, but for the extreme and undue brevity given to a class of articles, of which *Algebra* (one column) and *Analytical Geometry* (a dozen lines) may serve as specimens ; and the danger lest the work may be either marred of its just proportions, or swelled beyond its judicious bounds.

Strict originality of information, or felicities of literary execution, are qualities which we are little accustomed to seek or find in an encyclopædia. Such a work is oftener consulted than read ; and has rather to register decisions than to argue cases or bring fresh ones before the court. It is therefore a special praise, and a merit of supererogation, that this work claims independent value as an authority on many topics that it treats, — we may instance nearly every paper on practical science ; and that many of those on other matters are vivacious and entertaining pieces of literary composition, — for example, the articles *Abduction*, *Actors*, *Adventurers*, and *Agapemone*. Justice is done upon Mark Antony in a very brilliant and striking paper, a model, it seems to us, of its class ; and we do not often meet a completer sketch in its way than the capital one of St. Ambrose, or a finer biographical essay than

that on Allston, or a trying topic better handled than the brief yet full account of Major André. A most valuable and "altogether original feature of the plan" consists in the biographies of living persons, — Abd-el-Kader, and the present sovereigns of Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, occur to us as examples, — written with a singular fulness and freshness of information; together with the ample, friendly, and most interesting sketch of Professor Agassiz. The plurality of articles in such a work is necessarily biographical; and we are glad to note the peculiar excellence of this department. It is an example of praiseworthy care in editing, that in almost every instance (the Antonines are the only exception we remember) the dates of a man's birth and death come together at the beginning of his biography, — a convenience for which every reader will be grateful. In most cases, too, but not always, the characteristic anecdotes of eminent men have been preserved. This is right, however brief the notice. Often, all that time has spared of a man is embalmed in some apothegm or anecdote; and this is just what most readers care most for, and should least of all be lost. We are sorry to miss the two which the early historians were fond of recording of St. Ambrose.

One feature of this work may possibly best fit its purpose as a "popular dictionary," but rather impairs its value and interest for scholars. We look in vain for any hint of the results of literary or historical criticism, which, in the present age, are not only curious, but indispensable, even to the general reader. The uncritical, popular point of view is tacitly assumed, and no allowance made for myth or fable. Antæus is as real a person as Alexander; Achilles and Bronson Alcott are dealt with just alike in calm impartiality; Genesis and Chronicles, Homer, Ovid, Thucydides, Plutarch, and Prescott stand apparently on the same even level of authority. There may be good reason that so unsettled a matter as critical erudition should find no place in such a work. Scepticism or speculation once admitted, it might be hard to define its limits; and in details the simplest course seems safest. But we trust that at least the main results of modern criticism will appear under some appropriate head.

We have given the whole volume a careful attention; and we have remarked the various points of merit in it with no undue praise. The best commendation we can bestow upon the skilful and accomplished editors, is to require a high and strict standard of them. This the public is entitled to expect, as they in turn are entitled to the benefit of the general judgment upon their labors. Such a work, to thousands of readers, will be a substitute for libraries, and not a mere addition to them; and its aim must be, to be a faithful and complete register of the gathered treasures of the human mind hitherto. We think this high aim has been kept steadily in view; and that a work has been begun which eminently deserves the gratitude and support of the American public.

BIOGRAPHY.

WE have already noticed the appearance of Mr. Clapp's "*Sketches and Recollections*,"* and return to it now in order to exhibit more fully the traits which justify the brief judgment we have given. We have characterized the volume as a book of "confidences," — not only from a certain likeness in tone to the volumes with which that name has been associated by Lamartine, but because no other word quite so well expresses the mood of personal sympathy which it presupposes, and is tolerably sure to find or beget, in the reader. It is impossible to quarrel with a book whose temper is throughout that of the most bland and genial optimism. The writer finds not only sermons in stones, but good in everything. A universalism so thorough and sincere as his it is a most rare privilege to find. His incidental notices of other men, — his predecessor, the gifted Larned, who died with a brilliant fame for eloquence at twenty-three; Judah Touro, the munificent Israelite; Stephen Poydras, the New Orleans philanthropist, — all are in one style of warm and grateful eulogy. The climate of Louisiana and the character of its people, the Catholic priests and their influence, men of the world and sceptics whom he encounters in his ministry, the English Abolitionist who listens so courteously to his defence of slavery and the English man of letters who adopts it so warmly, the Bishops of the Establishment and the hospitable firesides of Britain, the French fellow-travellers who are so charmed to find he is not an Englishman, St. Peter's and the Alps, the planters and the lazzaroni, all share in the same benign regard. Never was the world seen so widely with so serene a sympathy. The sea has no terrors, a two months' voyage no weariness. Mr. Clapp "should have been a sailor"; no death seems to him so desirable as to perish in the great waters. The ghastly experience of death-beds so constant as to give him scarce three hours' rest, and of burials so incessant as to keep him worn and hungry in the graveyard till nine at night, do not alter his grateful faith that "death is a dispensation of love." A ten years' study of the Bible, verse by verse, satisfies him that in Scripture, as in nature, there is nothing which, rightly read, militates against this affectionate faith. For man's future upon earth he entertains nothing but the benignest hope; and death, he is sure, is the baptism of the spirit, the great, overwhelming change, which will prepare every human soul for the vaster revelation of life hereafter. Nothing that we remember, from beginning to end of these "confidences," jars this trustful and buoyant equanimity, except the single offence of "political preaching" alone.

To a book of this sunny and unvarying temper, almost any amount of seeming egotism and vanity might be cheerfully pardoned. Now and then a little reticence of personal feeling and personal flattery would have guarded the book from a possible unfavorable criticism; but to us

* *Autobiographical Sketches and Recollections, during a Thirty-five Years' Residence in New Orleans.* By THEODORE CLAPP. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co.

the entire frankness of it has proved winning and pleasant in the end. We feel that we owe to it a good deal that is of real value in the experience and the observation of such a life. No account whatever, for example, that we have seen, of either the physical or moral symptoms of a time of pestilence, at all compares in interest or in harmonious impression with this simple relation of a Christian minister's walk in the midst of it. This, indeed, gives a unique and a very high character to the book. Twenty seasons of epidemic fever, three times aggravated by the terror of deadly cholera, — in one case carrying off a number equal to "one sixth of the people in about twelve days," — are such an experience as few men have survived to record. No wonder his life seemed to him to be preserved by special miracle, amid the contagion of sick-chambers and the pestilential air of death; though he afterwards ascribes the mercy to a benignant law that certain constitutions are invulnerable and exempt from plague. We cannot cite the instances or the results; but we refer to this portion of the book as one which must have a high value to the physician, philosopher, and moralist, as well as lively interest for the general reader.

It is possible that Mr. Clapp may have been led, either by personal feeling or else by a consideration of the public for which he writes, to speak overmuch as an apologist or advocate of the community and institutions among which he has lived. For ourselves we are glad of his defence, and gratefully accept his testimony, so far as it goes. But it would have added to the interest of the book, and very greatly to its value, to have registered some more critical and comprehensive judgment — to which his thirty-five years of service so well entitled him — of a state of society made up of such peculiar elements, and one so remote from the knowledge or understanding of most readers, as fills the brilliant metropolis of the Gulf. Perhaps we should not complain at finding, instead of it, the mellowed and sunny recollections of a life; and we do not charge upon him any lack of insight or fidelity. But the book, though pleasing and persuasive, is less instructive than it might have been. We do not think that all Northern readers are to be presumed full of prejudice and hostility, needing to be propitiated by the presenting of one side only; or that a Southern public would take ungratefully the sterner and sadder lessons (if such there were) which life in a great city must everywhere impress on a thoughtful and Christian man. The autobiography has the air of showing only one side of an able and good man's life. And though we are grateful that it is the sunny side, yet we regret that the opportunity is apparently missed of contributing, as the occasion so fairly offered, to the profounder, if even the sadder, wisdom of the time.

Mr. Clapp's experience as a preacher, and his methods of preparation, justified by his long and high success, as also his remarks on the constitution of Protestant churches, borne out by his wide observation (pp. 241 – 243) of the workings of Romanism, seem to us well worth attending to. We desire to add our cordial expression of honor to his fidelity as a student and a man, in working himself clear of theological trammels, and to the generosity of the public which upheld him so gallantly through

the severe trial of a change of creed. A feature of especial interest and moral beauty is seen, also, in the gradual influence of his pastoral experience among the suffering, tempted, unbelieving, and sinful, to develop the more humane and benignant faith of his riper years. And we close the book, grateful that so valuable and rich a chapter has been added to the literature of the profession he has so faithfully served.

THE long-promised life of Dr. Kane* in one way disappoints our expectation, and in another more than meets it. The materials of biography are but scanty, and the book adds little to that knowledge of the man which a million readers have already got better from his own words. And it is by painful shifts of margin and digressions and correspondence, and a prodigious appendix of obituary honors, that this book is swelled into a tolerable similitude in bulk to the records of which it is the sequel. A more modest volume of half the cost would have been a more useful and fit memorial. In style and spirit it is a capital model of what such a narrative should be, — free, racy, brilliant, with a marked odor of the stump about it, which to our senses is far better than the odor of the lamp. No style could be more fit for the life of varied and singular adventure which it describes. And as the soberer portion of the story comes, it flows in a serious, affectionate, and religious pathos, in admirable keeping with the temper of the heroic yet gentle-hearted explorer.

Such a life outruns the extravagance of fiction. There is nothing better in Tom Brown of Rugby than the fantastic escapades of Kane's wilful boyhood; no accumulation of peril and adventure heaped upon Tom Thurnall of "Two Years Ago," which is not fairly matched in his valiant manhood. A martyr of hopeless malady from the first, each enterprise seems the conquest of an impossibility; yet into very few lives of five and thirty years has been crowded so much of positive activity and result. A complication of heart-complaint and chronic rheumatism cuts asunder the line of college studies, and the young man devotes himself — *consecrates* is hardly too strong a word — to a life of wandering and celibacy, of science and intense outward activity. Getting a nominal connection with the navy, he visits India, China, and the Eastern Archipelago, is nearly stifled in a volcano, and nearly dies of rice-fever. Up the Nile valley, he imminently risks breaking his neck at Thebes, and then falls sick of the plague at Alexandria. Then, after making the tour of Greece on foot, failing (while at London) of an appointment in Luzon, and exploring Germany and Switzerland, he returns and books himself "under orders" for naval service in prospect of the Mexican war; but is sent, sorely against his will, to the African coast, where he visits the king of Dahomey, toils three months as ship's surgeon in the stifling cockpit, and finally is sent home hopelessly sick of coast-fever. Partly recovered, he seeks new hazardous service under government, fights his way to Mexico, is sharply wounded in

* Biography of Elisha Kent Kane. By WILLIAM ELDER. Philadelphia: Childs and Peterson.

saving his prisoners' lives at the risk of his own, and slowly rallies after being given up for dead of typhus. At sea he is wretchedly sea-sick always; and on service in the Mediterranean there comes an attack of lockjaw, "as if every flesh-fibre of my body was a fiddle-string, and some hosts of devils were tuning me up," and he has "no more hope of ever seeing home." And then a voyage to Brazil and a fortnight's respite on the Florida coast are the "isthmus of ease smoothly linking two continents of effort, with the most massive and mountainous before him: he had abandoned himself to his fate as his last disappointment had colored it, and was pleasantly relieving its tediousness with the lyrics of elegant leisure, when, 'in such an hour as he knew not,' it sprang upon him like a strong man armed, and carried him into the field of a conflict fitting his necessities and his life." As blow after blow fell upon him, "he rose out of the wreck resolutely, and retrieved his life, in a strength made his own by holding it in fee of chivalrous service. This is the simple mystery of the man through his whole history."

We are glad to find the memory of Dr. Kane vindicated from the surmise which his narrative here and there suggests, that the sufferings of his last expedition were from any lack of forethought on his part. "It was a perfectly thought-out organization, and a wonderfully endeavored preparation." Wonderful indeed are the details here given of his intense activity in providing for it, checked as he was by chronic illness, the fatigues of lecturing, the unwelcome toils of composition, and the weary waiting upon reluctant Senators. And what a picture of intensity of nervous life is this: "When he had something on hand which must be done to time, — as writing his last book, — he worked till three in the morning, and then took out the tuck of the long constraint and relieved himself of its weariness by a dashing ride of five or six miles, or by cracking his dog-whips in the yard for an hour or two, — whips with lashes from sixteen to thirty-three feet long, which not one man in a thousand could unfold; but he could crack them like a pistol."

The traits of character which made Dr. Kane so rare a model to his young countrymen, — his personal habits, "nice even to daintiness"; his purity from all sensual indulgences, amounting even to "a horror of tobacco in all its forms"; his warm love of home and kindred, his gentle, almost feminine temper, such that, though "not incapable of taking human life for cause requiring it," he could never hunt a wild creature for food without some compunctious pang; and his affectionate trust in a living Providence, — these, as well as his heroic daring and untiring energy, give a particular value and charm to this memoir, which unites the fidelity of a biographer to the affectionate and grateful memory of a friend.

GEOGRAPHY AND TRAVELS.

THE adventurous traveller * whose name of late has become so familiar from his explorations and discoveries in Central Africa, is publishing the record of his wanderings, extending over a period of nearly six

* Barth's Travels in North and Central Africa. Vols. I. and II. New York: Harper and Brothers.

years. Three volumes of the five promised have been published in England, which in the American edition make but two. His protracted absence and silence at one time caused most anxious fears for his safety, and he was even supposed to have perished, adding one more to the long list of martyrs to African research.

Barth is a Prussian, the best years of whose life have been devoted to geographical study, especially of the vast and mysterious continent which has tempted so many adventurous spirits, and hitherto to so little purpose. He informs us that he became intensely interested in the plan of penetrating to Central Africa partly from his classical studies connected with the ancient commercial greatness of Carthage, and even more from his conversations with a Háusa slave in Káf in the regency of Tunis, in regard to Kanó, the great emporium of the heart of Africa, whence commerce radiates in every direction. Barth in 1849 accordingly offered his services to the British government, about to send out an expedition under Mr. Richardson. The offer was accepted, and Barth began his travels from Tunis on the 15th of December, 1849. Mr. Richardson fell a victim to the enterprise in March, 1851, and Barth was left alone to pursue his hazardous journey. Starting from the North he proceeded from the settlements of the Arab and the Berber, the wretched remnants of the great empires of the Middle Age, into a country dotted with magnificent ruins dating from the Roman domination, and then journeyed among the wild and savage tribes of the Taraweh, and afterwards through the negro and half-negro hordes to the borders of the South African nations. Scattered through these immense regions he found the greatest diversities of race, language, religion, and industrial culture. He found it impossible to travel without arms, but necessary to observe the greatest discretion in using them. He tells us that he always endeavored to impress it upon those with whom he came in contact that his mission was one of peace; and so successful was he, that in nearly every village he left firm friends behind him, on whom he could rely in case of a retreat.

It gives us pleasure to find, that, while laying aside his European dress, and adopting one suited to the climate and in conformity to the prejudices of the natives, he did not discard his Christian character. He always avowed and defended his faith against the principles of Islam, and only once in the long course of his wanderings did he find it absolutely necessary to pass for a Moslem, without doing which he could not have reached Timbúktu.

Dr. Barth's Preface is sensibly and modestly written, and the principal merit which he claims for himself is that of having carefully noted the whole configuration of the country, being thus enabled to correct many of the mistakes of former travellers. But to us the most interesting and important of Dr. Barth's labors consists in his discovery of the Benuwé, the eastern branch of the far-famed Niger, which is found to be a stream navigable for more than six hundred miles into the very heart of the country, — a region watered by noble rivers and lakes, and densely grown with the finest timber. It also produces in abundance various kinds of grain, rice, sesamum, ground-nuts, &c., to-

gether with the sugar-cane, cotton, and indigo. The whole of Central Africa, from Bagáirmi on the east to Timbúktu on the west, abounds in these products, while the natives weave their own cotton, and dye their home-made shirts with indigo.

The western branch of the Niger he found obstructed by rapids about three hundred and fifty miles from its mouth, but does not consider them absolutely impassable. Above them the river expands into a noble highway for nearly one thousand miles through a region of inexhaustible fertility. We do not question that eventually these vast tracts will become fully open to the commercial enterprise of the Christian world.

Dr. Barth enjoyed peculiar facilities for becoming thoroughly acquainted with the workings of the slave-trade, with its horrible accompaniments of slave-hunting. While the Southern statesmen and Southern journals are clamoring for the revival of the iniquitous traffic, we have here a picture drawn by an intelligent and impartial eyewitness of the misery caused by it even in its present illegal form, among those otherwise happy, and enjoying a humble, "though not at all a degraded, state of civilization."

The style of the work is too diffuse; the three volumes of the American edition might, without loss of interest, have been compressed into two; but we accept it as one of the most valuable additions to geographical and ethnological knowledge of this century; in its thoroughness and originality presenting a strong contrast to the hurried sketches of "white-kid-glove excursions," erroneously styled travels, of many modern tourists who are silly enough to print their observations.

WHILE the Prussian traveller was pursuing his explorations from the North, a brave and energetic Scottish missionary, with the Bible in one hand and a rifle in the other, was penetrating the unknown regions of the South. Dr. Livingstone's narrative,* aside from its value as a journal of discovery, is one of the most entertaining books of travels that we have met. His course led northward from Cape Colony, first to the Portuguese settlements of Loanda on the west coast, and thence across to the mouth of the river Zambesi, approaching the equator to within about the tenth degree. The most important scientific result of his journey is its testimony to the form of the continent, with the great central basin, which had already been determined by theory. Its most important practical result is the exploration of the Zambesi, which he thinks may be the highway of an important traffic, supplying the world with sugar and cotton in unlimited abundance, and so doing away the commercial justification of slavery. The inhabitants, simple savages as they mostly are, are yet all "fond of agriculture" (p. 521), and take kindly to the tutoring of a more intelligent race (p. 594), to judge from his own influence, which seems to have been most humanely and

* *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa; including a Sketch of Sixteen Years' Residence in the Interior of Africa.* By DAVID LIVINGSTONE. New York: Harper and Brothers.

nobly earned. Neither are they destitute of some highly interesting and curious germs of civilization of their own. They practise inoculation, and even something like vaccination (p. 142); they are shrewd judges of work, and have tools of their own, including a hoe, with handles like a plough (p. 442); they have their own notions, no way absurd, however barren, of a God and a future state (pp. 176, 686); they have well-defined methods of their own of enforcing a rude justice; none of them will attack a church; public opinion is a scourge so powerful among them, that by it they drive a wilful homicide insane (p. 665); a sort of moral police among them seems very effective (p. 552); and they understand well enough the stinginess of travellers who take advantage of their supposed simplicity to insult them with childish gifts (p. 644), though they may be too civil to complain of it. Dr. Livingstone seems to have become strongly attached to these poor barbarians; indeed, he grew so wonted to their tongue, that it was only by effort that he recovered the use of his native English. "Yet," he says, "to endure the dancing, roaring, and singing, the jesting, anecdotes, grumbling, quarrelling, and murdering of these children of nature, seemed more like a severe penance than anything I had before met with in the course of my missionary duties." (p. 246.) "Their disputes are usually conducted with great volubility and noisy swearing, but they generally terminate by both parties bursting into a laugh." (p. 503.) Their fear of white men (too well grounded) is most naïve and ludicrous (p. 502); as also the diversion they find in the grave exercises of religion (p. 175). Still it is an error, thinks Dr. Livingstone, to suppose that the Romish worship has any advantage, even with their untutored minds, over the simpler Protestant form; and his knowledge of them leads him to give the strongest testimony of the indirect value of missions among them, though he severely censures the method of sustaining them (p. 131), and to trust confidently to the effect of civilization and the Bible.

The frequent and intelligent notices of natural history in this volume make not only a very entertaining chapter of themselves, but are a revision of almost all our previous knowledge of these regions. The timidity of the lion, who demeans himself to prey on mice; the prowess of the buffalo, one toss from a bull being enough to "kill the strongest lion that ever breathed" (p. 158); insects that distil from the atmosphere pailfuls of acrid water (p. 452); white ants that swarm from their nest and "unhook their wings" previous to engaging in their terrestrial labors (p. 501); red ants that make incredibly rapid way with all animal remains (p. 467); the horrible fly (tsetse) that stings an ox or horse to death (p. 94); the diseases that afflict wild beasts (p. 150); the bird that serves as guest, guard, and comfort to the buffalo and the rhinoceros (p. 585); the ferocious charge of the elephant, and the roar of an ostrich that cannot be distinguished from a lion's (p. 157); — these are a few points of the diversified and curious picture of this tropic realm, which, if not all quite new, is always first-hand and fresh. Dr. Livingstone is no merciless Nimrod, like Gordon Cumming. There is a touch of fellow-feeling for his fellow-creatures, even when craving

nature drives him to slay them for food. The animal creation is to him a "mantle of happy existence" enveloping the earth; he half sympathizes with the brutes' terror at man, "the horrid animal that disturbs their peace"; and his Christian philosophy finds comfort, from his own experience of being mangled by a lion, in the assurance, that the shock paralyzes the nerves of sensation, so that the victims of the carnivora, once in the fatal grip, feel neither fright nor pain (p. 12).

This volume is another plain testimony to the shocking effect of the slave-trade, and of such degree of servitude as exists among the tribes. We need not enlarge on this testimony, but only refer to it among the tokens of a kindly and just humanity that win our respect and liking. The glimpse we get of the mongrel Portuguese civilization at Loanda, spreading with questionable effect among native or hybrid tribes, makes one of the most curious portions of the book. Though rather bulky, we should hardly know what to spare in it; and though in profession a missionary narrative, it would not be easy to find a volume of travels which is to be more heartily commended to the general reader.

THE latest book of travel which has come to our hand is a beautifully printed English volume, copyrighted in Boston, by O. Prescott Hiller.* It is made up of "Sketches" of noted places in England and Scotland, disquisitions on things literary and social, and the private experiences of the author. We are informed that "these light papers have been written in intervals of relaxation from graver duties and studies." Yet a solemn necessity is upon the author to speak. Compassionate to the spiritual destitution of those "who have not been favored with the same opportunities of visiting spots hallowed by so many golden memories and associations," and "remembering the delight with which he himself once perused works of this character," he now, in his turn, feels it "to be a *kind of duty* to endeavor to communicate a similar gratification to others." These extracts from the Preface give an idea of the style and spirit of Mr. Hiller's book. It consists of ponderous platitudes, ludicrous criticisms, facts borrowed from cyclopædias and guide-books, and fancies, now sublimed into bathos, and now attenuated into twaddle. The first sketch is an imitation of Irving, and we are treated to Mr. Hiller's emotions when he heard the cry of "Land!" after his ocean voyage, with that remarkable sunset, which he describes positively by superlative epithets, and comparatively, by telling us that "I have seldom witnessed a more brilliant sunset"; and to the reverie into which he falls on seeing Liverpool in the evening, in which he is reminded of Romeo and Juliet. Then comes a minute account of Mr. Hiller's expedition to the "home of a poetess," and the blunders which he made in trying to find the house where Mrs. Hemans lived. Of course it is proper here to think of the Ode on the "Pilgrim Fathers," and Mr. Hiller predicts that, "for years and perhaps for ages to come," this poem, set to music by "*Mrs. Brown*," "clothed in fit strains, will

* English and Scottish Sketches. By an American. London. 1857. 16mo. pp. 352.

be heard, on the 22d of December, ascending from all parts of the American continent." In the garden of the house he notices here and there "a brilliant dahlia raising its crimson head, in the midst of other less showy, but not less pretty, daughters of the earth." His interview with the present mistress of the house is not exciting. He asks a few questions, thinks of "The Sunset Tree," takes a sprig of poplar, and then leaves.

Next, we have an abstract of the account of Lindley Murray in the American Encyclopædia, apropos to a visit to his house near York. The remarkable fact is mentioned, that, "from the precepts and example of his parents, Murray imbibed lasting sentiments of morality and religion." Benjamin West comes in for a share of Mr. Hiller's judicious borrowing, though no "pilgrimage to his shrine" is recorded. Next we have a short notice of the tomb of Swedenborg, whose religious views seem to be those of Mr. Hiller. Then we are treated to a statement of reasons why Byron ought not to have a bust in Poet's Corner, along with Ben Jonson, Dryden, and "such as have been an honor to their species." "St. Paul's" pleases this critic, particularly its dingy exterior, though he regrets that it was built "too late."

Mr. Hiller does not like "Nobility," and devotes thirty pages, well spiced by poetical quotations, to an indignant rebuke of aristocracy and aristocratic customs. He ventures the prediction, that, "ere another century has rolled away, a hereditary aristocracy in England will be numbered among the things that were." At Pope's Grotto, he sees a rose-bush, and says aloud to himself, "'T is, indeed, the last rose of summer." Addison's Walk at Oxford suggests some reasons why Mr. Hiller thought at college, and thinks still, that Addison is a "charming writer." He visits the Country Churchyard, and experiences there the proper sensations. The sight of a Sonnet to Channing on the fly-leaf of a volume in the Manchester Library, recalls an interview which he once had with the great American divine, and that leads to a long notice of American authors in England, in which the familiar school-book extracts from Webster's speeches are profusely cited. Mr. Hiller prefers Webster to Burke or Demosthenes. The account of Shakespeare's tomb opens with the singular fact, which Mr. Hiller considers to be "*providential*," that "in visiting remarkable places, in the course of my travels, it has often happened that I reached them just at nightfall." He entered London by lamplight. He first saw Naples by moonlight. The first impression of Niagara was made in the darkness. And he saw Stratford just at dusk. A man that crossed the path just in front of the church he naturally took for the ghost of Shakespeare. In this Shakespeare sketch several notable observations are made. Mr. Hiller's classical sense is scandalized by false quantity of "*Socratem*" in the Latin line below the bust in the church, and he would emend it by substituting "*Sophoclem*," considering Shakespeare rather a Sophocles than a Socrates in genius. He has no doubt that the great poet's brain was "full and round, and developed in every part, for his universality of mind necessitated this." After sending for Irving's "sceptral poker," and suitably marvelling over that "scarred and indented"

piece of steel, he "*flatters himself*" that it has been "treasured up as a precious relic" since it received Irving's "meditative knocks." It is delightful to be assured that Shakespeare was not only Orthodox, but, "on the whole, was, in his own sphere, a man of very estimable character," and that "the two greatest geniuses which England has produced, Shakespeare and Milton, have been on the side of religion, virtue, and good sense." We commend this valuable essay on the great dramatist to Mr. Hudson, Mr. Collier, and all future editors.

The "Times" newspaper Mr. Hiller does not like. He thinks it mean, frivolous, flippant, and about on a par for moral influence with the New York Herald. "Abbey ruins" and "English skies" give him a chance to *ask himself* several questions, which get sentimental answers. The essay on "Anglicisms" successfully shows that the English are greater sinners than the Yankees in the corruption of their common language. Mr. Hiller likes Scotland, the dialect, the wit, the porridge,—all but the whiskey-punch. Wallace, Tannahill, Wilson the ornithologist, Burns, Scott, and Jeffrey are all sketched with discrimination. At Loch Katrine, where they all run up the bank for the best seats in the carriage, he is struck by this new and sad proof of "the miserable selfishness of the human heart." He describes a Scotch election with a quiet amazement that such strange things should be. And he appropriately closes his volume by some magnanimous and condescending remarks as to the forgiving good-will which Americans should return to their former enemies and oppressors. The volume is patriotic, reasonably pious, and very harmless. It lets us into the secret of its author's studies and preferences, literary, social, and astronomical. We are told more than once that Cassiopeia is his "favorite constellation," that Longfellow is his favorite poet, and that he is particularly fond of morality and goodness. We will suggest, however, that this single variation from graver studies and duties is sufficient, and that the public will need no supplement to such sketches of famous places and famous men.

THE last work of Father Huc * is, in many respects, the best fruit of his researches concerning the nations of Central and Eastern Asia. It is a valuable contribution to religious history. Beginning with the legend of St. Thomas as the Apostle to the Indies, which he vindicates by much curious special pleading, (even arguing that Thomas preached in China,) he brings down the narrative to the middle of the seventeenth century, and the safe establishment on the throne of China of the present Tartar dynasty. Most of the facts in his work are taken from the archives of the Roman Church, and especially of the Dominican, Franciscan, and Jesuit brethren, and a considerable part of them have been printed. But never have facts of such interest been brought together in a form so condensed and readable. The

* Christianity in China, Tartary, and Thibet. By M. L'ABBÉ HUC, formerly Missionary Apostolic in China. In two volumes. New York: D. & J. Sadlier. 1857. 12mo. pp. 718.

volume has high literary and artistic, as well as historical merit. It is the fashion, indeed, of our Protestant missionaries, to speak contemptuously of Huc, because he does not rate their services among those heathen nations according to their own estimate; but it is much easier to sneer at his credulity than to disprove his statements. Huc is a Jesuit, and cannot of course be expected to tell the whole truth. But he tells more of the truth than we are likely to get from any other source. If he glorifies the men of his own order, he has good reason for his boasting, for the sacrifices and zeal of the Jesuits in China are the finest monument of modern apostleship.

The discussion of the inscription on stone, found in 1625, at Si-guan Fou, is more ingenious than satisfactory. It certainly proves that some kind of Christianity was known in China as early as the seventh century, and confirms the ancient tradition. But we do not see that it proves that Olopen was a specially Christian missionary, or that the faith of the Lord of Heaven had not already been incorporated into a Pagan religion, and so been brought into China. Voltaire's insinuation that the production of the stone was a "pious fraud," is successfully set aside, and the cumulative proof which M. Huc brings turns the absurdity back upon the sarcastic philosopher.

The story of Prester John, of course, comes in for a passing notice. This fabulous sovereign, according to M. Huc, was a real Tartar prince, of immense wealth, unbounded power, and earnest religious faith; fatally weakened, however, by the Nestorian heresy. It is indeed a drawback upon the pleasure with which M. Huc recites the early triumphs of the Cross in Asia, that these triumphs were of error mingled with the truth; that these wandering hordes received the Gospel under false and soul-destroying forms. Yet he never departs from the style of narrative to take up as a Catholic the tone of invective. He submits with a quiet good-humor to the reproach on the early Christianity of these Eastern nations, sure that by and by the labors and sufferings of the true missionaries of the Church will more than make good this defect, and bring the balance right. In this respect his book is a pleasant contrast to Protestant histories of Romanism, in which the bigotry is rarely kept down. Without positively maintaining that the rites of the heathen religions of Buddh and the Lamas have been borrowed from the Christian rites, M. Huc leaves it to be inferred, by an adroit preparation of facts, that such was the origin of this resemblance between Paganism and Popery, of which Protestants have made such parade. He does not deny the striking similarity between the customs of Buddhist piety and the customs of Catholic altars, but he draws from that fact a quite unusual conclusion, and uses it as an argument for the genuine ritual of the early Church. He is glad, rather than mortified, to find these bowings, crossings, washing of cups, and lighting of candles, among the idolaters, since this proves to him that along with their idolatry they have preserved much of the true religion. Even the moral and religious system of Buddh himself, although it dates from a period long anterior to Christ, seems to him to show that Judaism had penetrated to India, and had

influenced the thoughts and speculations of the Indian philosophers. It is the latent purpose, we say, of these volumes of M. Huc, to show that the divinely appointed religion which the Church holds has in some form and to some degree penetrated all nations almost from the beginning, and has not waited for the missionaries of the thirteenth, sixteenth, or nineteenth century first to fulfil the prophetic word. He does not claim for Ricci, Schall, or D'Andrada, great as their services were, that originality of missionary work which Protestants ascribe to Judson, Poor, and Scudder. He would show that from the first the disciples of Christ have obeyed their Master's command, that they have in no age ceased to obey it, and that even before the time of the Saviour there were propagandists in the world of the religion of Heaven.

If our "Spiritualists" share this broad Catholicism of Father Huc, they will be glad to learn from his pages that the phenomena of "table-turning" were well known among the Tartars of the thirteenth century. The Franciscan ambassador at the court of the Mongol King Mangou was permitted to witness a solemn consultation of the spirits, and to hear with his ears the "raps" upon a "table." Perversely he insists on calling this supernatural soliciting a kind of sorcery. The grand religious debate which took place at the court of this monarch was marked by a fairness very unusual on such occasions. The three judges were a Mussulman, a Buddhist, and a Christian. At the opening of the debate, a decree of the Khan was read, forbidding the orators to say abusive words of each other, or to say anything which might raise a disturbance. A Catholic priest and a Chinese Bonze had the first hearing. After a full argument, the Bonze acknowledged himself vanquished. Then the Nestorian tried it against the Mussulman, but they found their faith *so nearly alike*, that they embraced one another and chanted together the same chant. And at the end, like good fellows, all the assembly, Pagans, Mussulmans, Nestorians, and Catholics, drank together. It is to be lamented that some of our controversies cannot imitate the Asiatic pattern.

We regret that we cannot devote a larger space to volumes so full of instruction and entertainment.

DR. BARCLAY'S work on "the Holy City,"* which has been so long expected, makes at the beginning of the present year its late, but welcome appearance. With all the labor which he has bestowed upon it, the author does not claim that he has made it as complete or accurate as it might have been made; yet his uncommon facilities, his patient investigations, and his excellent plan, are the guaranty of his success. Familiar as we are with works upon Jerusalem, we do not hesitate to say that this is, on the whole, *the best*. Its facts are copious and reliable, its reasonings are candid and earnest even where they are not conclu-

* The City of the Great King, or Jerusalem as it was, as it is, and as it is to be. By J. T. BARCLAY, M. D., Missionary to Jerusalem. Philadelphia: James Challen and Sons. 1858. Royal 8vo. pp. 621.

sive, its arrangement is orderly, and its spirit is reverent without being pietistic. There are some inelegances in style which a nice criticism detects, but these are quite forgotten in the general excellence of the work. The mechanical execution is very fine, both in print and engravings. Most of the last are taken from photographs. The three panoramic views of Jerusalem from the east, north, and west, are as perfect as it is possible for such sketches to be. The chromographs add, by their bright coloring, very much to the effect; and the ground plans are a great assistance in studying the topography of the discussions. No expense has been spared to make the work a standard work, — not merely a book of pleasant reading, but for permanent reference.

We have no space to give even a catalogue of the topics which are treated so fully and carefully in this volume, leaving scarcely anything for future writers. We can only mention the principal discoveries which are announced, and the subjects on which Dr. Barclay gives an opinion different from the opinion commonly received. Under the head of *discoveries*, we may mention the site of Bethphage, — the place of “Ænon, near Salim,” where John baptized, — the “Red Heifer Bridge,” which crossed the Kidron Valley, and connected Moriah with Olivet, — the caverns and quarries under Mount Bezetha, — the substructions in the enclosure of the Temple, which he measured carefully, — and a large number of sites of pools and fountains. Of controverted subjects, he especially discusses the site of the Holy Sepulchre and Calvary, which he locates northeast of the city, in the valley of Kidron, — the valley of Gihon and its pools, which he changes from the west side of Zion to the east side of Akra, — the “Tombs of the Kings,” on which he differs alike from Robinson and from the Catholic tradition, — the position of several of the gates, — the place of Bethesda, and the details of the Temple. His statements and arguments on all these points are well worthy of attention.

Dr. Barclay is at once a physician, an artist, and a preacher, — a volunteer and devoted missionary, whose whole soul is given to the work of converting the Jews in the Holy City, and restoring it to its ancient piety and beauty. His popularity in Jerusalem is confined to no class. He is respected alike by Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and his kindness is known to every American stranger within the gates of Zion. Such a missionary is worth more than any pompous “bishop,” presiding in an empty cathedral.

NEW FRENCH BOOKS.

THE most interesting work which the busy press of Didot has lately issued is an elaborate treatise on the “Basque Country,”* that region of France and Spain which is traversed by the western Pyrenees. Several eminent philologists (a Bonaparte among them) have busied

* *Le Pays Basque, sa Population, sa Langue, ses Mœurs, sa Littérature, et sa Musique.* Par FRANCISQUE MICHEL, Correspondant de l'Institut de France, de l'Académie Impériale de Vienne, de l'Académie Royale des Sciences de Turin, des Sociétés des Antiquaires de Londres et de l'Écosse, etc. Paris: Didot Frères. 1857. 8vo. pp. 548.

themselves with the tongue and manners of this primitive people; but it has been reserved for Michel to make a book on that subject at once scientific and entertaining. It is amazing that he has been able to compress into a single volume such a mass of curious information. He gives an analysis and a key to the language, abundant specimens of the proverbs, an account of the provincial drama, tragedies, comedies, and farces, the games of the people, with special description of the bull-fights; paints for us Basque smugglers, blackguards, and sorceries, fishermen, navigators, and adventurers; descants upon all that is quaint and odd in the national manners; and makes us acquainted with the remarkable poets, orators, preachers, novelists, musical composers, and singers of that secluded region. Such a volume creates the country anew, and is a surprise as great as if one should discover a Tuscany in Calabria, or an Attica in the Caucasus. Brittany, that birthplace of poets and philosophers, has now a rival, and Michel has done for the peasants of the Pyrenees a service as important as Chateaubriand for his countrymen.

The learning and research of this writer are extraordinary. He even quotes from American authorities, and it is pleasant to see the publishing house of our G. P. Putnam mentioned in a note. Greek and Russian references are very frequent. Nevertheless, Michel is very modest, and uses his authorities only to fortify his statements, not to parade his erudition.

M. RÉMUSAT's last philosophical work,* if not his ablest, is certainly his most readable work. As a criticism of the Baconian theory, it is by no means perfect or exhaustive; but as a candid, liberal, and clear exposition of that theory, setting aside all irrelevant details, it is most satisfactory. The sagacious Frenchman is a discriminating eulogist of the father of the Inductive method, separating in his estimate the man from the philosopher. His biographical notice, which fills a third of the volume, while it rescues the memory of Bacon from the unjust stigma of Pope's epigrammatic line, does not conceal or palliate the actual iniquity of the venal Lord Chancellor. Rémusat justifies the sentence of the judge who took bribes, but does not find that he was led by bribery to pervert justice, or that he deserves the name of "the meanest of mankind." His baseness seems worse, only because his genius was so great. He was not more servile or more cowardly than many great men who have escaped such condemnation. The spirit of the age, the needs of a courtier, and the habit of profuse expenditure, furnish ample reason why a lofty virtue might not be expected from one in Bacon's position. M. Rémusat is a strict moralist, but he makes large allowance for circumstances and for temperaments in the application of his moral verdicts. He is not more lenient to the sins of Bacon than to the sins of Abelard, but he tells their extenuation.

In his frequent mention of Bacon's religious principles, M. Rémusat

* Bacon, sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophie, et son Influence jusqu'à nos Jours. Par CHARLES DE RÉMUSAT. Paris: Didier & Co. 8vo. 1857. pp. 480.

shows his own broad religious sympathies. He takes pains to mention that Bacon's mother translated the sermons of Bernard Ochius, a distinguished preacher of the Socinian sect, and intimates that the leanings of the mother may not have been without influence in the training of the son. "It is rare," he remarks, "that *liberty of thought in religion* has not penetrated at some point the education of modern philosophers." He steadily insists that Bacon was a Christian, and that his philosophy is Christian, though he allows that it has not the same starting-point, nor does it lead to the same results, as the creeds of the Church. He admits that the Baconian method has wrought changes in philosophy which orthodoxy condemns; yet he does not condemn these changes. The closing chapters, which treat of the influence of Bacon upon succeeding ages, are masterly in their precision of thought and their breadth of judgment, and show that the French Academician is more than the peer of the Dublin Archbishop.

It is pleasant to know that the party of liberal Christian thinkers have so accomplished a representative of their opinions in the chief city of Catholic Europe. Not accepting the Unitarian name, Rémusat is certainly doing the best Unitarian work.

No French romance since *The Wandering Jew* has excited so much interest, called forth such variety of criticism, and been so universally read, as the singular work of M. Gustave Flaubert.* It is a romance which has nothing romantic about it, neither idea, nor character, nor scene, nor position. Not an individual of the book enlists the sympathies of the reader. All the personages, male or female, are commonplace, and most of them absolutely vulgar. Even the smart sayings, and the "glittering generalities," which usually enliven the pages of French fiction, are here utterly wanting. Judged by the ordinary rules, "*Madame Bovary*" ought to be dull, and a failure. Yet the almost universal verdict has pronounced it a success. Its success may be accounted for by remembering the causes of the success of *Jane Eyre*, to which, in many respects, it has a resemblance. It has the same boldness, fearlessness, and defiance of public opinion, the same honesty of expression, the same clearness of style, — a vocabulary as rich and as choice, a mastery of materials as perfect. Its pictures of life are as faithful and finished, its analyses of character as close and powerful. The provincial manners of Normandy are to the full as rude and disgusting as those of Yorkshire, and the scenery of such villages as "Tostes" and "Yonville" has scarcely any advantage in picturesque beauty over the scenery of the Haworth moors. But the one and the other are glorified by the Dutch accuracy with which they are transferred to the canvas of the novel. M. Flaubert is, in his way, a rival of Teniers and Ostade. Nothing escapes him in a description; and the objects which most writers would reject as superfluous or as repulsive in a graceful story, he makes, by his ingenious handling, to be necessary.

* *Madame Bovary, Mœurs de Province.* Par GUSTAVE FLAUBERT. Paris. 1857. 16mo. 2 vols. pp. 490.

Half the personages are such as Lamartine or Dumas would have never introduced; but these are the very personages which can least be spared.

The novel was commenced in the "Paris Review." But after a few issues it was found to be too frank and too dangerous in its free exposure of provincial morality, and the censors forbade it. Of course it was read all the more, and the fashionable world wondered at the fit of prudery which could proscribe this story of real life, yet allow such fictions as those of Sand, Balzac, and Sue. Its morality, certainly, is not of the Puritan kind, nor is its fastidiousness that of Chateaubriand or St. Pierre. Yet it is quite as decent as many productions which find a place in the "select library" of the Harpers. It is not likely to be translated, chiefly because the best part of it is untranslatable. It would be as hopeless a task to make English out of these singular idioms, as to make French out of the "Pickwick Club." There are hundreds of words in the book which are not to be found in the dictionaries in common use; and this, if nothing else, tempts an impatient reader to fling it aside before he has got through fifty pages.

One of the strange things about this author is, that he can have patience to finish with such care pictures of a life so uninspired, — a country doctor, a stupid priest, a linen-draper, a lame hostler, a foolish law-student, and a sensual squire. The spectacles which he gives are a cattle-show, a cheap opera, the daily trips of a stage-coach, and other equally exciting scenes.

M. DELESSERT'S lively narrative of his journey around the western and southern shores of the Dead Sea* furnishes us with all that is valuable in De Saulcy's much vaunted expedition to the site of the accursed cities. Geography and natural history gained something from that expedition, and the chart of the region is now more accurate than it was as figured by Irby and Mangles. A good many insects were caught and impaled, very numerous specimens of flowers and shrubs were safely boxed, fragments of all kinds of rock and mineral, clay, sulphur, and salt, were carefully preserved, times and distances were noted, and the true place (as M. Delessert thinks) of Sodom, Gomorrah, Seboim, Adamah, and Zoar was fixed and established. In regard to the site of Zoar our author differs from Dr. Robinson. The scientific results of the expedition, nevertheless, hardly pay for the risk and the expense.

The risk of such a journey is very great. There are mountains to be crossed of terrific steepness; precipices which threaten alike those who pass above and those who pass beneath; ravines which are labyrinthine in their windings; a frightful volcanic bog at the end of the sea, three miles in length, which can be traversed only by persevering and desperate flounderings; — scarcely any water to be found, except the bitter slime of fetid pools; a succession of Bedouin tribes, the most rapacious, ferocious, and villanous, to be encountered; poisonous in-

* Voyage aux Villes Maudites. Par EDOUARD DELESSERT. Paris: Librairie Nouvelle. 1857.

sects, scorpions, snakes, and panthers, which infest beds, tents, and culinary stores; the broiling heat of that great natural caldron, which rains down fierce as the fire which the Lord sent upon the cities of the plain, varied by such frequent showers of water as realize the legend of the Noachian deluge; the danger of thirst, starvation, assassination, suffocation, — from treachery, from ambush, from the air, the earth, and the people; — all this may well deter even an enthusiastic naturalist from attempting such a voyage. In the case of M. Delessert and his party, it was accomplished without any serious injury greater than that of severe pecuniary suffering. The helpless party were victimized by the Arab Sheiks in the most distressing manner. Such abominable exactions are rarely recorded in the stories of Arab levies on credulous travellers. The party were only too glad to get away from such expensive hospitality. To be spit upon occasionally was an additional pleasantry which they dared not punish.

M. Delessert has a true French humor, and loses none of the amusing absurdities of the way. He refutes the notion that no living thing is to be seen on the shores of the fatal sea, and represents the frequent oases as luxuriant in their beauty, the grass and reeds as of extraordinary rankness, the waters as vexed by flocks of ducks and smaller birds, and even fruits as not wanting. We have a description of the Jericho rose, with the legend of its opening when placed in the water, however withered it may seem, — of the apples of Sodom, fair without, but ashy within, — of "hasheesh" and its singular effects, as experienced at Jerusalem by a company of jolly Frenchmen, — of the famous salt mountain, where our friend did *not* see the statue of Lot's wife, — of everything, in fact, except the water of the sea itself, which is hardly alluded to. This traveller does not mention that he drank the water, or that he bathed in it.

PASTOR REY* came to America determined to be pleased with everything in this happy land, and he is pleased accordingly. He enjoys what other foreigners abhor, he praises what other foreigners ridicule, and his panegyric upon the temporal and spiritual progress of this latest marvel of Protestant civilization is shaded only by such criticisms as his theological antipathies suggest. It was his fortune, soon after his arrival, to taste the hospitalities of the excellent Dr. Baird; and his estimate of Unitarians and heretics generally may be judged from that early acquaintance. "The Unitarian doctrine" he is pleased to call "the residue, the *caput mortuum* of evaporated Christianity, a philosophic deism, *poor in works*, passive, like Mahometan deism, of which it is the brother." "Christ is to these Unitarians," he remarks, "only an embarrassing teacher, whom they would like to set aside; and they betray their embarrassment by putting him to secondary uses, such as naming churches, which they call 'Church of the Saviour,' 'Church of the Messiah,' &c." He assigns their origin to *worldliness*

L'Amérique Protestante. Notes et Observations d'un Voyageur. Par WILLIAM REY. 2 vols. Paris: Joël Cherbuliez. 1857. 16mo. pp. 704.

and *excessive riches*, and states that aristocracy, and not piety, sustains them. He is glad to learn that their numbers are diminishing, and that the Gospel is gaining ground on this fatal form of heresy. He quotes from a speech of Rev. Charles T. Brooks, to prove that the Unitarians are the natural allies of Mahometans and of the Hindoo Pagans. Their "*works*" he limits to four missionaries, a few agents, and a Quarterly Review. Dr. Channing, he says, has made the fortune of Unitarians in Europe, "*of whom there are an abundance, under the cover of the Established Churches, both Catholic and Protestant.*" We have a pleasing sketch of one of our May "*Collations*," where the nature of the beverage forestalls undue excitement, where laymen make profane jokes about the Lord's Supper, and a brass band plays between the speeches. The Unitarian talk about their *liberality*, he adds, dates from their loss of power. When they were strong, they were most arrogant and exclusive; "the sons tell still what their Evangelical fathers suffered in Boston at the commencement of this century." They have been fortunate, he admits, in inheriting from their Puritan ancestry a good personal morality, and this blessing has been their salvation.

The Genevan Calvinist is not so much troubled, however, by the little handful of heretics, whom he quite forgets when he goes away from Boston, as by the growing force of the Roman Church, which he hates with exemplary hatred. This he considers to be a real source of alarm in a God-fearing land. But even here statistics console him, and he is inclined to think that allied piety will prove more than a match for all the wiles of the mother of harlots. Slavery he regrets; but it is easy to see that his Union-saving and conservative Evangelical friends have assuaged his natural indignation at that sin. He is gentle in his remarks about it, and almost avoids the theme until he comes to his closing summary. He has great confidence in the Gospel, and lauds the Southern Aid Society. It is fortunate that his volumes were published so early in the year 1857 that he has nothing to abate from his admiration of the manner in which the affairs of the great Orthodox associations, the Tract Society, the Sunday-School Union, &c., are managed. He can only marvel at what the Lord enables these noble bodies to do. Occasionally there is a hint that Southern Christianity is not all that it ought to be, for Pastor Rey remembers that the members of Churches sell their Christian brethren, sometimes their actual children, and forbid them to read the Bible. His latent antislavery and his Genevan pride are alike gratified in the thought, that, next to the Bible, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and *D'Aubigné's History of the Reformation* have the largest circulation of any books in the world. We were not quite prepared for one half of this statement.

For a foreigner, Pastor Rey is remarkably accurate in his details of secular affairs, and his criticisms upon men and measures, upon the arts and sciences, are, in the main, just. It is a little curious, indeed, to find a European preferring the Hudson to the Rhine, for the very reason that an American confesses the inferiority of his own river. The Hudson, says our friend, has none of those old ruined castles and convents which disgrace the landscape on the Rhine, reminding the voyager

of barbarism, feudalism, and superstition. He thinks it a great gain to be out of sight of such ugly blots upon creation. All will not consent to his opinion that Mr. Greenough is "the Michel Angelo of America." *Mosquito bars*, that comfort of the West and South in Summer, he pronounces to be an illusion and a cheat, an invention for keeping the mosquitos *in*, instead of keeping them *out*. Though, as "children of Adam," Americans are "sinful to the core," yet he thinks a large part of their actual sin, their drunkenness and their crime, is of foreign importation. At Saratoga, he remarks, the people take such care of the body that it is doubtful there if *the soul really exists*, and it is not fashionable to take account of it. It is a great cross to him that, as a pious man, he cannot drink anything stronger than water in his visits to religious people, and in his travels; but he makes up for it by more diligent smoking. Alas that he had not seasonably met Brother Trask, or read the caution of Justin Edwards, whose name he mentions as one of the great men of America. It occurs to him as odd that so many persons should take iced water along with hot coffee. Private property in pews he does not like, and he argues the question if the Gospel can best be dispensed by that arrangement. His observations on Western manners are edifying.

The finest chapters in the work are those upon Indian Missions, upon the history of religious liberty, and upon "the shades on the picture of American religion." These shades he presents in their order, to the number of nine. The first is, that American ministers *will* "preach politics"; the second, that they take extreme ground on the temperance question; the third is the slavery question; the fourth, the meagre salary paid to ministers; the fifth, the multitude of sects; the sixth, the great number of Wesleyan Methodists, heretics, and fanatics (here he quotes Parsons Cooke, and describes a camp-meeting); the seventh, Episcopacy; the eighth, Catholic immigrants; and the ninth, rationalism. This classification will give an idea of the work as a survey of American religion.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

AMONG new English books, we notice, —

Ogilvie's Imperial Dictionary, English, Technological, and Scientific. 2000 Engravings. 2 vols. pp. 2384. With Supplement, pp. 508. London: Blackie & Son.

Also the Imperial Gazetteer. 2 vols.

A translation of Arago's Biographies of Distinguished Scientific Men. London: Longman.

The third edition, with large additions, of Sir James Stephens's Lectures on the History of France. 2 vols. Same publisher.

Lectures on the Right Use of the Early Fathers, delivered in the University

of Cambridge, by Rev. J. J. Blunt. London: Murray. A theological work of some value, of which a notice will be given in our next number.

A translation of Hegel's Philosophy of History. Bohn.

North America, its Agriculture and Climate; including Canada, the United States, and Cuba. By Robert Russell. Edinburgh: Black.

Travels and Researches in Chaldea and Susiana. By W. Kennett Loftus. London: J. Nisbeth & Co.

Oriental and Western Siberia, being a Narrative of a Seven Years' Residence. By T. W. Atkinson. London: Hunt & Blackett.

Thorndale, or the Conflict of Opinions. By William Smith. Edinburgh: Blackwood.

Works of Dugald Stewart. Edited by Sir W. Hamilton. Vol. X. Being the Memoirs of Stewart. Adam Smith.

An edition of Herodotus is announced, to be edited and annotated by Col. Rawlinson, — a work of high antiquarian and historical interest.

"A Year of Revolution." By Lord Normanby, will be reviewed in our May number.

Cardinal Mai's edition of the Codex Vaticanus, in four volumes, quarto, is announced as ready for sale.

NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

The History and Life of the Reverend John Tauler of Strasbourg; with Twenty-five of his Sermons (Temp. 1340) translated from the German, with additional Notices of Tauler's Life and Times, by Susanna Winkworth; and a Preface by the Rev. Charles Kingsley; with an Introduction by Rev. Roswell D. Hitchcock, D.D. New York: Wiley and Halsted. 8vo. pp. 481. (Antique.)

The Tecnobaptist: a Discourse wherein an honest Baptist, by a Course of Argument to which no honest Baptist can object, is convinced that Infant Christians are proper Subjects of Christian Baptism. By R. B. Mayes. Boston: John Wilson and Son. 12mo. pp. 172. (But not "carnal infants.")

Gathered Lilies; or, Little Children in Heaven. By A. C. Thompson. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 16mo. pp. 59.

SCIENCE, ETC.

The New American Cyclopædia: a Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by George Ripley and Charles A. Dana. Volume I. A — Araguay. New York and London: D. Appleton & Co. 1858. 8vo. pp. 752. (Noticed, p. 301.)

Physical and Celestial Mechanics. Developed in four systems of Analytic Mechanics, Celestial Mechanics, Potential Physics, and Analytic Morphology. I. A System of Analytic Mechanics. By Benjamin Peirce. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 4to. pp. 496. (Reviewed, p. 276.)

Introduction to Structural and Systematic Botany, and Vegetable Physiology, being a fifth and revised edition of the Botanical Text-Book. Illustrated with over thirteen hundred wood-cuts. By Asa Gray, M.D. New York: Ivison and Phinney. 8vo. pp. 555.

The World of Mind. An Elementary Book. By Isaac Taylor. New York: Harper and Brothers. 12mo. pp. 378.

POETRY AND FICTION.

Poems, by Rosa Vertner Johnson. 2d edition. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 334.

Waverley Novels. Household Edition. The Abbot. 2 vols.—Kenilworth, 2 vols.

The Poetical Works of James R. Lowell. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 2 vols. 32mo. (Blue and Gold).

The Lost Daughter, and other Stories of the West. By Mrs. Caroline Lee Hentz. Philadelphia: T. B. Peterson.

Beatrice Cenci: a Tale of the XVIth Century. Translated from the Italian of F. D. Guerrazzi, by Mrs. Watts Sherman. New York: Mason and Brothers. 12mo. (Paper.)

Poems, by Howard H. Caldwell. Boston: Whittemore, Niles, & Hall. 16mo. pp. 134.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Plant-Hunters, or Adventures among the Himalaya Mountains. By Capt. Mayne Reid. With Illustrations. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 353.

Lucy Howard's Journal. By Mrs. L. H. Sigourney. New York: Harper and Brothers. 12mo. pp. 343.

Stories and Legends of Travel and History, for Children. By Grace Greenwood. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 12mo. pp. 290.

The Sisters Abroad; or, An Italian Journey. Boston: Whittemore, Niles, & Hall. 12mo. pp. 267.

European Acquaintance: being Sketches of People in Europe. By J. W. De Forest. New York: Harper and Brothers. 12mo. pp. 276.

Fifteen Years among the Mormons: being the Narrative of Mrs. Mary Ettie V. Smith, by Nelson Winch Green. New York: Charles Scribner. 12mo. pp. 388.

PAMPHLETS.

Woman in her Relations to Liberal Christianity. A Discourse delivered in the Unitarian Church, Charleston, S. C., by Samuel Gilman, D. D., Pastor, on Occasion of the Anniversary of a Female Society. Charleston: Walker, Evans, & Co. pp. 13.

A Report on a Memorial of the Alumni of Dartmouth College, at Boston and the Vicinity, to the Trustees, on Scholarships and Prizes. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. pp. 54.

Second Annual Report of the Trustees of the State Industrial School for Girls at Lancaster, together with the Annual Reports of the Officers of the Institution. Boston: William White. pp. 28.

Sixteenth Annual Report of the Ministry at Large in the City of Providence. By Edwin M. Stone. Providence: Knowles, Anthony, & Co. pp. 28.

The Family Relation as affected by Slavery. American Reform Tract and Book Society. Cincinnati. pp. 24.

The Thirteenth Annual Report of the Ministry at Large in Lowell, to the Lowell Missionary Society. Lowell: S. N. Merrill. pp. 34.

An Abstract of the 33d Annual Report of the American Sunday School Union. Philadelphia. pp. 36.

Mesmerism, Spiritualism, Witchcraft, and Miracle: a Brief Treatise, showing that Mesmerism is a Key which will unlock many Chambers of Mystery. By Allen Putnam. Boston: Bela Marsh. pp. 74.